


UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



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A STUDY OF THE LIBER DE SPIRITU ET ANIMA

Its Doctrine, Sources and Historical Significance

by

Sister Frances Carmel

(Teresa Regan)

A thesis submitted in conformity with the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the University of Toronto

1948

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SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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Its Doctrine, Sources and Historical Significance

PROGRAMME OF THE FINAL ORAL EXAMINATION
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

TERESA REGAN
(Sister Frances Carmel)

by

B.A. (Dalhousie University) 1935

M.A. (University of Toronto) Sister Frances Carmel

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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1948, AT 11:00 A.M.

IN THE SENATE CHAMBER

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THESIS

A Study of The Liber de Spiritu et Anima

(Abstract)

The *Liber De Spiritu et Anima* is a short treatise on Christian psychology, long attributed to St. Augustine, but which is now known to have been composed during the latter half of the twelfth century very probably by Alcher, a Cistercian monk of the Abbey of Clairvaux. Of Alcher's life, very little is known beyond the fact that he lived at Clairvaux under the regime of St. Bernard and his immediate successors and that he enjoyed a certain reputation for his knowledge of the physical sciences. At Alcher's request, Isaac of Stella had written his *Epistola De Anima* which is a series of considerations on the nature of the human soul; it was in reply to this letter that Alcher composed the *De Spiritu et Anima*, a curious compilation in which are summed up and mirrored the principal themes and doctrines about the soul and its faculties developed by Christian thinkers from the time of St. Augustine until the middle of the twelfth century.

In sharp contrast to the apparent neglect of the work among scholars interested in mediaeval learning stand the widespread popularity of the *De Spiritu et Anima* in the early thirteenth century and the considerable influence which it exerted on the more outstanding thinkers of that time. Much of this success, however, was owing to its false attribution to St. Augustine under whose name the treatise was freely circulated and from the prestige of whose "authority" the work derived its strong appeal for Christian thinkers of the period. In their hands, the doctrine of the *De Spiritu et Anima* became a useful weapon with which to combat the novelties of the Aristotelian philosophy which was then being introduced into Christian circles and which was threatening to change the direction of traditional Christian thought. The authenticity of the work, however, was called into question by the adversaries of the Augustinian tradition, notably by St. Thomas Aquinas, who denied its Augustinian origin and rejected its doctrine in no uncertain terms. Thus, it came to pass that the history of its attribution to St. Augustine in the thirteenth century was closely associated with the philosophical controversy then being carried on between the theologians of the Augustinian current and those who inclined to the Aristotelian philosophy. From its position, therefore, within the great struggle between the Franciscans and the Dominicans, rival Schools of thought in the thirteenth century, the doctrine of the *De Spiritu et Anima* assumes historical importance. The present study, it is hoped, will contribute to a fuller appreciation of the significance of the *De Spiritu et Anima* as a factor in the transmission of the doctrine of St. Augustine as well as a crucial moment in the development of mediaeval psychology.

Basically, the author of the *De Spiritu et Anima* is a Christian Platonist who writes in the spirit of St. Augustine. This is manifest in his taking the historic Fall of man as a point of departure in a discussion on the nature of the

human soul. Created in the image and likeness of God, man's soul has been deformed by sin; as a result, the divine likeness has been lost. The image, however, which derives from the nature of the soul as a rational spirit endowed with free-will, remains. Moreover, it is because this image does remain that the lost likeness can be restored to man. In this restoration, according to Alcher, self-knowledge is an essential factor inasmuch as it is the principal means whereby man recognizes the true nature of his soul and its proper dignity as made in the image and likeness of God. Consequently, self-knowledge offers a sure approach to man's knowledge of God, the end to which man must direct the whole of his attention during his earthly life.

The three-fold hierarchy of being—Body, Soul, God—is the metaphysical foundation on which Alcher rests his psychological doctrine as well as his theory of knowledge. Accordingly, his study of the human soul, in the doctrine of the *De Spiritu et Anima*, is begun from the soul's actual existence within the human composite where it stands in natural opposition to the body. Body and soul are conceived in platonic fashion as two wholly disparate things. However, the opposition which Alcher allows between them is such that although they are unlike in nature, still body and soul both derive a mutual benefit from their personal union in man. Between the two substances, the author describes certain relations which ensure the unity of the person and at the same time safeguard the essential superiority of the soul as a spiritual substance. Yet this superiority does not necessarily imply an absolute independence of the body. On the contrary, unlike St. Augustine, the author of the *De Spiritu et Anima* admits a limited dependence of the soul in the sphere of sense perception and lower rational cognition.

Among the several powers of the human soul, Alcher discerns a hierarchy in which the lower powers depend in their functioning on the body which they govern without in any way hindering the efficacy of the higher powers whose activity is spiritual and wholly independent. His division of the soul's powers allows the author of the *De Spiritu et Anima* to complement his Augustinian notion of the superiority of the soul with the Aristotelian theory of sensible knowledge. He accepts the traditional distinction between *science*, a rational cognition of temporal things, and *wisdom*, an intellectual knowledge of spiritual and eternal things. Science and wisdom are two kinds of knowledge which imply a distinction of the cognitive faculty into reason and intelligence. These two powers, though directed to different objects, are not separate faculties; they are rather different aspects of the rational power of the soul which belongs specifically to man. Reason is the power by which the soul descends to things beneath it; intelligence, on the other hand, finds the objects of its knowledge above itself in the world of spirit. Alcher's distinction is clearly analogous to St. Augustine's division of reason as inferior and superior. In the doctrine of the *De Spiritu et Anima*, however, the religious implications of the Augustinian division are subdued and Alcher's distinction is turned in the direction of a theory of knowledge. The difference in treatment is a logical consequence of the relatively more philosophical character of Alcher's inquiry into the nature of the human soul, conditioned, as it is, by a different motive from that which prompts Augustine's search. (After the fashion of Boethius, the author of the *De Spiritu et Anima* superimposes a platonic 'intelligentia' upon a 'ratio' which has both Augustinian and Aristotelian elements; and his theory of knowledge reveals occasional inconsistencies which can be traced to its eclectic character.)

Further evidence of Alcher's departure from the historic Augustine appears in his use of the theory of divine illumination. According to the author of the *De Spiritu et Anima*, direct illumination of the intellect is found only in the attainment of a mystical knowledge which God grants to souls that rise to the plane of contemplation. At this level, Alcher teaches, the highest power of the soul, intelligence, is raised above itself by a divine illuminating grace, so that it becomes in a manner divine. In this instance, the intelligence is "informed from above." Thus deified, in a certain sense, the soul receives the power of a divine vision in which it directly beholds God Himself, the highest possible object of human knowledge. This, of course, is not the doctrinal content nor the doctrinal context of the theory of Divine Illumination as proposed by the

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Bishop of Hippo. On the contrary, for St. Augustine, the illumination has rather to do with the truth of man's judgments. Hence, at the highest level of human knowledge a chasm separates the author of the *De Spiritu et Anima* from the Christian Platonist, St. Augustine. Indeed, the illumination which Alcher describes reveals a certain affinity to a type of aristotelian doctrine developed by the Arabian philosopher, Avicenna, who teaches that man's intellectual knowledge is received from an external source by means of a direct infusion of intelligible forms into his intellect from above. Moreover, the contemplation which Alcher describes is not given indiscriminately to all men. Indeed, it is reached by comparatively few mortals and is the rare privilege accorded to these as a result of a spiritual *ascesis*. The kind of knowledge to which such souls attain is wisdom, and this belongs properly to Divinity. Contemplation can be reached only after a moral purification in which the soul, withdrawing from all attachments to sensible and earthly objects, recollects itself within itself, and, finally, abandons itself in a mystical union with God.

Above this highest philosophical knowledge, or wisdom, Alcher finds another kind of knowledge, one of a mystical sort. This latter is of interest to the philosopher, however, inasmuch as it begins from within the act of reason. Essentially supra-rational in character, this knowledge has three grades. These are manifest in the three activities of mind (*mens*), *cogitatio*, *meditatio* and *contemplatio*, which, in turn, designate the three steps in the mystical ascent of the soul towards God. They reveal the progressive penetration of the inner reality of things by the soul according as *cogitatio* seeks God in the material world, *meditatio* discovers Him within the soul itself, and *contemplatio* knows Him in Himself, supernaturally and intuitively.

Because of its predominantly Augustinian inspiration, the *De Spiritu et Anima* found an easy acceptance among thirteenth century disciples of the Bishop of Hippo. Its doctrine was not purely Augustinian, as has been seen; foreign elements had found their way into its teaching on such points as the nature of the relationship between the body and soul in man, the soul's activity in sensation and rational cognition and the divine illumination of the soul's intellectual powers. Yet these and other accretions reached the thirteenth century under the patronage of St. Augustine's name, and it was precisely in them that "Augustinians" of that period were convinced that they had discovered adequate support for their philosophical arguments against their adversaries in the Aristotelian current. Their implicit trust in the canonical weight of the authority of St. Augustine, however, was soon to be shaken. By denying the authenticity of the work and, therefore, rejecting the truly Augustinian character of its doctrine, St. Thomas cut the ground from under his opponents' feet. His sharp critique of the *De Spiritu et Anima* proved that the philosophical doctrine therein "could be discounted with the same facility as that with which it was written."

Thus, the real importance of the *De Spiritu et Anima* is seen to be derived not at all from its character as a doctrinal work, but rather from its historical location within the thirteenth century struggle between the disciples of a traditional way of thinking and those who inclined more to the newly-acquired teachings of Aristotle. Within the framework of that traditional thought, however, the *De Spiritu et Anima* assumes considerable importance as a decisive factor in the transmission of the thought of St. Augustine to his thirteenth century disciples, as well as in the development of mediaeval psychology.

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Minor Subjects:

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INTRODUCTION

The Liber de Libertate et Alia is a small manual of Christian psychology of which, so far as we know, no previous monographic study has been made. Such an apparent neglect of the work stands in sharp contrast to its importance in respect of the thought of the most outstanding philosophers of the thirteenth century. That the treatise was well known and widely circulated is a fact for which there is substantial proof. Its popularity is witnessed both by the frequent citations of many of the foremost thinkers of the times¹ as well as by the numerous manuscripts which have been handed down from the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.² Much of the success of the work is probably owing to the false attribution to St. Augustine, almost immediately after its appearance. For it was largely the prestige of St. Augustine's "authority" rather than any intrinsic merits of its own that caused the treatise to appeal to Christian thinkers of the period. Whatever be the explanation, the fact of the historical importance of the book in the thirteenth century is incontestable.

It is a fact which historians of the mediæval period freely admit. Gifford praises the work as "a really faithful manual of Augustinian psychology in high favor among the

scholastics."³ Gilson acknowledges it as "an interesting historical document, as being a compilation of numerous opinions about the soul and its faculties, drawn from the Latin sources then available, from Lactantius and Macrobius, even to the twelfth century authors, Hugh of St. Victor and Isaac of Stella."⁴

Now, nothing could have been more precious than just such a collection for writers of the twelfth century whose interest in the soul and its powers is evidenced by their numerous treatises on the subject.⁵ Here, each one could find a psychology to suit his needs. Moreover, such a compilation served as an easy channel through which earlier works in the line of the platonic-augustinian tradition were brought into prominence. Thus, "through the *RIA*, Macrobius' treatment of dreams was passed on to the later period, to John of Rupella, Vincent of Beauvais and Albertus Magnus and, in this way, the influence of Macrobius also became widespread indirectly."⁶ Again, it was through the medium of the *RIA* that Alcinus's psychology was made known to the thirteenth century where it was turned to good account by members of both the franciscan and the dominican schools.⁷ Small wonder, then, that Gilson judges the *RIA* as "a book which is indispensable for the historian of Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great."⁸ The conclusion of Father Lévy is in substantial agreement with this, although he insists, even more specifically, the important place which the *RIA* held in the thirteenth century

struggle between the theologians of the Augustinian current and those who inclined more to the Aristotelian philosophy.⁹

Even beyond the Continent, at Oxford, its influence was not unknown. In the writings of Robert Grosseteste, there are traces of a Neoplatonic-Augustinianism similar to that which characterizes this work. His doctrine of light as the intermediary between the wholly spiritual soul and the wholly wholly material body appears to have been inspired by the

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For two reasons, then, the *De Anima* assumes a considerable importance historically: first, as a mirror or a summary-up of the main themes and doctrines about the soul and its variously classified faculties as they had developed in psychology from St. Augustine until the middle of the twelfth century; and secondly, because of the influence exerted by the work on the thinkers of the thirteenth century. It is precisely the historical importance of the treatise that justifies the undertaking of the present study, and it is likewise this same historical importance that has dictated both the point of view to have adopted and the method we have followed in our study.

The primary purpose of this thesis is to present the *De Anima* as a summary of Christian psychology of the twelfth century, seen, however, against its own historical background. Certain preliminary questions, nevertheless, will need to be

examined first. The problem of the authorship of the *Summa* has long been a vexed one and our first chapter will be devoted to an investigation of it. There are likewise a number of external considerations of a literary nature that demand attention, such as the Cistercian milieu from which the author of the work most certainly came, his characteristic use of sources, etc.; these will form the subject-matter of a second chapter. We shall then be ready in Chapter 3 to undertake an examination and detailed analysis of the doctrinal content of the text and, in Chapter 4, to study, in relation to the doctrine we shall have seen in the previous chapter, the chief sources from which the author has drawn his characteristic conception of the soul. This latter subject will be dealt with in two sections: the first will treat, in broad outline, of the dominant philosophical traditions whence the doctrine was derived; the second will then indicate the lesser influences which, to some extent, altered the general direction of the author's thought so as to bring this doctrine, as a whole, directly into line with the development of the Augustinian tradition such as it appeared in the thirteenth century.

Chapter 1

THE NATURE OF THE GIFT

I

False Attributions

The psychological treatise, Liber de Spiritu et Anima, was composed about 1162.¹¹ Within the following century, both the approximate date of its composition and its author had become unknown. At the beginning of the thirteenth century it was accepted as one of St. Augustine's writings, an opinion to which the Franciscan Masters especially, as Alexander of Hales, John of Rupella and St. Bonaventure firmly adhered. In time, however, its Augustinian origin was seriously questioned. This doubt led to its being attributed to several different authors in turn. Thus, Meyer, in the latest edition of Weber's Grundriss, repeats Meyer's suggestion:

"Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus saw Augustine; Vincent of Beauvais (Spec. Nat. 23, 25; Spec. Mor. 12, 13; Spec. Met. 17, 62) judged both of St. Victor, while Thomas Aquinas (De Anima 12, ad 1a) names simply 'a Cistercian monk' as author, without specifying anybody more definitely."¹²

Dom Tissier, on the other hand, in his catalogue of Cistercian works, is quoted as inclining to the authorship of Isaac of

Stella,¹³ though he has no adequate reason for his assumption.¹⁴ Still more recently, scholars have generally accepted the work as belonging to Alcher of Clairvaux.

A.

History of its Attribution to St. Augustine

Among the several authors to whom the *De Anima* has been variously attributed, St. Augustine holds first place. Why this should be derives partly from the content of the work itself and partly from the circumstances of the times in which it appeared. Insofar as the *De Anima* "illustrates the development of psychology on Augustinian principles as a framework", it could be considered as having come from his pen. Considering the temper of the times in which it was written, there may be at least a modicum of truth in the statement that "in order to assure it a wide circulation, the copyists of the times ascribed it to Augustine."¹⁵

The history of its attribution in the thirteenth century to the Bishop of Siponto is closely associated with the philosophical controversy then being carried on about the simplicity of the soul. Indeed, it was in connection with this particular question that the writing was most frequently invoked.

"The question of authenticity was not asked in the middle ages in any disinterested and disinterested fashion, but was inserted in the struggle between the theologists of the Augustinian current and those who inclined more to the Aristotelian philosophy. The former upheld the authenticity of the *De Anima* and Augustine because of the authority which founded their philosophy, his opinion on the simplicity of the soul in particular." 16

"For St. Augustine...the essential requirement is to describe the structure of the human soul so that it may be revealed as an image of the Trinity. We believe that God is one in three persons; the human soul, therefore, must be one and three in its own manner, and the relation of its essence to its faculties must in some way imitate the relation of the divine unity to the three persons in the Trinity."¹⁷

It is this characteristic which exercised so profound an influence on the Augustinian psychology of the Middle Ages, especially through the intermediary of the Neoplatonist Boetius.¹⁸

It is not surprising, then, to find that those thirteenth century thinkers who favor the absolute simplicity of the soul, wherein no principle distinction is admitted, rely on the authority of St. Augustine and freely quote the PSA.

What may have been the particular contribution of Thomas Gallus, or Thomas of St. Victor as he is sometimes called (d.1246), in this connection, we are not yet in a position to judge although his biographer affirms that

"St. Bonaventure would be able to make precise the same principles of division of the constitution of the soul in its ascent toward God, proposed by Thomas of St. Victor. It does not remain less true that the fundamental doctrines of franciscan spirituality, more, even, that the very soul of the first franciscan school is in germ in this (Thomas') Commentary on Isaiah." ¹⁹

The position of the early franciscan masters, on the other hand, is abundantly clear.²⁰ Throughout his Summa

Theologia, Alexander of Hales (ca.1170 or 1176-1245), Franciscan Master of Theology at the University of Paris, continually refers to Augustine as the author of the *De Anima*. Frequently, we find the expressions: "Item, Augustinus in libro De Spiritu et Anima"; "Arguit Augustinus in libro De Spiritu et Anima"; "Dicit enim Augustinus in libro De Spiritu et Anima". Of the seven definitions of the soul proposed in the beginning of his tract on the rational soul, five are taken from the *De Anima*.²¹ Concerning the question as to whether the powers of the soul are to be called 'parts', Alexander writes: "Dicit enim Augustinus" *Haec essentia anime in sua potentia consistit nec per suas partes dividitur, cum sit simplex et individua...*²² which is an exact quotation from the *De Anima*.²³ Again, when there is question of the unity or the multiplicity of sense, it is Augustinus, through the *De Anima*, which prompts Alexander's solution.²⁴

If it be objected, however, that in spite of this influence from the *De Anima* Alexander admitted in the soul a certain composition of form and spiritual matter²⁵ which destroyed the Augustinian simplicity, we have only reply that the explanation lies in the diverse influences which were at work in the thought of the Master.

"Autant qu'on en veut juger, Alexandre s'inspirait en théologie de la pensée d'Augustin sous la forme qu'elle avait prise chez les Victorins, mais il lui fallait user de ces principes pour résoudre certains des

problèmes qui venaient de surgir depuis qu'on avait découvert Aristote. Si le détail de sa pensée nous échappe, nous pouvons admettre... qu'il a donné son influence réelle au groupe de théologiens franciscains dont l'œuvre devait être d'assimiler le savoir philosophique nouveau à l'aide des principes posés par saint Augustin..." 28

One of the sources of this "new philosophical learning" was the thought of John of Duns Scotus, the immediate successor of Alexander in the chair of theology (d.1293). In fact, Alexander's Summa Theologica owes much to the Summa de Anima of John, which Ictin indicates was one of its sources.²⁹ That being so, the question of the composition of the soul in Alexander's doctrine appears in a new light, since John's own psychology had already shown certain definite Aristotelian tendencies.

"En psychologie, le maître reste fidèle aux théories augustiniennes telles qu'on les trouve chez Albert le Grand et Clairvaux, mais il essaie d'y adapter des formules et des doctrines aristotéliciennes..." 30

John's solution of the problem of the composition of the soul had, in its turn, been inspired by the famous "Bisarius" of Philip the Chancellor with whose doctrine he was thoroughly acquainted. 31 The original distinction between physical composition, into matter and form, and metaphysical composition, into the principles 'id quod est' and 'id quo est', which Philip had introduced, was adopted by John and given as ever further impulse in the direction of Aristotle when he identified the composing elements of the metaphysical composition with essence and existence. Essence and existence here, however, are

to be understood in the light of an Aristotle interpreted in an Avicennian sense. The essence, by which a thing is what it is, 'id quo est', is the form or perfection conferred on an already existing subject, 'id quod est' when the latter has been properly disposed to receive it. Between the two components there is no real distinction, for the 'id quod est' is simply the subject or being which received the form or perfection by which it is what it is, 'id quo est', in such a manner that there is constituted a simple being which has a metaphysical composition but no physical composition of matter and form whatsoever.³⁰ When applied to the soul, this doctrine led to the development of John's final position wherein he denied that the soul was composed of matter and form, yet held that it was metaphysically composed of essence and existence.³¹ A similar doctrine was to be taught by Albert the Great and St. Thomas - but to discuss it further is beyond the scope of our immediate work.³²

Like his master, John of Capella was thoroughly imbued with the principles of Augustinianism; consequently, he suffers no doubts as to the authenticity of the *Enn.* Throughout his treatise, the *Summa de nigra*, he is convinced that he quotes Augustine as often as he touches the *Enn.*, which he does with perfect freedom.

³⁰Derjenige aber, auf den John de la Rochelle vor allem abstellt, ist Augustinus. Seine Autorität, die er in Vergleich zu anderen unerschütterlich häufig heranzieht - im ganzen etwa 134 mal - die oft auf ein und denselben Satz mehr und mehr, ja noch bis 11-fach wiederkehrt, hat, was vor allem von besonderer Bedeutung ist, in allen

wichtigsten Fragen entscheidenden und ausschließenden Wert... wiederholt zitiert er das pseudo-Augustinische Werk *De Anima et Spiritu*, das er wie die meisten seiner Zeitgenossen...den Hl. Augustin zuschrieb..." 33

In some places, his borrowing is so direct that the text of the *Summa de Anima* becomes simply a transcription of the DAA. Thus, in the second half of his treatise, which deals with the powers of the soul, John's classification of the faculties perfectly parallels that of the DAA.³⁴ Elsewhere, the Augustinian division of reason into superior, whose object is wisdom, and inferior, which treats of prudence, and the inclusion of both these within the mind, is adopted by John almost word for word from the DAA.³⁵

Following the tradition of his Franciscan predecessors, St. Bonaventure, (1221-74) likewise believes that the DAA is a genuine work of St. Augustine, in whose authority he places so much confidence. "Ut sic intelligenda sunt verba... et verba etiam augustini in libro de anima et spiritu, qui dicunt..."³⁴ On another occasion, he writes:

"Doctores autem theologici dicunt...sicut augustinus, ubi de hac materia loquitur, insinuat expresse (inter alios DAA 15)...ut hoc idem valde est rationabile, ponere in homine unam substantiam perfectiorem quae det ei vitam et sensum et intellectum. Propter quod notandum quod 'sensualitas' tribus modis accipitur. Uno modo...et hoc modo accipitur in libro de spiritu et anima, decimo quarto capitulo, ubi dicitur: 'Anima quae vere est spiritus, et caro, quae vere est corpus, in suis extremitatibus facile junguntur, id est, in phantastice animae, quod corpus non est sed sielle corpori, et sensualitate carnis, quae fere spiritus est...' 35

Further, the six degrees of the soul's ascent towards God, whereby St. Bonaventure designates the functions or 'aspects' of reason, correspond so closely to the classification of the faculties of the soul as given in the ISA,³⁹ that one cannot but discover there a direct influence.⁴⁰

"Juxta igitur sex gradus ascensionis in leum sex sunt gradus potentiarum animae, per quos ascendimus ab inferioribus ad summa, ab exterioribus ad interna, a temporibus ad aeterna, scilicet, sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia et apex mentis..."⁴⁰

Thus, the Hierarchic Sector does not share the opinion that the ISA is apocryphal.⁴¹ Until, when writing his Commentary on the Sentences, about 1233-1234, he appears to be aware of a doubt, in certain quarters, as to its authenticity. For, when attempting to prove the essential unity of the powers of the soul, he writes:

"Et hoc confirmare nituntur per Augustinum, in libro de Anima et Spiritu ubi videtur hoc expresse dicere et sentire. Et si tu dicis quod liber iste non est Augustini, per hoc non evaditur, quia hoc ipsum in libro de Trinitate dicit de potentiis animae, quod 'sunt una essentia, una vita...' "⁴²

Somewhat farther along he continues:

"Ex ipso verbo beati Augustini colligitur, quod cum dixit memoriam, intelligit rem et verum. Sed una esse essentiam, non dixit per omnimodam identificationem, sed per quandam intrinsecam coherentionem. Et hunc modum loquendi credendum est habuisse auctorem libri de Anima et Spiritu, sive fuerit Augustinus, sive alius..."⁴³

It was, in fact, shortly before this time that the authenticity of the ISA was first called in question by

St. Albert. In his earlier writing, the *Summa de Creaturis* (ca. 1240-41- or 43?), the Dominican Master does not hesitate to quote Augustine as author of the treatise. "Hic ergo Augustinus in libro De Spiritu et Anima quod unum est substantia rationis particeps, respondendo corpori accommodata..."⁴⁴ and once more, "Augustinus enim in libro De Spiritu et Anima distinguit inter vim et potentiam dicens..."⁴⁵

In his Commentary on the Sentences, however, written a few years later,⁴⁶ (1246-49), Albert denies its Augustinian origin in favor of a certain "William, a Cistercian".... quod de libro De Spiritu et Anima dicitur, negari potest quod non est Augustini, sed cujusdam Guillelmi cisterciensis qui multa falsa dixit....⁴⁷ and immediately after, he confirms this denial, "...et hoc a nullo auctore libetur omnino, nisi ab eo libro qui falso describitur Augustini, si dicitur De Spiritu et Anima..."⁴⁸

A possible reason for Albert's rejection is offered in the *Isagoge in Libros De Anima*, finished before 1251-57, and erroneously included among his works.⁴⁹ Here, on the very same question of the essential unity of the powers of the soul with its substance, there is a striking similarity between the author's reasoning and that of St. Bonaventure.⁵⁰ The former states very explicitly that certain thinkers do not accept the authorship of Augustine for the text since the latter side

no mention of the work in his *Retractiones*. These writers, consequently, deny any weight to the arguments of their opponents who rely exclusively on the authority of the *Historia* of *Albert*.

"...Et sic colligitur (potentia animae esse idea quod ipsa anima) sicut habent pro se, illud scilicet quod beatus Augustinus dicit in libro de divinitu et anima, quod anima est esse potentiae; idem enim hoc dicit ibi. Sed alii dicunt quod Augustinus non composuit hunc librum; et ratio est quia in libro *Retractionum*, ubi enumerat omnes libros suos, nihil est de illo." 51

But however much the *Isagoge* may coincide with the thought of St. Albert, still we cannot legitimately draw any conclusions from the text, since the work is not a genuine work of the saint.

It would appear, then that St. Bonaventure and some other anonymous author, whose doctrine is conspicuously like St. Albert's, are conscious of a definite opposition to the authenticity of the *ISA*. This opposition is levied with particular directness against the central issue of the simplicity of the soul. For, once the canonical authority of Augustine had been disproven, the whole of the Augustinian position would thereby be imperilled.

For is it difficult to identify the leaders of the opposition, the "alii" who reject the Augustinian authority of the *ISA*. Foremost among the partisans of the contrary tradition, who were disposed to accept the "Aristotelian novelties", was Thomas Aquinas. In the Fourth Book of his Commentary on the

sentences, composed about 1554-56, Aquinas refuses to give the weight of Augustine's authority on the grounds that its true authorship was seriously in doubt.

"Liber ille creditur a multis esse Augustini; dicitur enim fuisse eiusdem cisterciensis qui cum a dictis Augustini compilavit et quendam de se addidit. Unde quod scriptum est, pro auctoritate habendum non est..."⁵²

Hence, according to the language of the times,⁵³ the work may be freely discussed and its doctrine even rejected. Ambiguous passages, which leave no doubt as to the mind of the compiler, are likewise found in several of the *Questiones disputatae* (1256-72) where the text becomes as explicit as possible against the authenticity of the work.

"Liber de spiritu et anima non creditur esse Augustini..."⁵⁴ "Liber ille non est Augustini, nec oportet eum in auctoritate accipere."⁵⁵ "Liber ille, cum non sit Augustini, non habet in his necessitates ut ejus auctoritates recipiamus..."⁵⁶ "Liber iste, de spiritu et anima, non est Augustini, sed dicitur ejusdem cisterciensis Palensis; nec est curandum de his quae in eo dicuntur..."⁵⁷

As to the true author of the treatise, St. Thomas is very reserved; the true author is unknown... "Liber de spiritu et anima est apocryphus, cum ejus auctor ignoscatur..."⁵⁸, but he claims simply that it belongs to 'someone else' without trying to name anyone more definitely.⁵⁹

To have, here, the definitive opinion of Aquinas on the inauthenticity of the *MA*. His insistence, as every suggests,⁶⁰ may be explained by the psychological subjects

treated in the Disputed Questions, which, historically, were linked with the long controversy being carried between the Augustinians and the Aristotelians. In any case, it is significant that in his later writings, e.g. the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas employs only the latter and I remark: "...sicut dicitur in libro de Spiritu et Verbo" and "quod ibi scriptum est."⁶¹

The partisans of Augustine, however, in spite of the opposition of St. Albert and, more particularly, of St. Thomas Aquinas, continued to regard the text as authentic, as the manuscriptal tradition advised. Albert points out that the evidence in favor of Augustine is actually overwhelming.⁶² So that, in the older editions of his works, the Prologus came to be published under the writings of the Bishop of Hippo. Among these older editions was that prepared by the Benedictine monks of St. Maur. It is this latter which was incorporated by Migne in his later edition as found in the Index of Migne, where the Prologus is included in the sixth volume of the works of St. Augustine. The editors, however, in a prefatory notice, make it clear that they are in no doubt as to the apocryphal character of the Prologus.⁶³

B.

Examination of Claims to authorship

The various claims, then, which have made the question of authorship such a vexatious one must be examined. First, the fact cannot possibly have been the work of Augustine, inasmuch as many passages from several authors who lived centuries after the Bishop of Hippo are quoted in the treatise. There are extracts from Basilides,⁸⁴ who lived after Augustine by about two hundred years; from St. Isidore,⁸⁵ who wrote in the early twelfth century, and several others. Thus, the internal evidence of the work itself, namely the frequent citation of authors from works of authors who lived only long after the death of St. Augustine, leaves beyond all question that the latter did not write the treatise, and further places the external evidence furnished by the various manuscriptal traditions of its authorship (which - I repeat - which itself offers a probable explanation.⁸⁶

For quite a similar reason is the origin of ^{that} the treatise not ascribed by Louis of St. Victor. Although it was circulated among his works, there is evidence to the effect that the four books of his De Anima, the quantity of which authorship is no greater than the quantity of the treatise. Several sentences have been lifted from various other works of Louis and have been inserted in the treatise, where they have conferred a

charge of sending in the new contract, although they were quoted word for word. Furthermore, passages from Isaac of Stella's letters appear in our compilation, yet, the date for their use is written until after August's death.⁶⁷ Now, 1942, could they have existed?

Don Visier's claim, that the Isaac of Stella as author is included and entirely established, according to the authors of the Histoire Littéraire.⁶⁸ In the Vistorsien catalogue, Visier includes the treatise in entirely after the Historia de Isaac of Stella with the Israel line: "Isaacus b. Isaac abbas de Stella, cum ut ipse inscribere placuit, Alchiri de Isaac liber, quia hic est auctor the work belonged to Isaac."⁶⁹ Alchirrieder points out, however, that Visier himself was not fully convinced of Isaac's authorship but wavered between Isaac and Alchir. The second part of the introductory notice, which Visier had seen somewhere in his journey through libraries is the cause of his wavering.

"Isaac nennt ja seinen Vorgesetzten ausdrücklich 'Alchir' und Visier hat die genannte Überschrift irgendwo auf seinen Reisen in die willkürlichen Stellen, 'Alchiri de Isaac liber' wasit er selber nichts annehmen gewusst hat, daher er zwischen Isaac und Isaac reschreibt hat..."⁷⁰

Of the several authors to whom the work has been assigned, only the original claim, that it may have derived from a Vistorsien monastery, remains. It is moreover, this claim

which later scholars have come to modify and define more precisely, and which find acceptance today among most scholars from whose enquiries the anonymous "Clairvaux" presumably revealed himself in the person of Alcher, a monk of the Abbey of Clairvaux.

II

Probable Authorship of Alcher of Clairvaux

In the absence of any definitive proofs as to the authorship of the *AAA*, the balance of evidence favors Alcher whom we accept as the most likely candidate. The reasons alleged to the contrary, while true in themselves, appear somewhat too remote from the work itself to weigh very heavily against the more solid facts presented by the coincidences between Isaac's *De laing* and the *AAA*.⁷¹ The objection based by the manuscript evidence may be answered adequately by the derivative character of the greater number of them; of those which may be exemplars, we have seen that the autenticity has already been called in question by the motives of the scribes who copied them.⁷² Such evidence, therefore, can prove nothing about the true author of the *AAA*, but merely confirms the excellent and authority with which the works of St. Bernard were invested at that time.⁷³

A.

Consensus of Opinion

Most scholars today agree in naming Alcher as the author of the LBA. The editors of the Histoire littéraire de la France⁷⁴ and the Benedictine publishers of the works of St. Augustine⁷⁵ judged the work to belong to Alcher, and offered such compelling reasons for the opinion that various students, such as Werner⁷⁶ and Elienstater⁷⁷ accept them and signify their agreement. Latterly, historians in general share the agreement as to the true author. Both Ceyer and Grabmann agree in naming "Alcher of Clairvaux as author of the pseudo-augustinian tractate, LBA"⁷⁸, while Gilson simply remarks, "Comme l'en admet communément, le LBA est l'œuvre d'Alcher de Clairvaux."⁷⁹

B.

Alcher of Clairvaux

Of the proposed author, Alcher, we know almost nothing. The few biographical details we do have are drawn chiefly from the letter which Isaac of Stella wrote to Alcher. They do little more than locate Alcher within the current of twelfth century mysticism as it was introduced by St. Bernard. In his title, "ad quemdam familiarem", Isaac intimates that Alcher

was a member of the same religious community -- himself. From this, his Cistercian origin as well as the time to which he belongs can be deduced. He was a contemporary of Isaac who died in 1169. A sketch of his character is revealed in the "*vir studiosus discendi*", which is more than amply borne out by the known acquaintance which the man shows with the writings of the Latin fathers and other learned men. In agreement with this, the Historiae litterariae describes Aicher as a Cistercian monk of the Abbey of Clairvaux, "who cultivated learning and holiness under the direction of St. Bernard and his two immediate successors, Fastredus and Geoffrey." Besides his holiness and the sacred learning in which he excelled, Aicher seems to have enjoyed a certain reputation for scientific learning. From Isaac, we hear of his knowledge of medicine, "*Amicus in physica*", a fact which is attested by the several portions of the work which relate to the composition of the human body and the organization of its various parts. In short, Aicher appears to have been a monk who was equally well-versed in the sacred sciences and the profane.¹

Since it is from the extant correspondence of these two men that much of our knowledge of Aicher is derived, as well as our proofs for his authorship of the work, it seems advisable to establish, however briefly, the relations existing between them.

Alcher's Relationship with Isaac of Stella

The exact date of Isaac's birth is not known. According to Huet, he was born in England about the beginning of the twelfth century. He received a good education in literature, philosophy and theology, and was probably a cleric at the court of Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury. Here he came into contact with John of Salisbury, Thomas Becket and John of Salisbury. In 1145, he left England and went to France, where he shortly afterwards entered the Order of Cîteaux. Later, in 1147, he was appointed abbot of the foundation at Stella in the diocese of Poitiers; three years after, he went as abbot to the island of Ré, but he remained there only a short time before returning to Stella, where he died in 1163. Of his learning, we are told that

"He had gained his knowledge of Latin literature, philosophy and theology in the English schools and had listened to the best famous teachers in France probably only for a short time." 62

Both Isaac and Alcher, therefore, were religious following the Cistercian rule of life, the one in the office of superior, the other as a simple monk. From the letter of Isaac, 'Amplius quoniam familiaris sum, et scio', 63 we learn that Alcher had been present at a conference where Isaac was discussing the question of the soul. The topic was of such

interest to Acker that he brought the matter to critique his discourses - even by letter⁵⁴ - and to explain for him the nature of the soul, not in any theological fashion; but rather from the viewpoint of its essential being, its relation to the body, and the mode of its union with and separation from the same. It is a metaphysical explanation of the soul and its powers which Acker desired - a task for which Isaac confessed he did not feel qualified.⁵⁵

So insistent, however, was the demand of Acker that Isaac finally addressed to him a letter, the De Anima,⁵⁶ which is a veritable treatise on the human soul and the classification of its faculties. The disagreements of Acker regarding the union of the soul and the body in man and the possibility of uniting two disparate substances set the outline for much of Isaac's epistle.

He believes that there are three realities, body, soul and God; of none of these do we know the essence; but we know body less than soul and soul, less than God.⁵⁷ As it stands in God's image, the soul has been called a "similitudo corporis".⁵⁸ Located between God and body, it has something of each and, from its central position, it may be said to have a lowest, a middle and a highest part.⁵⁹ The lowest part of the soul (imagination) is joined with the highest part of the body (sensitivity); and the highest part of the soul (intelligence)

...where, far from confounding the two substances which compose human nature, the author tries to point out their essential distinctness and the decided separation between the activity and destiny proper to each.

It is a fact worthy of note that twice in the *De* the author took the occasion to speak of the structure of the human body.⁹⁴ True, the body as such occupies a position of quite secondary importance, while the soul, as life-principle, seems to interest the writer much more. Still, the fact of his mentioning the composition of the body - all - insignificant enough in itself - takes on a particular importance when considered in relation to Isaac's letter. For in this epistle which he had addressed to John, "dilecto suo, amico", Isaac had expressed the wish that John, so competent in scientific knowledge, write a treatise on the composition of the human body, after which he, Isaac, may the more easily indicate the salient relations existing between the soul and the body.

"...propterea melius nosti, qui in physica eras...
De compositione igitur corporis humani si nobis
epistola scribere non facis negamus, sed
quia deo a nobis illius compositionem
quomodo illud instrumentum a gratia et alectationis
non differat, melius nosti, melius
facile dimittat..." 95

When taken in conjunction with this request, it does reveal a certain well-founded probability that the *De* is an answer to Isaac's letter. It is, besides, suggestive that in this

latter work the author has fulfilled the desire of his friend, that Ellenetrieder, following Berner and the Historie, finds good reason for accepting the authorship of Isner.

Confirmation of this probable sequence of the works, drawn likewise from the related content of each, lies in a comparison which Isner had suggested in passing and which is found worked out in detail in the lib.. The progress of the soul towards wisdom and charity, effected through the five senses and four affections respectively, may be likened, Isner remarked, to the voices of the angelic choirs, if one had time to make the comparison.

"quinque elementis progressionibus rationalitatis
exercetur ad sapientiam, sicut ipse affectus, seu
voluntas periturus ad charitatem, quatenus in novem
istis progressibus (non) ibus anima in seipsum proficiens,
sensu et affectu quasi internis quibusdam gradibus...
Facile autem vacanti erit hoc per sensus nominibus et
ordinibus comparare angelorum..." 96

Surely, it is something more than mere coincidence to find just such a comparison carefully developed in the lib.,⁹⁷ and if so, then the probability becomes greater that the latter work is a reply to the De anima of Isner.

Just here an interesting bit is furnished. Let us take like a literal slip of the pen would seem to indicate beyond doubt that the scribe was handling Isner's letter. In the passage quoted above, the libet wrote that the five senses lead to wisdom and the four affections to charity, or that by these

like a person on the road advances against itself, as though by certain internal feet, "quasi internis subducens pedibus". In the parallel passage in the *De* appears "anterioris pedibus",¹⁸ a reading which is unintelligible except when interpreted as the error of a scribe in his copying of the manuscript. As internal evidence, then, such a discrepancy serves to throw light on the dependent character of Isidore's writing.

This dependence, in its turn, provides some help in fixing an approximate date for the composition of the *De*. At the conclusion of his epistle, Isidore has stated that the conditions under which he had written it had been particularly distressing; plagues and famines, the like of which had not been witnessed in many years, were ravaging the country everywhere.

"Hec tibi, frater, inter innumeras atrocitas, ne non obediens, scripsi. Venerunt enim hoc anno super nos omnes pestes cum pestilentia et fame, quibus omnia retro saecula, ut putatur, non viderunt; suorum quidem praeteritis namque signis videmus et notivimus..."¹⁹

In agreement with this, a series of French chronicles describe a violent famine which stalked everywhere during the period 1161-62 and the tremendous numbers of deaths which occurred in the following year.¹²⁰ Therefore, the composition may be dated that Isidore was writing his *De* during spring 1161-62. And if the *De* is a reply to this letter, it could not have been written before 1161. At the other extreme, since Isidore, to

when the reply would have been directed,¹⁰¹ died at Melles in 1189, we may reasonably infer that Alcher's reply was not written after that date. The date of dating the treatise thus become fairly well established. Alcher must have composed the *ISA* somewhere between 1183 - 1184.¹⁰²

III

General Estimate of Treatise

We turn, now, to the character of the work as a treatise in its own right. From the outset, its worth has been variously estimated. We have seen that in the thirteenth century, it was frequently cited as a work of St. Augustine by Alexander of Hales, John of Rupella, St. Bonaventure, Albert the Great, among others, and therefore, enjoyed the prestige of the 'authority' deriving from Augustine's writings. Even at that time, however, in opposition to the opinion of so many of his contemporaries, St. Thomas refused it any very great importance. "Liber ille auctoritatem non habet." He seems, indeed, to have had scant respect for the treatise, "to which," he says, "we need pay little attention,"¹⁰³ but which "can be passed over as easily as it was written."¹⁰⁴ Such a condemnation may be due to the lack of order and intellectual order which characterizes the *ISA* for, elsewhere, the saint objects that the author of the work has badly understood or misinterpreted

the meaning of the writers whom he quotes.

"...sunt ibi multa vel falsa vel incerta dicta,
quid ille qui librum contempsit, non intellexit dicta
sanctorum a quibus accipere conatus fuit..." 1-5

Comparatively few historians of philosophy devote any consideration at all to the *MA*, but simply pass it over in silence. Of those who mention it, the majority do not appear impressed with its scientific value, but are content merely to classify it as a twelfth century manual of Augustinian psychology wherein are mixed up the teachings on the soul current in the early so-called "scholastic" period. In a short notice, Geyer objects that the *MA* lacks the originality of its companion piece, the *de anima* of Isaac,¹⁰⁶ while Gilson agrees that "comme une réponse à l'épistola d'Isaac, il faut avouer que ce fut une assez pauvre réplique..."¹⁰⁷ Among historians, Deulif alone considers the work in any favorable light. He finds it "a well-arranged treatise with a considerable didactic value, besides being full of erudition."¹⁰⁸ His estimate has little in common with the judgment of Trassus, who complains that "the author shows much reading but little understanding of the art of binding together a discourse, so that his learning resembles sands upon which no impression has been made."¹⁰⁹

We hope there is something of truth in both these criticisms. As it stands, the *MA* seems to be a fairly good compendium of what Christian thinkers, from the time of

Augustine, had held respecting the nature of the soul, its relation to the body from which it differs essentially, its immortality and the nobility of its destination. If that is what DeWulf meant by "well-arranged", as indicative of Alder's thought in stressing his doubts about the possibility of the soul's being joined to the body, his opinion has some justification. For certainly, on all these points, there is a fundamental difference between the soul and the body, and the mode of their union has something of mystery about it. But on any other grounds, DeWulf's opinion seems hardly tenable.

On the other hand, Erasmus' criticisms of a lack of cohesion in the *Enchiridion*, as a result of which he claims it is without distinctive character, is more justifiable. For actually, no definite system can be discerned in the author's ordering of his material. The work is a compilation, and one in which the compiler is totally dependent, for his thought, on those writers from whom he has made his borrowings. Consequently, no internal development of the work as a whole takes place. More than once in the course of the treatise, the author retraces his steps and makes a wholly new beginning, as when, for instance, there is question of the nature of the soul. Here, naturally, different definitions of the soul will be needed according to the variety of the sources used. This entails a good deal of repetition of the material handled, without any apparent attempt at systematization or unification.¹¹⁰

That the author was a man of wide reading, well acquainted with works both sacred and profane is beyond question.¹¹¹ The writers most frequently cited are St. Augustine, Hugh of St. Victor and Isaac of Stella, on whose views chiefly, the compiler has built up his own thoughts;¹¹² next to these, Gennadius, Isidore of Seville, Cassiodorus and Alcuin are used repeatedly. Bede, too, appears occasionally, and Lactantius. For the psychological phenomena of dreams, Macrobius supplied the required information, while the moral content is drawn largely from St. Anselm and St. Bernard.

Quite in keeping with the purpose of its author,¹¹³ the ISA became a handbook revealing the status of mediæval psychology as far as the latter twelfth century. There, readers found brought together in summary fashion, everything of the sort which was demanded by the doctrine of a rational soul and which could be of interest to the religious and moral knowledge of the soul, "abridging the theories of the Latin Fathers from Augustine, Gennadius and Boetius to Bernard and Hugh of St. Victor, passing by way of Isidore, Alcuin and Anselm."¹¹⁴ Set thus squarely in the line of the Christian neo-platonic tradition, such a work became very useful to Christian thinkers of the thirteenth century, since each could draw from it just that psychological doctrine which was accessible to him.

IV

A systematical analysis of the doctrinal content of the *DA* will permit us readily to recognize its character as a compilation, whose unity is imposed on it from without, as a result of the circumstances of its birth. It will prepare us then to examine the various sources from which the author has drawn his theses in regard to the soul and the classification of its faculties, and so to show the importance and the significance which its peculiar historical position gives to the *DA*. This position is, of course, one of place as well as of time. We shall therefore better appreciate the author's point of view and preoccupations, if, before proceeding to the doctrinal analysis, we first consider the actual setting in which his thought developed and was expressed, namely the deeply spiritual milieu of a Cistercian cloister in the period of its finest flowering. This is one of the features external to the actual doctrine of the *DA* that will form the subject-matter of the next chapter.

Chapter 2

INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TREATISE

In the absence of any positive proof, the whole weight of evidence seems to favor the authorship of Alcher, a Cistercian monk, who composed the TSA in reply to a letter, the De Anima, a psychological excursus on the nature of the soul, which his friend, Isaac of Stella, had addressed to him.¹

Besides the reasons alleged in support of this opinion in the preceding chapter, there is the general quality of the works which have proceeded from the Cistercian houses. In very few instances have their writers been remarkable either for the profundity of their thought or for the originality of their contributions.² On the contrary, Wilmart remarks, "Il est vrai que les Cisterciens ont été volontiers des compilateurs."³ The character of such a work as the TSA would not, therefore, be without precedent in the monastery at Clairvaux where Alcher lived under the regime of St. Bernard and his immediate successors.⁴ Moreover, the fact that Isaac's letter is directed to his presupposes that Alcher was

busying himself with psychological studies; hence, his treatment of the same in the 11th.⁵ Further, the predominantly psychological interest which became a characteristic note of the later mystical writers of the twelfth century, particularly those of the Cistercian school, is such in evidence here, and will help to approximate the date of the composition of the work.

Here, the deeply religious mentality of the writer is shown in the ease with which he handles the more theoretical conceptions of the human soul, its likeness to the Trinity, its illumination by Truth Itself and its unification by clarity, its need for a moral purification in order to ascend to a mystic union with God. So that, even apart from the personal relations of its author with Isaac of Stella, the whole religious and moral content of the work is suggestive of a setting in which very definite traces of the Cistercian spirit are evident.

From these considerations, we are led, quite naturally, to claim that the work emanates from a distinctly Cistercian milieu. It is the specific purpose of this chapter to find out to what extent, if any, such a claim is justifiable. In our examination, we shall seek the general quality of Cistercian spirituality, secondly, the nature of the work as a meditation and the author's use of his sources, and thirdly, the

characteristic features which these sources have in common as revealing the main themes which dominate the author's thought and which help to shape the outlines of his conclusions. In this way, the work can be located historically in the line of that platonic tradition stemming from St. Augustine and within the current of that mysticism which was inaugurated by St. Bernard.

Cistercian Spirituality in the Twelfth Century

It must be from something more than mere coincidence that so many of the questions which concern the author of the *ISA* have to do with subjects which had already been treated in the writings of several Cistercian authors, as St. Bernard, William of St. Thierry, Isaac of Stella, among others. Inspired by the same ideals, there is a certain degree of similarity in the intellectual formation of these men and in their tastes, which, however, allows at the same time for their individual differences.⁵ In its turn, the *ISA* is permeated with that characteristic spirit which was bequeathed by St. Bernard to all houses of the Order which came under his influence.⁶ That precisely this characteristic spirit was, will be indicated in summary fashion as revealing the typically Cistercian milieu in which the *ISA* was composed.

For St. Bernard, as for his disciples and successors, the monastic vocation was looked upon as a means of living a perfect Christian life. The monastery was the school wherein the doctrine of Christ was lived in practice and where, under Christ's guidance, men learned the work discipline of ascending into heaven. Such a school was a revival of the ancient pattern of the solitary life of the Fathers of the Desert, "that most glorious part of Christian perfection and religion", those men "whose love of conversation seemed to touch heaven most nearly."⁸

Of the Cistercian mode of life, the same author has a very apt description.

"Le moine cistercien est un composé de paysan, d'artisan et d'ascète. La vie spirituelle ne coïncide pas pour lui avec une méditation intellectuelle des vérités fondamentales du christianisme, mais une laquelle il y pousse de mieux en mieux son intelligence et sa volonté. C'est de cette méditation, où l'extériorité imaginative abolit presque entièrement la réflexion critique, que naît le mysticisme du XII^e siècle. Le type en est le traité de diligendo deo du célèbre St. Bernard, d'origine cistercienne, et abbe de Clairvaux.... Pour cet esprit ardent et passionné 'toute la philosophie est la connaissance de Jésus crucifié' au ce qui revient au même, la connaissance de l'amour de Dieu pour les hommes, qui mène les hommes à aimer Dieu... La vie chrétienne est la description de cette voie (de se sauver en suivant le Christ) qui part de la considération de soi-même (méditation sur nous-même, sur le monde et sur Dieu) pour aboutir à la contemplation... et enfin à l'extase où l'âme, s'élevant au-dessus des sens corporels, se détachant plus elle-même, est exaltée jusqu'à la jouissance de Dieu, et devenant ainsi différente d'elle-même et finalement semblable à Dieu, est finalement béatifiée." 9

Now, it is clear that a mystical doctrine developed along such lines tends to be moral and religious rather than purely speculative; it is a rule of life for the soul which forcibly recalls the interiorism of St. Augustine.¹⁰

"The mystic's delight is to interpret the visible world as a sign of the supernatural...Those of them (mystics) who also deal with philosophy devote themselves by preference to problems of psychology and ethics. They concentrate their attention upon the interior man, stress the duality of body and soul and teach that the soul must be freed from the bonds of sensibility." 11

In this way, the traditional conception of monastic life received a particular interpretation among the Cistercians.

"Les Cisterciens ne se sont pas fait une conception scolaire de la vie monastique, mais une conception monastique de la vie scolaire. Ils ont réduit l'Ecole au Cloître et lorsqu'ils ont comparé ce dernier aux écoles, c'est pour montrer qu'il s'y substitue et en dispense, comme la foi se substitue à la philosophie et en dispense..." 12

And since it was directly from St. Bernard, as Abbot of Clairvaux, that Acher had received his spiritual and intellectual training, it is no matter of surprise to discover that several portions of the DMA show close affinities with the saint's ascetical and mystical teachings.

The Cistercian rule aims at the perfection of the christian life, which is charity. "Lex ergo dei immaculata caritas est."¹³ The monastery is the school where the apprenticeship of love is served, and where, by meditation on

God's love for man whom he made to his image and likeness, man's love for God is enthralled and fostered in it, finally, man is restored to the likeness to God which had been destroyed by sin. Such a restoration to God's likeness consists chiefly in the perfect accord of the human will with the divine, which, in essence, is charity. In this state, man loves God for His own sake, so that while remaining himself, he, nevertheless, is united to God by a complete union of will.¹⁴

Evidently, this restoration to God's likeness takes account of man's soul primarily, but it must also consider the body as well, insofar as the body is an essential part of man. The first step in the asceticism is the suppression of any inordinate love of the body which keeps the soul from God. Hence is explained the Cistercian asceticism. The subservience of the body must be realized and its actions properly directed toward the soul which it was given to serve.

"Ideoque curius tractandum est corpus, ne se eliet, ne imbecileat; sic tamen ut servire sufficiat; cuius ad servandum spiritui datum est. Sic sic tractandum est tanquam propter illud vivamus, non utquod sine eo vivere non possumus..."¹⁵

For such purification is a necessary condition of the disciplining of thought and will,

"Cum (animus) intra se regrediatur, et corpore nihil forti elatione necesse et consuetudinis colligit... Cum autem ab eis exortitur, movet nisi corpore in alio se consistere. Cum vero ad capitulum spiritus vel divinus exortitur, non alius de eis quam de corporibus, vel de corporibus potest sentire..."¹⁶

The distinctively Cistercian element in this process is the application of the psychological analysis which it suggests, the constantly reiterated 'know thyself' formula which Bernard made one of the fundamentals of his teaching, and which was to remain characteristic of the work of his successors, especially Isaac and Aicher.¹⁷ The first lesson for the monk is to learn to know himself. Such self-knowledge requires humility which is the indispensable condition of Christian perfection.

"According to the views of St. Bernard, who reproduces those of St. Augustine, humility is truth; it is the result of the sincere and painful knowledge about ourselves, of what we are, and of the silliness of our worth. The virtue of humility is thus found to be the genesis of perfection. St. Bernard, like St. Augustine places it at the base of the spiritual edifice... Knowledge of himself, humility, perfection are realities which in the eyes of the abbot of Clairvaux call for and produce one another... Humility it is which renders us compassionate for the wretchedness of others, the sense of our own insignificance, of our own weakness and our poverty inclines us to be indulgent towards the failings of those around us... Finally, humility by bringing the other virtues to perfection raises the soul to the heights of mystical contemplation..."¹⁸

Man's duty, then, is to look to what he is and to what he can become. The first should fill him with humility,¹⁹ which, in turn, leads to charity, and the latter, when perfected, casts out all fear. This is the process of St. Bernard which became the characteristic theme of the whole Cistercian school - to replace fear by charity by means of the practice of humility.²⁰

The prerequisite condition of the soul's ascent towards God is found in what has elsewhere been called "Christian asceticism"²¹ but with a peculiar nuance. Here self-knowledge has been extended into a social love of the neighbor like unto ourselves in misery, "sic amor carnalis efficitur et socialis cum in commune protrahitur..."²² and thence, it is further enlarged into a personal love of Christ, who became man in order to save us. This is the purpose of meditation on the sensible humanity of Christ in the Sisterhood's spiritual program. From such a sensible love, one is drawn into a higher and more spiritual love by the frequent recollection of His passion, and this leads to a mystic union of the soul with God here on earth while waiting to be eternally united with Him hereafter.²³

Such a clearly-defined course is easily recognizable as the source of the doctrine of the progress of the soul towards its homeland, God, as proposed in the Rule. Here, the same typically Augustinian approach is found. It is by passing from the exterior to the interior and ascending thence to the superior that the soul comes to reach its final beatitude in the enjoyment of God.

"Si vero ab hac infinita distractione quae deorsum est, se erexerit, et hanc infinitam deorsum est paulatim in unum se colligens, secum esse viduerit, tanto amplius unum colligetur, tanto magis cognitione et desiderio sursum eleuetur; donec tandem unum immutabile sit, et ad illam veram et aeternam, quae est apud Deum, immutabilitatem perveniat, ubi perpetuosae omni mutabilitatis vicissitudinis requiescat..."²⁴

For nothing is more interior or more present to man than God, yet He will reveal Himself only to those who have learned to look within their own souls wherein His image is mirrored.²⁵ Thus, the need for self-knowledge as the sole approach to the knowledge and love of God.

"Ab hoc ergo mundo ad Deum revertentes, et quasi ab ipso sursum ascendentes per contemplationem nos transire debemus. Ascendere enim ad Deum, est intrare ad se ipsum; et non solummodo se intrare, sed in se habili eodem modo in interiora, se ipsum transire. Qui enim interiorius intrans et interiorius penetrans se ipsum transcendit, ille veraciter ad Deum ascendit... nihil enim ad beatam vitam præstantius videtur quam velut clausis carnalibus sensibus extra carnes meditare effectum quempiam intra semetipsum converti, alioquin effectum a mortalibus cupiditatibus sibi soli et Deo loqui..." 26

Such a striking similarity of doctrine as is here represented, together with the other likenesses to the views of Isaac of Stella on whose teachings Eckhart has drawn heavily, makes the Cistercian provenance of the text quite certain.

The emphasis, however, which the author places on the various aspects of the doctrine suggests a closer chronological connection with the successors of St. Bernard than with the Mellifluous Doctor himself. For the intense and almost exclusively mystical quality, so characteristic of Bernard's writings, had usually taken on the features of a more predominantly psychological interest in his disciples.

"Après St. Bernard et Guillaume de St. Thierry, la grande poussée mystique cistercienne perd la sa force et leurs continuations s'orientent plutôt vers le moralisme religieux. Certains d'entre eux ont pourtant accueilli dans leurs écoles des éléments

philosophiques dont l'action devoit être au-dessus de tout. Tel est particulièrement le cas d'Isaac, abbé du monastère cistercien de l'Île... et du... l'Écluse de Clairvaux. À vrai dire, leurs œuvres sont moins des exercices de mystique spéculative que les expressions d'une spéculation orientée vers la mystique..." 27

In such the same vein, Meyer speaks of the influence of this mystical current on the development of the philosophical thought of the latter twelfth century.

"Das (die Mystik) bewirkt eine ausserordentliche subjectivierung und Verinnerlichung nicht nur des religiösen Lebens, sondern der Kultur überhaupt, woraus sich dann eine neue Einstellung auch gegenüber den philosophischen Problemen ergibt. Unmittelbar ergiebt dadurch die psychologische Beobachtung eine wertvolle Befruchtung, die sich in eigenen psychologischen Traktaten kundgibt..." 28

For the more purely philosophical elements of the CMA, we may look in the direction of the school of St. Victor.

While, in general, the same mystical tendency as among the Cistercians is to be found with Hugh and Richard,²⁹ nevertheless their teaching has developed a more speculative character which is absent from the Cistercian outlook.

"The object of contemplation therefore was not, at St. Victor, an eternal truth alone. It was all truth. The soul begins with the contemplation of scientific truth that has been discovered by intellectual effort. Then, little by little, under the influence of grace, it is raised to the vision of divine truth..." 30

Here, at St. Victor, philosophy and theology were placed side by side, each within its proper sphere.

"Eine Verbindung der Dialektik mit der Mystik erstrebt die Schule von St. Victor, besonders in ihren Hauptvertretern Hugo und Richard. Ihnen ist es zu danken, dass das mystische Element auch in der wissenschaftlichen Theologie sein Heimatrecht behielt..." 31

And in the intimate union of these two distinct sciences, philosophical speculation was given an impulse in the direction of the great philosophical-theological syntheses which form no small part of the glory of the thirteenth century.³²

To the writings of Hugh of St. Victor therefore, which Alcher quotes with considerable freedom, we may trace the more philosophical portions of the *ISA*.

From this point of view, from the easy blending of the predominantly psychological current of twelfth century mysticism deriving from William of St. Thierry and Isaac with the more dialectical approach of Hugh of St. Victor, we may confirm our previous surmise that the *ISA*, embodying, as it does, the psychological teachings of Isaac on the nature of the soul - into which, however, certain Victorine elements are introduced - is Alcher's reply to the *De Anima* of Isaac and was, therefore, composed shortly after 1162.³³

II

The Author's Use of his Sources

In the treatment of his subject, the author is more or less conditioned by the character of his work as a compilation;

hence, the method he follows is largely eclectic. Throughout the whole work, there is hardly a single passage of any considerable length for which Alcher is not indebted, either directly or indirectly, to some previous writer. Originality is consciously absent from the treatise as a whole. On the contrary, there seems to be neither law nor limit to the extent of his borrowings nor to the freedom he allows himself in his presentation of the opinions borrowed. From St. Augustine, one of the first great Christian thinkers of the middle ages, to Isaac of Stella, a contemporary of the author, every source which could possibly yield some information on the subject of the soul and its powers was tapped. Boethius, Cassiodorus, Alcuin, Anselm, Bernard, Hugh of St. Victor, among others, all offered their contribution, so that somewhere within the work are found the opinions of all the more important Christian thinkers of the early middle ages. In truth, the *ESA* summarizes the outstanding doctrines of twelfth century Augustinian psychology, and does, then, represent an abridgement of the Christian psychological tradition as it appeared just prior to the new current introduced by the thirteenth century Masters. Thus, Werner says.

"Das im Verlaufe dieser Schaffensperiode Geleistete und Errungene, unter gleichzeitiger Verarbeitbung jener älteren Lehrautoritäten, auf welcher die ganze Entwicklung der bezeichneten Periode steht, findet sich eclecticisch zusammengestellt in der pseudo-Augustinischen Schrift *De Spiritu et Anima*, über

vollig ohne Methode und systematischen
Zusammenhang...." 74

A similar freedom characterizes Acher's manner of using his sources. The very casual way in which he handles these makes the work of interest and value as an indication of the average Augustinian psychology in vogue during the second half of the twelfth century. There are long passages quoted directly from other authors with no acknowledgment whatsoever of their being borrowed or of the source whence they came. Thus,

Dea. c. l. LXIII
ll. 40, 227.

Audisti, anime mea, quales
te esse oportent. Tuus error
soliman occupationes tuas, et
abscondere medicinae tumultuo-
sis cogitationibus tuis. Intra
cubiculum mentis tuae, et
exclude omnia praeter teum, et
qui adjuvent te ad quaerendum
eum; quoniam ego loquar tibi,
requiesce aliquantulum in mi.
Sic ergo, anime mea, hec; sic
quis es, loquere et quaer te
in illis. Certe tu es lux es
quod es, et tu es qui es; id
est, quod nihil majus cogitari
potest, nec melius, nec melius
est iucundius. Vita es, sapi-
entia, lux, veritas, beatitudo,
et cetera omnia bona; tu
tibi omnia sufficiens, nullo
indigens, pro omnia indigent
et vult, et ut bene sint.
Invenisti, anime mea, quod
quaerebas; quaerebas enim eum, et vult et ut bene sint.

Translation
(Ed. Schmitt, Descoilli in Syria,
1933) Ch. I pp. 81-173

Aja mea, homuncio, fuge paululum
occupationes tuas, absconde te
medicinae tumultuosis cogitation-
ibus tuis... Intra in cubiculum
mentis tuae, exclude omnia praeter
teum et quae te juvent ad quaer-
endum eum, et claudere ostio
omnes eum. Sic enim, totus er
eum, sic enim hec: quaerere vultus
eum...

Ch. III p. 110)
Tu solus eras, desine, es quod
es, et tu es qui es. (Ch. III p. 111)
et quidem credimus te esse
aliquid pro nihil majus cogitari
possit. (Ch. III p. 112) It vita
es et lux et sapientia et
beatitudo et cetera et multa
et cetera bona, et tamen non es
tibi omnia et sufficiens tu
tibi omnia sufficiens, nullo
indigens, pro omnia indigent
et vult et ut bene sint.

et invenisti eum esse quiddam
suumum amicum, quo nihil melius
cogitari potest; et hinc esse
vitam, sapientiam, lucem,
veritatem, beatitudinem, aeternam
beatitudinem, et hinc hinc hinc
tatem, et omne verum bonum.

CH. IV. 111; In invenisti,
suumum amicum, quo nihil melius
cogitari potest, et invenisti eum
esse quiddam suumum amicum, quo
nihil melius cogitari potest; et
hinc esse vitam, lucem,
sapientiam, beatitudinem, aeternam
beatitudinem, et hinc hinc hinc
tatem;...

The whole of chapter 34 of the 111, concerning with the
words, "excita me, anima mea," down to the end of the sixth
last line, ending with the words "non sufficient plenitudinem
gaudii" is a transcription in toto of chapters 24 and 25 of
Anselm's Monitiones, with a few merely verbal changes.³⁵ In
much the same manner, such of St. Victor's Collationes de
Sapientia is abridged and reworked to furnish the soul
with a consciousness of the debt of love and gratitude which
it owes God as its Creator and Redeemer;³⁶ while St. Bernard's
sermons on the Canticles are also quoted at length by the
compiler of the 111. Yet in no one of these instances does
the compiler make any reference to the sources of his doctrine.

CH. III
111, 112.

Constituta es peccatis, irretita
vitiis, capta illecebris, ex-
silio captiva, corpore carcerata,
haerens laqueo, infirma lino,
afflicta membris, confusa curis,
distans a rectis, contracta
timoribus, afflictis doloribus,
erroribus vaga, suspiciosis
inquietis, sollicitudinibus
anxia, a vena in terra inimi-
ca rana, caliginata cum certis,

Sermons on the Canticles
(111, 112, 113, 114, 115.)

(111, ch. 1, 111) Constituta
es peccatis, irretita
vitiis, capta illecebris, ex-
silio captiva, corpore carcerata,
haerens laqueo, infirma lino,
afflicta membris, confusa curis,
distans a rectis, contracta
timoribus, afflictis doloribus,
erroribus vaga, sollicitudinibus
anxia, a vena in terra inimi-
ca rana, caliginata cum certis,

deputata cum his qui in inferno sunt. I sic deputata et deputata via respirare in pace, venia et misericordia, et cum his angelorum ducere suave jugum carnis; oportet te esse iudicem, veracundum, providum, circumspicuum, nihil penitus admittentem, praevidentem gloriam conscientiae tuae. In nullo conscientiae sit quo erubescat praesentiam veritatis, quo cogaris avertere faciem tuam a lumine Dei. Et ut hic decere divi oblectat aspectus, proleat fons, et diffundat se per membra et sensus corporis, quatenus inde reluceat omnis actio, sermo, aspectus, incensus, risus. Et tamen risus mixtus gravitate, et plenus honesti. Modus, actus et usus totius corporis cum apparuerit, sit actus purus, modestus totius exorsus insolentiae et lasciviae, levitatis et ignaviae. Sit sermo pariter, vultus illi rictus, aspectus verecundus, incensus modestus talis talium pulchritudo et innocentia ingenuitas sic sollicita est cum bona conscientia facie integritate servare, ut juxta apostolum provideat bonum, non tantum coram Deo, sed etiam coram hominibus.....
 ..cui consentiat ad correctionem, quo illuminetur ad conditionem; cui imitatur ad virtutem, quo reformetur ad sapientiam; cui conformetur ad decorem, quo fruatur ad jucunditatem.

et ostremo arvens in terra iudicemus, juxta prophetiam voce, extinguentes cum certis, deputata cum his qui in inferno sunt; licet, inquam, sic deputata, et sicuteretur; de quibus tamen tunc habere posse aliquid, non modo unde respirare in pace velis, in pace, in pace vice quiescit; sed etiam... tu ve carnis jucundus reus ducere angelorum non videretur. (85, 10; 1193)
 iudicem, veracundum, providum, circumspicuum, nihil penitus admittentem, praevidentem gloriam conscientiae tuae; in nullo conscientiae sit quo erubescat praesentiam veritatis, quo cogaris avertere faciem tuam a lumine Dei.... divinos oblectat aspectus; (85, 11; 1193) proleat fons... et diffundit per membra et sensus, quatenus omnis inde reluceat actio sermo, aspectus, incensus, risus (si tamen risus) mixtus gravitate, et plenus honesti.... modus, actus et usus, cum apparuerit serius purus, modestus, totius exorsus insolentiae atque lasciviae, levitatis, cum ignavia alienus... pulchritudo animae, mentis ingenuitas, sollicita servare cum conscientia bona facie integritate. Vel, juxta apostolum, provideat bonum, non tantum coram Deo, sed etiam coram hominibus. cui consentiat ad correctionem, quo illuminetur ad sapientiam, cui imitatur ad virtutem, quo reformetur ad sapientiam, cui conformetur ad decorem, cui conformetur ad fecunditatem, quo fruatur ad jucunditatem.

In the shorter direct citations, in which the work bounds, Alcher shows the same eclectic spirit. Selections

lifted from one work are re-printed and inserted at intervals within those from another work of the same author, with a not unintelligent planning, so as to result in a new literary production, the continuity of whose thought is maintained yet whose true origin is hardly recognizable. Thus, Acher inserts a short piece from the De unitate animae within a passage from the De Genesi and li terum of it. Invalide.

[illegible]

Passages from different authors are likewise placed side by side when such a juxtaposition is convenient.³⁸ It is this wholesale borrowing and re-casting of materials borrowed which crystallizes the peculiar character of the *Enc.* For the compiler, obviously, makes no pretense of assimilating the thought of his predecessors; he is content merely to collect fragments from their teachings and to group these into a kind of unity which will be convenient for the human memory...

"Pro satet et corpus dielictis, quae te dilige, tunc totum, breve istud et certum colligere, aliqne in hoc studii radice, quod maxime commendatur. Ceterum maxime est memoria huius, et brevitate parat; et si in multis divisionibus, fit sicut in istis..."

In grouping together quotations from the different sources, it becomes necessary, at times, for the compiler to add a few words of his own in order to make the transition between the thought of the two sentences. This compiler does not hesitate to do.

"Eic a Patre per Filium et Spiritus sanctus vel (potius) in Spiritu divinis ad nos descendunt. Inter aliosque trahit Filium suum qui redimeret servos..." 40
 "...in hoc vita in mundo est hominibus... quatenus cum hinc esset, nihil corporale ad us trahit, et a corporali passione liberis existit. Vivificatione et sanctificatione descendit anima ad carne. Præsentia namque sua illud vivificat, illi- git in unum, atque in uno tenet..." 41

For does the author show any greater reluctance in changing somewhat the syntax of the original to suit his immediate needs, so that a passage which has appeared in indirect discourse is cast in direct discourse with another. 42

Again, the criterion of his placement of passages is not always intelligible beyond a mere appeal to the author himself. A subjective attitude towards his theme, a sort of personal constancy, appears to be his chief guide in selecting and rearranging his extracts. As a result, he seems to be completely impervious to the deeper logical sequence and literary balance which characterize many of the works upon which he draws. This is particularly noticeable in his more mystical moments. If there appears to be a locus apt for the injection of an exhortation, Slater inserts the 'sermon' with a naive disregard for the appropriateness of its surroundings. 43

In the indirect citations, there is an almost complete dependence on the sources which Aleher is handling at the moment. These sources, however, remain unacknowledged by him as was the case with the direct quotations.⁴⁴ In most instances, there is a servile imitation not only of ideas but even of expression, without any evidence of any serious attempt at interpretation. Thus, at least the doctrine of certain passages cannot fail to be recognized as having its source elsewhere:

De Civ. Dei, VIII
II 40, 205

Isidori Episcopi De Sent.
II 174, 1163

...Ex qua re intelligitur,
quod ita est anima secundum
modum in suo corpore, sicut
Deus est in suo mundo...

Universitas aeterna creaturae
quasi corpus est Divinitatis,
singulae autem quasi singula
membra. Sicut vero Deus in
toto et in singulis totus, sed
in semetipso; sic anima in toto
suo corpore, et in singulis
membris in semetipso tota...

From the 'Commentaria in Iovinianum Scipionis' of Macrobius, Aleher's division of dreams into five classes is taken almost verbatim.⁴⁵ While, the source for his description of the material composition of the human body from the four elements and of the vital power whereby the soul endows the body with life is, without doubt, St. Augustine, as the following comparison reveals.

Dea ch. XXI
IL 40 795

De Sensu ad Litteras VII, 13
IL 34, 562.

Vis vitalis est in corde, quæ ad temperandum fervorem cordis ærem hauriendo atque reddendo, vitam et salutem toti corpori tribuit. Cere namque puro sanguinem purificatum per totum corpus impellit per venas pulsatiles, quæ arteriæ vocentur.

(ch. XXIII IL 40 802) Humanum siquidem corpus ex quatuor elementis compositum est; sed in carne et ossibus terra maxime apparet propter terrenam soliditatem. Aqua in humoribus, aer continetur in pulsione; ideoque semper est in motu, quia ventilabrum cordis est, ne nimis calore cor consumatur et dissolvatur. Sedes ignis est in corde; et ideo inferius est latum et superius acutum; quoniam formam ignis retinet. Quædam vis ignea cere temperata a corde ad cerebrum ascendit, tanquam in coelum corporis nostri; ibique purificata et celata per oculos, aures, nares; ceteraque instrumenta sensuum, foras protrahitur, et ex contactu exteriorum formata quinque sensuum corporis facit; visus, videlicet, auditus, gustus, odoratus, et tactus. Qui tangendi sensus ab anteriori parte cerebri ad posteriorem transiens, et inde per cervicem et pediculus spinæ descendens per totum corpus diffunditur.

Etiam si non est alioquin id quod medici non tantum dicunt, verum etiam probare se sufficienter quævis cere caro terrenam soliditatem in promptu gerit, habet tamen in se et aeris aliquid, quod et pulsatibus continetur, et a corde per venas quæ arteriæ vocantur, diffunditur; et ignis non solum fervidas qualitates, cujus sedes in jecore est, verum etiam luculentas, quæ velut aliis variis subvilare celsant in excelsam cerebri locum tanquam in coelum corporis nostri; unde et radii exierunt oculorum, et de cujus radice velut centro quoddam, non solum ad oculos, sed etiam ad sensus ceteros tenues fistulæ decedunt, ad aures scilicet, ad nares, ad palatum, propter audiendum, olfaciendum, atque gustandum; ipsumque tangendi sensum qui per totum corpus est, ab eodem cerebro dirigi dicunt per pediculus cervicis, et semper quæ continetur ossibus, quibus dorsum et lina conscribitur, ut inde se tenuissimi quidam rivuli, qui tangendi sensum faciunt, per cuncta membra diffundant.

As a result, there is little indication of Alcher's having assimilated or really digested these previous teachings before incorporating them into his own treatise. Hence, the ISA lacks any organic development. There can be found no systematic rounding out of any one theme or even part of a theme which can be claimed as distinctively Alcher's own. Rather, the work resembles a mosaic of the opinions of other thinkers, externally fitted together into a fairly intelligible pattern, when taken as a whole. Thus, while it lacks the essential unity of a well-developed treatise, the work does, nevertheless, possess a certain accidental unity deriving from the author's use of his source materials...and it is no more than this which Alcher seems to claim for it.⁴⁶ It is moreover, precisely in this unity, however secondary, that we find a justification for the further study of the content of the ISA from a doctrinal and a historical viewpoint.

As to the style of the author, there is nothing outstanding. It has, for instance, none of the elegance of St. Bernard's latin nor any of the stylistic flourishes of the Mellifluous Doctor, except where the latter is quoted directly. The few unusual words or expressions which do occur are found only in a derivative context.⁴⁷ True to character of the work as a compilation, its style presents nothing of originality or distinction; in this, it stands in contrast to the more humanistic tendencies of other twelfth century writers.⁴⁸

III

Structural Analysis of the Text

As published in the collection of *Signe*, the *De* is divided into sixty-six chapters. In preparing this edition, recourse was had to several of the manuscripts from a comparison with which such a division was made. Other editions of the work follow a different order. Thus, as included among the works of Hugh of St. Victor, there are only thirty-three chapters; while the Cistercian edition of Visser ends with chapter forty-four.⁴⁹ From a similar variation among the manuscripts, Wilmart concludes that it is probable that the work was originally composed in three books.⁵⁰ While waiting for a critical edition of the *De* to appear, we adopt the division proposed in the *Latina patrology*, as being the most complete.

In spite of their variety, the sources of which the author availed himself, have one feature in common. They represent in varying degrees that traditional mediaeval thought which stemmed from St. Augustine. Typically Augustinian themes, which had been continued with various accidental changes in the course of the Christian Middle Ages, are not only to be found in the *De* but even form the outstanding and guiding lines of its thought.

posed against a typical background of Exemplarism, the idea ensures the dependence of all things on God in a triple mode. All beings are seen to participate in a threefold manner in God - especially is this true of the human soul which was made uniquely to God's image and likeness.

"Et sicut Deus est ab omnibus capabilis et participabilis; sic anima omnium est capax. Capabilis et participabilis omnibus est Deus, quia naturali suo munere scilicet Spiritu sancto, et usu ex munere gratiae, participatur ab omnibus per essentiam quae sunt, et secundum illam ad idoneam speciem quae ab illis differunt, et secundum utrumque ad eorum usum quo proficiunt. Ista haec omni homini et creaturae inveniunt, quasi quaedam vestigia summe essentiae, imaginis et muneris, id est, Trinitatis Patris, Filii et Spiritus sancti... Sic in illa Trinitate sumus et vivimus omnia rerum, perfectissima plenitudo et beatissima dilectio..." 21

Having accepted this basic exemplarism of St. Augustine as relating all created essences to God, another follows on with the theory of Divine Illumination which occupies a central position in his doctrine. Man's power to know reality rests immediately on an illumination originating outside man himself; for inasmuch as the truth of human knowledge derives from eternal, necessary immutable principles, human reason, by its own unaided powers could not attain to knowledge. A further help must be given in the illumination which comes from grace in the light of which alone man is enabled to know and to love. For although men have the faculties of knowing

and loving from nature, still, knowledge and love are not phenomena of the purely natural order, but are effected through grace.

"Verumtamen facultates et quasi instrumenta cognoscendi et diligendi habet ex natura; conditiones tamen veritatis et ordinis dilectionis nequaquam habet nisi ex gratia. Facta siquidem a Deo mens rationalis, sicut ejus imago suscepit, ita cognitionem et amorem. Vasa namque quae creatrix sapientiae format ut sint, adiutrix pietatis replet ne vacua sint, si strenuum operarium invenerit..." 52

so that it is only when reason has been enlightened by a ray of interior light and is kindled by its warmth that it attains to a knowledge of wisdom and to an affection of love.

"quia (ratio) etsi spiritus rationalis ex d. no Creatoris habilis est ad cognoscendum verum et diligendum bonum, tamen nisi interioris lucis radio fuerit perfusus et calore succensus, nunquam consequitur sapientiae cognitionem vel charitatis affectum..." 53

In keeping with this, God and the soul are considered the objects proper to human thought.

"Fieri autem non potest quaedam divina providentia ut inveniendi facultas desit religiosis animis se ipsos et Deum suum pie, caste ac diligenter quaerentibus..." 54

In disposing the soul to a knowledge of these objects, the effective part has a very definite function to fulfill. Before he comes to a knowledge of God, man must possess the knowledge of his own soul. It is self-consciousness which is the surest and best approach to his Creator. "Et cum vult Deum cognoscere, elevat se super se mentis acie..."⁵⁵ For the dignity of man

rests on the fact that he was made to God's image and likeness. By studying the image, therefore, one can come to learn something of Him in whose image man was made. Hence Alcher's preoccupation with the soul's self-knowledge.

"Ipse (Deus) siquidem est ejus (anime) patria et habitatio, ad cujus similitudinem factus est. quisquis ergo se talem reddi desiderat, qualis a Deo factus est, id est similes Deo, redeat ad se, et stet in se, et sic intra semetipsum quaerat, et videat unde constet homo, et ex qua sui parte factus sit ad imaginem Dei..." 56

The soul knows itself intuitively, in and by itself, hence the senses rather hinder true knowledge than contribute to it in any essential way.

"Animus corporis dominator, rector, habitator videt se per se; per se ipsum sese ipsum videt. Non quaerit auxilium corporalium oculorum, imo vero ab omnibus corporibus sensibus tanquam impedientibus et perstreptentibus abstrahit se ad se, ut videat se in se, ut noverit se apud se..." 57

Thus, he who desires to come to a knowledge of himself and his Creator must free himself from his senses and turn within to the inward vision.

"Ideoque ut homo sibi incognitus cognoscant se, magna opus habet consuetudine recedendi a sensibus, ut anima ad se colligat, et in se ipso retineat. His siquidem sensibus impeditur anima, ne cernere semetipsum valeat et Creatorem suum, quem sola et simplex sine istis oculis intueri debet..."

From this results that characteristically Augustinian dualism in which man's soul and body are looked upon as

substances complete in themselves, having only an operational union.

"Ex duabus substantiis constat homo, anima et carne; anima cum ratione, carne cum sensibus suis; quos tamen sensus non movet caro absque animae societate, anima, vero rationale suum tenet sine carne..." 59

Immediately there follows from this the transcendence of the soul over the body. Present, whole and entire in every part of the body, the soul is, however, only united to it by the action which it exercises constantly in vivifying the body.⁶⁰ Yet, the union is of such kind that the soul loves its body and is separated from it only with reluctance.

"...quibusdam affectibus et quadam aversitia anima corpori conjungitur, amensque suam aversitiam homo carnem suam odio habet. Societas autem illi, licet ejus societate praegravetur, ineffabili tamen conditione diligit illud; acut carcerem suum et ideo libera esse non potest..." 61

With the mystic strain holding a prominent place in his thought, it was natural for Alcher to concentrate his interest on the life of the inner world of his soul, in the analysis of which he remains firmly rooted in the augustinian tradition. For St. Augustine, the human soul was made to the image of the Trinity. In its own way, then, it must be one and three and the relation of its faculties to its essence must, in some manner, imitate the relation of the divine unity to the Three Persons of the Trinity.⁶² From his very literal interpretation of certain augustinian formulae,

Alcher allows no real distinction between the soul and its faculties but distinguishes them solely on the basis of the functional relation of the essence to various objects.

"Anima...secundum benignitatem Creatoris etque secundum sui operis officium variis nuncupatur nominibus....Ista tamen non differunt in substantia, quomodoaodum in nominibus; quoniam omnia ista una anima est; proprietates quidem diversae, sed essentia una..." 63

This simplicity of the soul, on which the author insists so definitely, is one of the cardinal points of the whole treatise. "Anima in essentia est simplex; in officiis est multiplex..."⁶⁴ and again, in identifying the powers of the soul with the soul whence they proceed, Alcher repeats,

"Verumtamen propter varia exercitia variatur et varie nuncupatur. Dicitur namque sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia. Et haec omnia in anima nihil aliud sunt, quam ipse, aliae et aliae inter se proprietates propter varia exercitia, sed una essentia rationis et una anima; proprietates quidem diversae sed essentia una; secundum exercitia, multi sunt; secundum essentiam vero, unus est in anima et idem quod ipse..." 65

In the traditional manner, the powers of the soul are divided into rational, concupiscible and irascible in which are contained the whole essence of the soul. This trinity of its natural powers in no way lessens the substantial unity of the soul but merely distinguishes the relations of the one substance to its various powers.

"Tota namque animae substantia in his tribus plena et perfecta consistit, id est in rationalitate, concupiscibilitate et irascibilitate quasi quaedam sua trinitate; et tota haec trinitas est quaedam animae unitas, et ipse animus..." 66

But while the soul has these natural powers which are identical with it in essence, it has also cert in accidental qualities coming to it from without, such as the virtues and the vices, in relation to which the soul is as a composite being. The soul, then, is both simple and complex; complex, in respect of God who is whatever he has, utterly simple; and simple, in respect of the body which is nothing that is predicated of it, wholly complex.⁶⁷

In its nature, therefore, the soul stands midway between God and the body-world. It has, consequently, two characteristic modes of action according as it is inclined towards God by one counsel or towards the body by another.

"Saepe duplices sunt actiones. Alio namque consilio arripitur ad Deum; aliis aliis inclinatur ad carnes..."

In this is found the Augustinian division of reason into superior and inferior according to the material objects. For this division does not concern the faculty of knowing only, but the whole rational soul with its two faculties of knowledge and will. It has reference to those two initial attitudes between which man must choose, viz that of turning above or below, so that by it, the soul either rehabilitates itself or degrades itself and that means it rehabilitates its power to love as well as its power to know.⁶⁹ This distinction into superior and inferior reason constitutes the soul's search either above or below itself for fitting objects

of knowledge or of love, so that the higher part is directed towards God and the intelligible world and is, therefore, distinguished from the lower which treats of inferior objects, the sensibles. In the first case, reason is virile, whereas, in the latter case, it is as though weakened by the lower elements and hence is more effeminate.

"Est itaque in ratione quiddam ad superna et caelestia intendens, et id dicitur sapientia; et est quiddam ad transitoria et caduca recipiens, et id vocatur prudentia. Haec duo ex ratione sunt, et in ratione consistunt. Et dividit se ratio in duo, scilicet in seorsum et deorsum; seorsum in sapientiam; deorsum in prudentiam, quasi in virum et mulieres, ut vir sit superior et regat, mulier, inferior et regatur..." 70

The wise man is he who withdraws from the attraction of sense-images which are continually bombarding him from without; he remains in the higher world of the intelligibles and does not suffer the degeneration which occurs when the soul descends into the world of sense.⁷¹ From this is seen the necessity of a catharsis if one wishes to know himself and God. The condition of self-knowledge is the abandonment of the world of sense and the refusal to carry with sense-images which leave their imprint on the soul.

"...Ita videbit...ut sine magno labore ab eis separari non possit quibus cum amore inhaesit. Propterea phantasias corporalium imaginum deformatur, easque alto impressis etiam soluta a corpore non exuitur. Si enim a corporalibus affectionibus corrupti ne hic non mundatur, corpore etiam corporalibus tenetur passionibus. Studeat ergo in hac vita se mundare ab huiusmodi faeculentia..." 72

From these indications it is evident how closely the *OSA* follows the Platonic tradition of St. Augustine. And from the very diverse elements of which it is composed, the treatise reflects the transitional character of twelfth-century thought, looking backwards to the tradition of the encyclopedists rather than forward to the more scientific expositions of the soul which thirteenth-century thinkers were to present.

For purposes of examination, however, it is necessary to organize this wealth of material so as to find in it some semblance of order. The following schema, which we have worked out, is based directly on the division into chapters as given in Wigne. According to the chapter-headings there, the contents of the work have been arranged in four main sections, each with its own subdivisions. From this can be seen the general movement of the work as a whole, as well as the different emphasis which the author places on the more affective and mystical elements of the doctrine therein contained.

I CONSIDERATION OF SOUL VIA SOUL

- a) Chapters 1-8 incl. - Description of the nature and powers of the human soul which is an image of the Trinity; nature of man as composed of two substances, soul and body.
- 6-8 - reveal more mystical trend - Exemplarism.

- b) " 9-13 - life and activity of soul as shown in the gradation of its capacities from sense through wisdom. Identification of soul and faculties; its simplicity. Simple in its essence, it has multiple functions.

II RELATION OF SOUL TO BODY IN MAN

- a) " 14-19 - Soul is in body as ruler; it unifies the various elements of the bodily composition. Soul has two lives, one in God and one in body. Therefore, the ordering of body under soul and soul under God.
- 19-24 - Immolation in love of God frees favors conferred on man.
- b) " 25-28 - Placed midway between God and body, soul has powers directed to each. Towards body, a triple power as Natural, vital and animal - whence it is the soul working in the body which perceives in diverse ways. Psychic phenomena as dreams, visions, spectres. Actions of spirits on human beings.

III SOUL IN BODY AS DISTINCT SUBSTANCE - THEIR UNION IN MAN

- a). " 30-33 - from side of soul: independence of soul in itself as to its existence and activity.
from side of body: man is mortal; senses impede true knowledge; formation of senses and imagination from matter of body.
Union of soul and body by descent of soul into body via sensitization and sensibilization. Separation and spiritual activity of soul by ascent of soul from matter via meditation and contemplation.

IV HUMAN CONSTITUTION - BEFORE AND AFTER THE FALL OF MAN

Chapter 34 Theme introduced "While interior man" is the Anima; one in substance, the differentiation of names derives from plurality of functions. As God's image, soul bears its own trinity. Spiritus versus Anima twofold power of the single essence.

- a) " 35-39 - Dignity of human state as intended by God (state of innocence) Man's resemblance to God.
- b) " 40-43 - as actually existing in the present order (Fall and death) Restoration of lost likeness by baptism.
- c) " 44-54 - Present human dignity. The soul as mirror wherein soul sees God; Man has free-will; can even recognize the Trinity. Activities of interior man and primacy of self-knowledge as preferable to other sciences. Three degrees of rational knowledge.
- d) " 55-61 (mid)- Future life of soul in heaven; punishments to be feared, but especially happiness of heaven.
- e) " 61-65 - Happiness fulfills all man's capabilities of soul and body. Excitation on means of ensuring soul's happiness.

A study of the structural disposition of the parts of this schema will indicate the main lines along which Alcher formulated his teachings about the human soul. In the following chapter, therefore, we shall attempt to analyze this doctrine as it is exposed in the text of the SSA.

Chapter 3

DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMA

I

Purpose of the Treatise and Method

At the outset of his treatise, in the preface, Iohannes indicates the nature of the task he has set himself in composing the IMA. He proposes to examine the nature of the human soul and its homeland. Of the many difficulties involved in such an inquiry, he appears not to be unaware. But whereas he knows that the soul contains something of mystery in itself and hence cannot be comprehended solely by its own powers, still he is confident that the secrets of its nature will not remain closed to him, if he seeks God's help with humility and diligence; if he recognizes, that is, his utter dependence on God.

"Fieri autem non potest quatenus divina providentia ut invenirendi facultas desit religiosis animis se ipsos et Deum suum pie, caste, et diligenter querentibus; ideo reddam se mihi, hoc Deo rec, cui maxime se debet, ut videbo quid sit anima, et quae patria ejus." 1

Without doubt, then the purpose of the IMA is to study the human soul from the viewpoint of its essential structure and

the end towards which it is directed.

As proof that this was actually the direction of Alcher's thought, we may invoke the witness of Isaac of Stella's de anima to which the text is Alcher's reply. There, it is stated that Alcher's interest in the soul was of a philosophical character. He wanted to learn about the soul from the viewpoint of its essence and its powers, the possibility of its union with the body, and its immortality, as opposed to the theological description of the soul to be found in Scripture.

"Vis enim a nobis edoceri de anima, sed neque id quod in divinis litteris didicimus, id est qualis fuerit ante peccatum, est sit sub peccato, aut future post peccatum, sed de ejus essentia et viribus, quomodo sit in corpore, vel quomodo exeat." 2

In the previous chapter, we have seen something of the flavor which the mystical doctrine of St. Bernard enjoyed within the monasteries during the late twelfth century. Such a strong mystical tendency supposed, in its turn, some definite conception about the nature of the soul.³ For mysticism demands a program of asceticism, which presupposes an understanding of the mutual relations of the soul and the body in man. Given the proper conception of the human composite upon which such a mystical doctrine is founded, the question naturally arises as to how two essentially unlike substances, spirit and matter, can coexist in man with a

harmony which will ensure for him the full development of life. From the analysis was revealed the primacy of the soul wherein, as a rational spirit, man is made to the image and likeness of God. This was to discover the ideal of the primitive destiny of man and the deformation of his present state with its need of being reformed. This reformation, however, can be accomplished only when one has a clear understanding of what man's soul is and what it can become.

Such was the general framework within which the late twelfth century thinkers in general discussed so eagerly the nature of the soul,⁴ and such seems to have been the starting point of Alcher's inquiry.

Coupled with the theological concept of man as a creature made in the divine likeness and destined for union with God in heaven, there was the accompanying metaphysical notion of man's composite nature, of the union of soul and body within the unity of the human person. With the humble tools of faith and reason, Alcher, like many of his contemporaries, undertook to examine the human soul both as to its proper nature and powers and its union with the body in man.

From faith Alcher knew that the soul was created by God from nothing; that it was redeemed by God from sin and that it was destined to share in his happiness forever. From reason, he saw something of the dependence of the body on the

soul. Therefore, in looking for his salvation, Adam located the soul in its proper place in the hierarchy of being, as below God but above matter. Standing midway between God and body, it has relations with each, as being governed by God, but as governing the body. In this way, he distinguished within the soul a double aspect, which is signified by the twofold designation *Anima* and *Spiritus*. These two names, however, represent a two-fold power of one single substance. For although the soul is not of the same nature as God, still, as created in His image and likeness, it has one life in God, which constitutes the 'interior man', and another and a wholly different life in the body which it animates and vivifies; this is the 'exterior man'.

"Anima vero ex eo dicitur est quod animet corpus ad vivendum, hoc est vivificet. Spiritus est idem anima pro spirituali natura, vel pro eo quod spirat in corpore appellatus est spiritus. Anima et spiritus sunt idem in homine, quavis aliud notet spiritus, aliud anima...Humana anima quidem, quia in corpore habet esse et extra corpus, anima pariter et spiritus vocari potest...Duplex est quidem vita animae; alia qua vivit in carne, alia qua vivit in Deo..." 5

The original harmony which existed in man, when the soul was subject to God, and the body was subject to the soul was seriously impaired as a result of Adam's sin. Consequently, the opposition within this dual life of the soul is the effect of original sin. As man separated himself from God by looking outside himself and seeking satisfaction

in external things, so gradually these lesser things cease to absorb him until he forgets what he had been and becomes a stranger to himself. By the reverse process, then, by a turning from sensible things and a retracting within his self, into his own soul, man can attain to a knowledge of himself from which the harmony of his being can be re-established.

"Sicut enim pro rebus animæ usque ad mortalia lapsus est; sic regressus ejus in rationem esse debet, quæ impugnantibus vitis resistere valeat, ut secundum naturam suam vivat, et ordinari appetat sub illo a quo reus debet, et supra ea causa regere debet..." 6

By turning within, and recognizing himself as a rational spirit, man comes to know himself; there, in himself, he beholds the divine law according to which he was fashioned, and in that law, he can come to know something of the Creator Who made him but whom he cannot yet see directly in himself. Through such contemplation, the soul is drawn ever more closely to the Creator until it is finally united to Him by charity. In this way, the harmony of man's being will be restored and all the capabilities of man's soul will be fulfilled in that supreme union with God which constitutes the happiness of man.

"Accernat ergo (anima) et dividat se per se ab eo toto quod visibile videt in se; et invisibilem omnino se esse videt in eo quod videt se, et tamen visibile non posse videt. Melius elevat se supra se, et in eo quod est primum et principale speculum speculandi Dei, illiusque imaginis ad similitudinem primum et cognatum miris factus, invisibilem esse invenit. Hoc est autem ipsa ratio et sensus ratione utens, quæ ad similitudinem Dei facta est, et in ejus amore, quæ

contemplatione dulciter requiescere. Quia neque perfectius suum factorem manifestant, quae illius similitudini vicinius appropinquant. Haec autem est ipsa rationalis creatura, quae et excellenter et proprie ad illius similitudinem facta est; et tunc citius Creatorem suum, quem non videt, agnoscit et diligit, cum se ad illius imaginem factam intelligit." 7

Self-knowledge, then, offers the surest approach of the soul's return to God. For, by considering what is within itself when freed from the body with which it is joined, the soul is led to the contemplation of the divine image within itself, whence, penetrating beyond itself, it even attains to God.

"Ab hoc ergo mundo ad Deum revertentes...per nosmetipsos transire debemus. Ascendere enim ad Deum est intrare ad se ipsum; et non solum ad se intrare, sed ineffabili quodam modo in intus, se ipsum transire. Qui enim interiorius intravit et intrinsecus penetravit se ipsum transcendit, ille veraciter ad Deum ascendit..." 8

From these few considerations, we may not only reaffirm the author's purpose in composing his treatise, but we may, besides, discover the principal means whereby he hopes to accomplish it. His method is in keeping with his end. Because of the preeminence of the soul in the human composite, he proceeds according to the method of interiorization, passing from the exterior to the interior, and thence to the superior. In this manner, he describes the characteristic activities of the human soul,

"Cum ab inferioribus ad superiora volumus ascendere, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, post se

ratio, intellectus et intelligentia, et in summo est sapientia. Summa namque sapientia ipse deus est." 9

according as it progresses from the lowest knowledge by sense perception in which the soul, acting through the agency of the body, perceives the objects of the visible world, through its highest knowledge in wisdom, in which the soul, through its intelligence, transcends its own being to enter into converse with God.¹⁰

In the following analysis, we shall, in examining the doctrinal content of the work, use the same method of procedure which the author employed in composing it. We, therefore, sum up Alcher's position, at the outset, in order to indicate the general movement of the analysis.

The ends for which the soul was made, namely union with God, conditions the nature of the soul; this end is to be realized by a gradual unfolding of the soul's proper activities. These activities, in their turn, include certain relations which the soul bears to the body along with other relations which it has with God. Therefore, man's soul must be considered from a triple point of view; the presence of the soul in the human composite; the nature of the soul in itself as an independent substance; the destiny of the soul as orientated towards God. The analysis, as a result, will move throughout from the exterior world of the body towards

the interior world of the spirit, and thence to the transcendent world of the supernatural, where in, by grace, the soul attains to its final beatitude.

We shall begin the movement by establishing the legitimacy of the author's claim that the principal means of discovering the true nature and destiny of the human soul is self-knowledge, and then, pass on to show in what this self-knowledge consists.

II

The Necessity of Self-Knowledge - In What it Consists

A study of the human soul most naturally begins from its mode of being within the human composite. For man's soul was not determined for a separate existence, but immediately at its creation was conjoined to an earthly body which it was to inhabit.

"Deus omnipotens...nullis sui necessitate rationibus spiritus creavit ut eos suae beatitudinis participes faceret...atque alios ad probandas humilitatem et obedientiam in terrenis habitationibus terrenis corporibus sociavit, ut ad vires sensum luteam materiae vegetarent..." 11

The soul was not produced from any pre-existing matter but was created by God from nothing; at its creation, it received a form whereby it was made to the image and

likeness of its Creator.

"Anima non formatur ex materia inferiori, sed in sua creatione formam accipit quæ facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei..." 12

As such, it was breathed forth by God, the very breath of life, into matter already prepared for its reception; this matter, when vivified by the presence of the soul became a living human body.

"Spiraculum vitæ humanam animam intellige, quæ non pro utit terra vel aqua sed Deus inspirat; quo sensus corporis animantur; unde homo factus in animam viventem generatur..." 13

Such, then was the creation of the human soul. When God decreed, a rational soul was created and infused into the predisposed matter of the human body, and from the union of these two, a third substance was constituted, a living human being. Man, therefore, is a composite being, having a spiritual element as well as a material part, inasmuch as he is made up of soul and body.

"Dei vero iudicio conculgari in valva, et conquiri atque formari; ac firmato iam corpore, animam creari et infundi; ut vivat in utero homo ex anima et corpore constans, et egrediatur vivus ex utero plenus humana substantia..." 14

In this creation of human nature, God was prompted by no necessity. Out of the superabundance of His love, He made and destined him for a share in His happiness.¹⁵ But if man was to participate in God's happiness, he had to possess, in his nature, that whereby he could so participate. There could

be no participation without some similarity of being, for nature can act only in accordance with its being.

"Natura namque, prout Deus instituit, quod suum est operatur. Natura siquidem est quaedam vis et potentia divinitus rebus creandis insita, quae unicuique rei suum esse tribuit..." 18

Within man, consequently, there must be a certain affinity with the divine. This affinity can in no way come from the body, for God is wholly incorporeal¹⁷, and as such, beyond the reach of any body. It must, then, proceed from the soul.

Now the form by which the soul is characterized, by which it is made in the image of God, is reason. For this is what the soul most properly is, a rational spirit.

"Ratione insignita est anima...atque sic cetera animalia decenter excellat, utpote substantia rationalis. Hoc enim proprie est anima, substantia scilicet rationalis, id est spiritus rationalis..." 18

The human soul surpasses other living beings inasmuch as it has reason; and from its spiritual nature, it can both know and love God in whose image and likeness it was created.

"Anima rationalis et intellectualis facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, ut factorem suum pro imagine cognoscat, et pro similitudine diligit. Ex imagine scopus Dei habet rationem, et ex similitudine charitatem..." 19

By nature, man's soul is directed to know God and to love Him, and from this twofold natural tendency of his soul, man is said to be made to the image and likeness of the Creator.

From the image, the soul has reason that it may know God, and from the likeness, it has charity to love Him. The image of God appears in the rational intelligence, that is, the spiritual mind with its power of free-will. This is a natural endowment of human nature, and as such, is common to all men. By it, the soul has a dynamic tendency towards God in whom it recognizes its true end. Essentially a natural aptitude for God, the image is indelible and hence, cannot be lost.²⁰ But human nature is in no way constrained to follow this inclination, for man is entrusted to the freedom of his will. "Libertati siquidem arbitrii sui commissus est homo."²¹ Therefore, in the realization of this tendency, the fulfillment of this natural capacity for God, man remains perfectly free. He becomes only what he wills, what he loves. From this is derived his likeness to God.

As depending on free-will, the likeness is voluntary; it is acquired by human effort, and once acquired, can be lost again either in whole or in part. Such a loss, however, is always repairable from the image which man bears naturally within himself. "Sic homo ejus servabit similitudinem, cujus in se naturaliter portat imaginem..."²² Now, just as the divine image is revealed in human nature as rational, so the likeness is found in human freedom, in man's power of freely choosing. Accordingly, it is seen in man's conduct, his works and his virtues, for by these does a man prove his likeness (desire

to God.

"Apparet ergo Imago Dei in intelligentia rationali, in mente spirituali, in honore liberi arbitrii. Apparet similitudo Dei in moribus pro natura, in operibus pro justitia, in virtutibus pro gratia; ut moribus natura perornetur, ut justitia operibus comprobetur, ut gratia virtutibus compleatur, et sic se ex praeentetur homino..." 23

The Creator Who made man to His own image is clarity, goodness and justice, the perfection of all the virtues; so, man must strive to become charitable, good and just. And just as the more closely anything approaches to its maker, the greater becomes the likeness, as the more virtuous a man becomes, the closer is he to God and so much more like to Him. For it is in the love of virtue and its practice, proceeding from his power of choice, that man manifests his likeness to God.

"Nam sicut Deus creator, qui homines ad imagines suam creavit, est charitas, bonus et justus...ita homo creatus est ut charitatem haberet ut bonus esset et justus...si virtutes quanto plus quisque in se ipso habet, tanto propior est Deo, et majores sui Creatoris perit similitudines..." 24

Describing the soul as an image of God in this fashion, Alcher clearly distinguished therein its two faculties of knowing and loving, and saw the image as existing primarily in the intellect, while the likeness, he placed in man's will.

From that point of view the historic fact of the Fall of Adam and the consequent effects of original sin on human nature are of pivotal importance. For, by that sin, human

nature suffered a terrific loss. The soul, deprived of the fullness of its knowledge, was turned away from the Good towards which it naturally tended and the strength of its will was weakened. The nature of the soul, however, remained unchanged; it did not become irrational nor lose its power of election, its free-will.

"Postquam vero seductione serpentis per Evam cecidit, naturae humanae perdidit, perdidit et signum similitudinis; non tamen electionem, ne non esset eum, quod emendaret peccatum. Manet itaque ad quaerendam salutem arbitrii libertas, id est rationis voluntas; sed admonente prius Deo et inspirante ad salutem..." 25

Turned away from God by sin, man became perverted because he was at variance with God and separated from Him. He sought the good of his soul in external and inferior goods, and, becoming engrossed with these, the soul forgot its true nature. In this it forfeited its likeness to God.

"Corporeis vero passionibus consopitus, et per sensibiles formas extra semetipsum abductus, oblitus est quid fuit. Et quia nihil aliud se fuisse meminuit, nihil praeter quod videtur esse credit..." 26

Nevertheless, the soul itself remained what it was before, so that the image by which it naturally tended towards God was not destroyed; and it is from this that the likeness could be reformed.

"A quo (Deo) si avertitur (anima) remanet informis; quia dissimilis; nec ideo tamen efficitur irrationalis; quia restat imago Dei, inde et potest reformari..." 27

But human nature, abandoned to itself, could never repair its fault. Therefore, God took the initial step in man's restoration. He sent His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh to save man, and sent His Holy Spirit by whom I adopted man into sonship with Himself.²⁸ Out of love, then, God came to man and even Himself became man in order that man might return to God.

"Charitas est via Dei ad homines, et via hominum ad Deum. Per charitatem enim venit Deus ad homines, venit in homines, factus est homo. Per charitatem homines diligunt Deum, eligunt Deum, ad Deum currunt, ad Deum perveniunt..." 29

And it is in the knowledge and recognition of how much he owes to God that man's first impulse towards Him is accomplished.

"Mens itaque spiritualis, seu intelligentis rationalis, primo Creatorem suum aspiciat; deinde creaturam ipsius videat; et mediante arbitrii libertate ad eum, qui condidit omnia, se et cetera referat..." 30

By looking within himself and beholding what he really is; by acknowledging the image and likeness of God in which he was created in the first man, and to which he was even more wonderfully restored in the second man, does man dispose himself for the reforming of the divine likeness in his soul and his consequent return to God.

"Quapropter quisque diligentius attendat primae conditionis suae excellentiam, et venerandas sanctae Trinitatis in se ipso imagines agnoscat, honoresque divinae similitudinis, ad quam creatus est, nobilitate morum, exercitatione virtutum, dignitate meritorum habere contendat; ut quando apparerit qualis sit, tunc similis ei appareat, qui mirabiliter eum ad similitudinem suam in primo homine condidit, mirabiliusque in secundo, id est in se ipso reformavit." 31

For the things which restore the divine likeness in us are the contemplation of truth and the practice of virtue, inasmuch as man is like to God in being wise and just. Things reveal their author more perfectly according as they approach the more closely to his likeness. This remains true for the rational soul also which properly and in a unique way was made in his likeness. The soul knows its Creator when it does not see more quickly when it understands itself as created in his likeness.

"quae vero in nobis divinam similitudinem reperiunt duo sunt, id est speculatio veritatis et exercitium virtutum; quia in hoc homo similis est Deo, quod sapiens et iustus est. Quia aliquando perfectius auctorem suum manifestant quae illius similitudini vicinius appropinquant. Hoc autem est mens rationalis, quae excellenter et proprie ad similitudinem illius facta est; et tunc citius Creatorem suum, quem non videt, agnoscit, cum se ipsam ad similitudinem illius factam intelligit..." 32

From this it follows that man cannot know the Creator directly in this life. The fullness of knowledge which he enjoyed before the Fall is depleted.³³ Now, his knowledge of God comes obliquely through the divine image implanted in his rational soul. Hence, man must seek to know himself in order thereby to come to a knowledge of God which, in turn, will lead to union with him through love.

In this sense, self-knowledge is actually of fundamental importance for the soul. "Nulla scientia melior sit illa qua cognoscit homo semetipsum."³⁴ Compared with it, the other

knowledges pale into insignificance.³⁵ Its chief value is that it offers an easy approach to the knowledge of God, in which Alcher was primarily interested. For, to him, self-knowledge is not so much a question of the analysis and dissection of the self alone, but rather, as we may conclude, a coming to behold, through the superior powers of the soul, the image of the Creator within the soul and the abandoning this image to its natural inclination towards the Good. The soul, which so discovers itself, by definition discovers God, for in seeing what it is in itself, it sees itself as mirroring the divine perfections. How then could it know itself and not know its Creator?

"Deinde elevat (anima) se supra se, et in eo quod primum et principale speculum est speculandi Dei, illiusque integrali ac similitudini perfectae et cognatum magis factum, invisibilem Deum inspicit. Hoc est ipsa ratio et mens utens ratione, quae ad triam similitudinem Dei facta est, ut per se invenire possit eum a quo facta est, et in ejus amore atque contemplatione dulciter requiescere..." 36

Self-knowledge, therefore, offers the best and surest approach to a knowledge of God and becomes an indispensable condition of man's ascent towards the divine.

"Nunc revertamur ad speculum nostrum, et videamus quomodo per cognitionem nostri possimus ascendere ad cognitionem ipsius Dei..." 37

But Alcher seems to have been aware that such knowledge involved something more; it presupposed a certain understanding of the constitution of human nature. Therefore, he counselled

that in seeking self-knowledge one must first learn something of the nature of man.

"quisque ergo se talem reddi desiderat, qualis a Deo factus est, id est similem sibi, reflectat ad se, et stet in se, et sic intra semetipsum quærat, et videat unde constet homo, et ex qua parte sui factus est ad imaginem Dei..." 38

In company with the author, therefore, we are led to inquire "what is man?"

III

The Nature of Man

There is nothing original in Alcker's description of human nature. Man, for him, is the same complex being which previous thinkers had judged him to be. He is a composite made up of two distinct substances, soul and body; the soul is a spiritual substance endowed with reason, and is therefore independent; the body with its material senses is dependent on the soul for its being and activity.

"In duabus substantiis constat homo, scilicet anima et carne; animam cum ratione, carnem cum sensibus animæ; quoniam sensus non movet caro alioquin anima esset societas; anima vero rationale suum tenet sine carne..." 39

There is not room, then, for a third substance in man, according to Alcker, nor is there any need for such a one.⁴⁰ Human nature is complete when the rational soul, created by God, is infused into properly disposed matter which has been prepared for its reception. Of that union, man is born, a complete human person,⁴¹ possessing a human body oriented and

vivified by a rational soul, which, from its spiritual nature, is fitted to govern this body. "Animus est substantia quaedam rationis vertice, reserendo corpori incessante..."⁴² and again, "Animus corporis dominator, rector et habitator videt se in eo..."⁴³

Man's body is composed of wholly material elements brought together in certain due proportions and developed along with its formation in time. The matter of which it is composed can be nourished and moved and can grow and take on human shape before the reception of the soul; but that by which this matter is quickened into life and determined as specifically human is precisely the rational soul. To be living and human, then, the body must be joined to a rational soul.

"Homo namque corpus nec vivere nec nasci potest sine anima rationali; vegetatur tamen et movetur et crescit et humanam formam in utero recipit priusquam animam rationalem recipiat..."⁴⁴

For the soul is the orienting principle of the body.

"Anima nominatur totus homo interior, qui vivificatur, regitur, et continetur lutea illa massa, humectata succis, ne infecta dissolvatur..."⁴⁵

By its presence, the soul vivifies and unifies and sustains the body in its being. Further, it determines the proper proportion and fitness of the bodily parts, with a view not only to its beauty, but also to its growth and development.

"Praesentia namque sua illud (corpus) vivificat, colligit in unum, atque in uno tenet; defluere atque contabescere non sinit, congruentiam ejus adunquam conservat, non tantum in pulchritudine, sed etiam in crescendo atque rigendo..."⁴⁶

Just as it cannot exist without the soul, so neither can the body function without its help. For the bodily senses, as though organs of the soul's power, are rendered active only through the power conferred on them from the vital activity of the soul.

"Habet etiam corpus quicunque sensus, qui ex eo dicti sunt, quia per eos anima totum corpus subtilissime agit et vires sentiendi. Ita autem haec omnia adjuncta sunt animae, ut una res sit..." 47

In respect of its being and its activity, therefore, the human requires the presence of the rational soul.

The soul, on the other hand, is a spiritual substance possessing its own proper nature in which it surpasses all the elements. It does not need the body for its being, much less for its activity⁴⁸ because the human soul lives substantially (animam substantivam), and in this it differs from other souls.

"Solus hominem credimus habere animam substantivam, quae exuta corpore vivit, et sensus suos atque imperia vivaciter tenet...neque cum corpore moritur... quia substantialiter vivit; neque postmodum interitura...anima humana non cum carne moritur quia nec cum carne...seminatur...sed...dei judicio creari... diximus." 48

It was not generated with the body nor formed from any pre-existing matter, but was created directly by God, a rational spirit, according to His image and likeness.⁵⁰ It will not, therefore, die with the body because it was not so generated, but, after the body has returned to the earth from which it came, the soul still retains vitally its natural powers. From

its spirituality, the soul is immortal and cannot die nor can it cease to act.

Now, although the soul is an invisible and spiritual substance, always living and always in action, having its activity from itself and through itself, "Dum autem vivit in se, et ita se, et se et per se, sed non sicut solent..."⁵¹, still, it is so united to the body as to form one person with it. For, from the union of soul and body, the human person is constituted. Together they make up one individual, one man in whom there is something of both natures. Thus, soul and body, distinct in their natures, are joined in what Acher terms a personal union within the unity of man.⁵²

Now this union of two wholly unlike substances is accomplished Acher explains according to the principle that like attracts like. The soul descends to the body to vivify and sensify it, and, in its turn, the body ascends to the soul by means of the senses and the imagination. Between the highest bodily element, that is, the sensibility of the body, which is chiefly fire, and the lowest spirit, the phantasm of the soul, which is a certain fiery vigor, there exists a similarity such that, without any change in their natures, they can be joined in a personal union. In their extremities, as in most apt media, the soul which is truly spirit is united to a material body in such a manner as to form one

person with it. The union, therefore, is accomplished, in some ineffable manner, in the spirit i.e. in the phantom of the soul which is not a body but is like to body and the sensibility of body, which is almost a spirit inasmuch as it could not be without the soul. For just as the highest spirit, the intelligence bears the image and likeness of the higher being, God, so that it can be receptive of him and united in a personal union when he so wills, without thereby losing its own nature, so, in the same way, the highest body, that is, sensibility, bearing a likeness to the soul, can receive its essence in a personal union.

"Sunt etiam utriusque quaedam similia, corporis scilicet supremum, et spiritus infimus, in quibus sine naturarum confusione, personali tamen unione facile connecti possunt. Similia enim sunt similibus. Itaque anima quae vere spiritus est, et caro quae vere corpus est, in suis extremitatibus facile et convenienter uniantur, id est, in phantasiae animae, quod corpus non est sed simile corpori; et sensualitate carnis quae vere spiritus est, quia sine anima fieri non potest. Sicut enim supremum ens, id est, intelligentia sive mens imaginem et similitudinem gerit sui superioris, id est dei, unde et ejus susceptiva esse potuit, etiam unionem personalem etiam, quando ipse voluit, obsequi ulla demutatione naturae fuit assumpta; sic supremum corpus, id est, sensualitas animae gerens similitudinem ad personalem unionem ejus essentiam suscipere potest...Convenientissimam enim mediam sunt carnis et animae, sensualitas carnis, quae maxime hominis est: et phantastica spiritus, qui laevis vigor dicitur..." 52

Therefore, Alcher ruled out the need for a third substance in man; ⁵⁴ for, from this union of the soul with the body, a complete human person is constituted. He likewise dispenses with the necessity for a duality of souls. man

does not possess two souls, one, sensitive (animal), by which he is living and animated, the other, rational (spiritual), by which he knows. Rather, it is one and the same soul which both furnishes life to the body through the senses and sustains its own vital activity through the intellect.

"Non duas animas, sensualis et rationalis, altera qua homo vivat, et altera qua ut quidam putant, sapiat; sed una atque eadem anima in semetipso vivit per intellectum, et corpori vitam tribuit per sensus..."⁵⁵

For God willed that soul and body should become one man, so that, without violating either nature, something of the soul was added to the body and something of body was given to the soul for the unity of person, not for the diversity of nature. Whatever is proper to each becomes common to both, proper for the nature, common for the person.

"Fit enim auctore Deo anima et caro una individuum, unus homo; unde salve naturae utriusque proprietate adicitur carni quod animae est, et animae quod carnis est; pro unitate personae, non pro diversitate naturae. Sed igitur ibidem singularis est proprium commune fit commune; proprium pro natura, commune pro persona..."⁵⁶

Thus, in some remarkable manner, these two wholly unlike substances share a natural affinity for each other. By certain affections and a fondness for it, the soul is joined to the body in such a way as to have a love for it. No one ever hates his own body, however burdensome it may be for the soul. On the contrary, "the soul loves its prison" and withdraws from it very reluctantly; during life, it suffers with it in itself

those griefs with which it sees the body afflicted, and although the soul in no way needs the body, still, it is greatly afflicted when it must depart from it.

"quibusdam affectibus et quodam sollicitudine animae corpori conjungitur, secundum sollicitudinem quo carnis suae officio let. Societas namque illi, licet ejus societate praeferatur, inabili tamen conditione diligit illud; sentit carcerem suum, et ideo libera esse non potest. Caloribus ejus vehementer afficitur. Periclitatur interitum quae mori non potest. Timet defectum suum, per naturam non potest deficere. Oculorum speculatione delectatur, sonoris delectatur auditibus, suavissimis jucundatur odoribus, laeta epulatione reficitur. Et licet his rebus nullatenus ipsa utatur, prae vi tamen coherere colligitur, si subtrahantur..." 57

Indeed, so strong is the attachment between them that the guilt of original sin which was contracted in the flesh has its repercussion in the soul. Hence, the life of the soul must be renewed by Baptism.

"exinde fit animae originali culpae obnoxio, quam caro contrahit, et animae refundit, cum qui unita est in persona, licet divisa sit in natura. Et propter necesse est parvulus, dum vivit, Christi sacramento renovari, ne debeat ejus animae societas carnis peccati, quae gravatur etiam corpore aucto, nisi dum in corpore vivit, salutari fuerit remedio expiata..." 58

In fact, even after death, the soul will be reunited to its body for all eternity. "Ipsa enim corpus et nunc et in fine semper est habitura animam cum qua facta est una persona." 59

Death, in this way, is viewed as a historic incident in the life of man. The soul is, by nature, spiritual and hence, immortal; therefore, it cannot die. The body, on the

contrary, receives all its life from the soul's presence within it. Consequently, there is in man, in whom both body and soul are united, a mortal element as well as an immortal. And just as life is the result of their union, so death is caused by their separation. For each does not acquire what is joined, but rather divides it and returns each to its own origin - the body to dust and the soul to God. Just as the sun brings the light of day when it comes, so too, the soul brings life to the body when it comes and causes death when it withdraws. But the soul itself does not lose its own power when it leaves, and so our life does not end with death. It simply leaves what which it had vivified and thereby causes its death; for death is caused by not-vivifying what it has deserted, not by losing what is living. The death of man, then, is nothing other than the return to the earth from which it was taken of his body, whence the animating principle has withdrawn, and the consequent loss of animation which the body possessed only from the soul.

"Ex corpore et anima constat homo; et quidquid oculis corporeis videtur, propter corpus factum est, corpus propter animam, anima autem propter deum. Vita corporis animae est; vita animae deus est. Immortalis anima est, quia carne caret... Et idea in morte nostra non perit, sed corpus destituit, dum discedens anima via suam non reddit, sed quod vivificaverat hoc dimittit et quantum in se est, ad terram alacris facit, quam carnis recessus, a qua eius vis vegetativa vivificantis a secesserit, in terram se non recedat est reddit, ut sensibus quos non per se habet restituit. Anima, non aliter quam sol lucem diem, vitam infundit carni cum venerit; carnes efficit, cum recedit. Terra tamen non consumit conjuncta, sed dividit cum originali suae at usque reddit..." 60

From this is seen the validity of the philosophers' judgment and the significance of their definition of man. "Homo est animal, rationale, mortale". Herein they have taken into account his two-fold nature, as being part matter and part spirit, from which they have located man in his proper place in the hierarchy of creation, above the beasts and lower things to govern them, and beneath God to whom he himself is subject. He is the meeting point of the two worlds, of spirit, above, and of matter, below, in both of which he participates. Thus, man's unique position as well as his duty becomes clear. He must subject his animal nature, his bodily passions, to reason, and direct his reason, in turn, to God. For to this end is the complexity of his nature, that both the earthly in him as well as the divine may be satisfied. Just as the soul was turned away from God by the consideration and enjoyment of what is transitory and passing, so its return to Him is by reason, by which the soul can resist the warring vices and order all things according to their due ends, that is, the body to the soul and the soul to God.

Illud significat nos in fine movere debet, quod a veteribus sapientibus ita homo definitur est: 'Homo est animal, rationale, mortale.' Hoc genere posito, quod animal dicitur est, additis duas differentias videmus, quibus ad operum erat homo, et quo sibi esset redeundum et fruendum. Sicut enim incremens animae usque ad animalia lapsum est; sic re-vertens ejus in rationem esse debet, qua insuperantibus vitis resistere valeat, ut secundum naturam suam vivat et ordinari appetat sub illo a quo re-verti debet, et supra se quo pervenire debet. Homo verus, quia rationale dicitur, secundum se hostilis; alio, quod est in, a divinis. Illud alio retineat, hostis erit; alio alio se evertit, ad divinos non perveniet..." 61

such is the direction of man in fulfilling the proper end of his being--a turning from what pertains to the body to strive after things of the spirit. For from his two-fold nature he has a two-fold good. The good of the body, without, in which consists the world and pleasures, and within, the good of the soul, namely, God and the delight of His presence. The first is exterior; the second most interior and above all things. Thence, in returning to God man must turn within himself in order therefrom to rise to God. He must go from the external world of body into the region of his own soul and thence ascend to the Creator.

"Et sic patet quod anima rationalis homo, et ultimus terminus salutis, in quo consistit beatitudo. Anima rationalis est ens, et essentialiter individuum spiritus. Anima rationalis est immortalis, et immortalis immutabilis spiritus. Anima rationalis est interior, et interiorior profunditatis suae. Et mundus iste est exterior. Ens autem interior. Nihil enim eo intus, et nihil eo praesentius. Interior est enim res, quia ipse est super omnia. Ab hoc ergo mundo ad revertentes, et quasi ab hoc sursum ascendentes per necessitatem transire debemus." 82

From this preeminence of the soul in man springs Alcher's conception of personality and his theory of the body-soul relations consequent upon it. He emphasizes the absolute distinction between the two substances brought together in man's nature by placing the essence of the human person in the soul: "Una(nature) interior, quae est ipse homo, quoniam sens unus omni, ipse est ipse";⁸³ and again, speaking of the distinctively human element as reason:

"Tanto maior necessitas indicitur homini exercendae rationis, quanto maiorem defectum patitur sensualitas. Ratio autem inde incipit unde aliquid occurrit, quod nobis cum animalibus non sit commune..." 64

Soul and body do not form the composite human person in exactly the same relation as posited by Aristotle and developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. On the contrary, the body contributes nothing to the soul but is simply conjoined to it; it can be called a person solely from the fact that it partakes of the personality of the soul. Alcher's position here is closer to that of St. Augustine in that he holds sensation to be rather an act of the soul in the body. Knowledge, therefore, comes not so much through the senses as through the mediation of the soul. The soul is the sufficient principle of all the characteristically human activity of man. Through the power of sensation, the soul reaches out to the sensible, whereas man's relation to the suprasensible has its term in reason or intellect.

"Intendit se etiam animus in tactum, et eo calidum et frigidum, asperum et lenius, durum et molle, grave et leve, sentit atque discernit. Deinde innumerabiles differentias asperum, adurum, concursum atque formicarum gustando, olfaciendo, audiendo, videndaeque dijudicat; atque in his sensibus ea quae secundum se ipsam sui corporis sunt appetit, fugitque contraria...Cum ergo vult intelligere vel divina, vel humana, vel se ipsum, suasque considerare virtutes, abstrahit se ab omnibus corporis sensibus, quibus non adjuvatur nisi ad corporeas formas colorumque sentientes; et spiritu et ratione se elevat, meditatione atque contemplatione ad Deum ascendit..." 65

It should be abundantly clear, from the foregoing, by the author's study of man's nature proceeds as it does, in the direction of the Augustinian interiorism; and why this, in its turn, necessitates a detailed examination of the nature of the human soul as such. Such a study must take its point of departure from some consideration of the human body as the visible instrument of the soul...and must reach its termination in the union of the soul with God which is the perfection of its highest powers. It is to this study, in the order followed by Alcher, that we shall now direct our thought.

IV

The Rational Soul in Man

A

The Human Body

Despite his reputation for learning in the physical sciences, Alcher's description of the composition of the human body, as it appears in the text, is quite ordinary and scanty enough. There is sufficient evidence, however, from the various sections which he has conscientiously made of the body that he was quite in agreement with the opinions of his predecessors, and that he found them adequate for his own purpose. He added nothing to them. His contribution is tantamount to a re-

statement of what thinkers before him had held.⁶⁶

In assembling his notions about the human body, we shall do well to recall the probable reason for Alcker's writing on the subject at all. Isaac of Stella had indicated in a letter to Alcker that knowledge of the composition of the human body would provide a good starting point for an understanding of the human soul and its mode of union with the body.⁶⁷ In his reply to Isaac, therefore, Alcker gives information about the body which seems to be directed to that very end, and which, of its nature, leaves little room for doubt as to Alcker's real motive in discussing the question. The body in itself seems to be of little account; its importance derives from the fact that it is a means whereby Alcker may learn something about the rational soul.

His teaching, in this way, quite naturally divides itself into two parts, according as the author considers the body in itself as to its physiological composition, or in its relation to the soul of which it is the instrument. We shall follow this division and look first at the physiological make-up of the body.

(a) Elements and humors:

The human body, when taken from the dust of the earth, is material; its constituents are the four elements, the proper

quality of each of which is to be observed in the bodily structure. Thus, earth, the heaviest of the elements, appears in the flesh and the bones, on account of its solidity; water is to be found in the bodily humors, while air and fire are in the lungs and heart respectively.

"HUMANUS SQUIDEO CORPUS EX QUATUOR ELEMENTIS COMPOSITUM EST; SED IN CARNE ET OSSIBUS TERRA MAXIME APPARET PROPTER TERRÆ SOLIDITATEM; AQUA IN HUMORIBUS, AER CONTINETUR IN PULMONE...SEDES IGNIS EST IN CORDE; ET IDEO INFERIUS EST ISTUD; ET SUPERIUS ACUTUM, QUONIAM FORMAM IGNIS RETINET." 68

To these four primitive elements, then, the physiological structure of the body can be reduced. For the elements are all contained in the foods from which the humors are formed; from the humors, certain like natures (*consimilia*) result and from these like natures the various functions are determined for the exercise of which the organic members are given. In briefest outline, the author describes how the composition takes place:

"CORPORIS AUTEM COMPOSITIO SIC FIT. CORPUS CONSTAT EX OFFICIALIBUS MEMBRIS; OFFICIALIA EX CONSIMILIIBUS, CONSIMILIA EX HUMORIBUS; HUMORES EX SIBI; SIBI EX ELEMENTIS..." 69

Still, while these elements form the basic constituents of the body, as being wholly material, they cannot of themselves constitute the human body as such. But, by the presence of the soul, the matter is quickened into life and, by its governance,

the elements and humors are drawn together into a unity. The dry and solid earth becomes moistened with the humors and the fire of the heart is automatically cooled by the air always in motion, lest the heart be consumed and dissolved by its excessive heat. That whereby the material components of the body are unified and animated is a vital principle, the soul, which vivifies, unifies and sustains the body in being.

"Anima nominatur totus homo interior, qua vivificatur, regitur et continetur inter illa membra, humectata succis, ne arefacta dissolvatur..." 70

and again: *"Anima praesentia sua vivificat corpus, colligit in unum, atque in unum tenet."*⁷¹

To explain how the incorporeal soul controls and sustains the material body in being and activity, Acker has recourse to the law of attraction. The spiritual soul rules the body through its subtler parts, fire and air, which are most like to spirit. Directly beneath the spirit, the whole mass is governed according to the functioning of these two bodies, for without them, there would be no sensitivity in the body nor any spontaneous movement of body by the soul. Being light and purer, fire and air move the heavier elements, water and earth, and are therefore, confined within the moist and earthy body through the presence of the soul, so that there is produced a tempering and balance of all four elements.

"Cum anima sit incorporea, per subtiliorem a lumen corporis sui, id est per ignem et aerem quae in isto nostro mundo recte laxata sunt corpora et ideo magis spiritu similiora, corpus edocuit. Ita siquidem priores excipiunt motus animae vivificantis eo quod incrementa et urae sunt propinquiores quam humor et terra, et ad aerem proximum ministerium tota moles administratur. Nullus sine dubio hic vel in corpore sensus est; vel ab anima spontaneus motus corporis. Ignis enim et aer quae leviora sunt, movent aquam et terram quae gravia sunt. Quapropter corpora etiam post animae praesentiam tenentur in corpore terreo et humido, ut omnium calor fiat temperatus..." 72

The principal constitutive of the complexion of the body is the harmonious combination of the four elements in such wise that the contraries may achieve a perfect balance. This is effected through the soul. If such a state of equilibrium continues, the body retains its life and its health; if, on the other hand, the due measure and proportion is destroyed, the bodily life and health is impaired. Thus, certain kinds of sleeping disorders, as well as the passions, are seen to arise from illregulated humors and such physiological conditions.

"In hoc genere est epilepsia... nec non est alius nini quaedam ranciditas a stomacho vel a corde ad cerebrum ascendens, et ibi via arteriae comprimens..." 73

The powers of the soul by means of which this normal state of equilibrium is maintained within the body are called the vital forces.

(b) Vital forces

Bodily life is derived from and sustained by the vital activity of the soul. The soul, infused by God into its earthly habitation, has powers by which it unites with the body. These are three in number and differ both according to the sensible organ through which they function and the end to which they are directed. As intended simply for the sustenance of life, it is the VITAL power, of which the heart is the organ; for the conservation and propagation of life, it is VITALIAL and is exercised through the liver; for the perfection of life, it is ANIMAL and resides in the brain.⁷⁵

Since these powers have to do directly with the body, they can be said to be powers of the body as well as of the soul, inasmuch as they are produced by the soul in the body and could not be without both.

"Iste visus tam animae quam corporis dici possunt; quia ab anima in corpore fiunt, nec sine utroque fieri possunt..." 76

For the soul, being immaterial, cannot function in the body except through the instrumentality of the bodily members.

Now through the power of sense the soul approaches the body through the intermediary of the sense organs.

"Sensus vero unus est in anima...et cum corpore non sit, corporeus scilicet, quia corpus non transcendit; vel quia corporalia instrumentis exercetur, et ab numerum instrumentorum quinque partibus dicitur..." 77

(c) Senses (Sensus)

The body has five senses or as inasmuch as the power of sense passing from the soul through the various organs is affected by sensible objects in a five-fold manner. "Exterior homo circa ista temporalia quinque partito a sensu afficitur, id est, visu, auditu, tactu, odoratu et tactu..."⁷⁸ They are called the five senses of the whole body from its power of feeling.

"Habet etiam corpus quinque sensus, qui ex eo dicti sunt, via per eos anima totius corporis subtilissime arbitrat vigore sentiendi..."⁷⁹

Thus, the soul acts through the sense of touch and by that feels and perceives hot and cold, hard and soft, rough and smooth, heavy and light. Then, by tasting, smelling, hearing and seeing, it discerns innumerable distinctions of flavors, odors, sounds and shapes.⁸⁰ But the senses are helped exteriorly, for although the organs are apt by nature to function, still they do not accomplish their object without the help of an exterior medium, e.g. light for the eye and sound for the ear. To illustrate how the power of sense requires the cooperation of the bodily organ and some external medium, Alcher describes the process of sensation in the following manner.

That which in the body is most subtle, and therefore, nearer and more like to the soul than the others, namely, light, is diffused first of all through the eyes themselves;

it shines forth from the rays of the eyes to behold visible objects. These latter are mixed at times with a pure air; at other times, with a misty air, or again, with a denser or more earthly air; and in this manner, the five-fold sense is brought into play with the very sense of the eyes where alone it excels.

"Corporis sensus sic fiunt. Quod est in corpore subtilissimum et ob hoc saltem subtilius et vicinius quam cetera, id est, lux, primum per oculos ipsos diffunditur, exitque in radiis oculorum ad visibilia intuenza; deinde natura quidam modo cum aere puro, secundo cum aere caliginoso atque nebuloso, tertio cum corpulentiores humore, quarto cum terrena crassitudine, quinque sensus cum ipso sensu oculorum perficit, ubi ipse sola excellit..." 81

Consequently, as if to indicate their superior position and function in the human body, these senses are all placed in man's head (face) inasmuch as it was into his face that God breathed the breath of life, whereby man became a living being. It seems fitting, then, that the organs which receive this life through sensation should likewise be found in the highest portion of the human body, because as instruments of the soul, they approach more nearly to it.

"Isti sensus quia in sola facie praesentati sunt, idcirco scripsit arbitrari quod Deus 'in faciem hominis' levit humiliter, iraculum vultu et factus est in animam viventem." 82

The sense organs, then, are the proper channels by means of which the vital forces are transmitted to the body from the soul. As such, they are important since without

the agency of these bodily organs, neither human life nor the activity which flows from it could long continue. Still, their importance is to be measured only in terms of the soul from which they derive their efficacy. For the force which animates the body in the beginning and which supplies its vital activity throughout does not result from the body in any sense, but solely from the soul. In a very real sense, therefore, the body is seen to be an instrument of the soul. The exact nature of this instrumentality of the body is not too hard to define; it obtains from the relations which obtain between the body and soul in man.

At the basis of bodily life are the three principal organs, the heart, the liver and the brain, each of which, in turn, requires the help of lesser organs for the welfare of the living being. The heart depends on the proper functioning of the lungs which automatically temper the cardiac heat; the liver attends the circulation of the blood throughout the body thus ensuring a state of equilibrium of the elements; it is dependent for this on the veins and arteries which prevent a stagnation and ensure fluency in any one part. From the brain is controlled the whole nervous system where in all the bodily movements originate and are controlled.⁸³

Such a perfectly disciplined agency and ordered functioning of the bodily organs reveals the presence of some dominating principle, a vital force, which has for office to sustain life in us and to ensure the development of the several organs. This is the soul which has been infused into the body to give it life and sensation. "Vivificationes et sensificationes descendit animus ad corpus."⁸⁴ So close is the relationship existing between the body and soul in man, that if either be wanting, human life immediately ceases. The soul is life, living from itself; when infused into the body, it vivifies it so that the body becomes not life, but living. The life of the body depends on the soul and can it retain any life but that which flows into it, therefore.

"Vita animus est, vivens quidem, sed non aliunde quam se ipsa; et ab hoc non tam vivens, quem vita est. Unde est quod infusa corpori vivificat illud, ut sit corpus de vitae presentia, non vita, sed vivens..."⁸⁵

Something of the nature of the relation which exists between the two can be learned from the definitions in which Aicher describes the soul. He calls it "mensura substantie, rationis participans, regendo corpori subordinata."⁸⁶ wherein he indicates not only the soul's superiority as a rational substance, but its natural aptitude to rule the body by reason of that same superiority. For the human soul alone of all spiritual substances inhabits an earthly body.⁸⁷ In this it is distinct from angels. Thus, however mysterious may be

the manner of its vivifying that body, it is clear that the soul retains its native superiority over matter, so that it dwells in the body as its governing and directive principle. "Corporis dominator, rector et habitator."¹⁰

The conjunction of spirit and matter in man is effected in a supra-rational, unintelligible way. All that can be considered is that the soul, united to a physical nature, operates in and around this nature. In some inexplicable fashion, the soul can be perfectly adapted to the needs of this inferior nature without losing any of its own energy or intellectual power. The soul does not meet the body from within, as though it were enveloped by matter, nor from without, as though enveloping matter. Rather, it is in the body as being both interior and exterior, both superior and inferior. By governing, it is superior; by supporting, inferior; by animating and giving the body being, it is interior; by enclosing and regulating its movements, it is exterior. It is within in such a way as to be also outside, and it supports, so as also to govern. The soul is in the body in the same manner in which God is in the world... its proper mode being allowed to each.

"Ex qua re intelligitur, quod ita est anima secundum suum modum in suo corpore, sicut Deus in suo mundo. Interior siquidem et exterior, superior et inferior est; repledo superior, portando inferior, replendo interior, circumdando exterior. Sic est intus, ut extra sit; sic portat ut praesidet..." 39

So there is no part of the body where the soul can be localized; it is everywhere whole and entire working throughout the whole body in the bodily organs, not by spatial extension but by vital intension.

"Hic anima...ter totum corpus diffunditur, non locali distensione, sed vitale intensione..." 90

The soul is not lessened in the smaller members of the body, nor is it increased in those more fully developed. "Hic anima nec minutis membris minuitur, nec adunctis augetur." 91

The body, then, is for the soul as though a musical instrument, an organ. Just as the organ, when its parts are properly coordinated, emits melody on being touched, whereas, if the parts are not perfectly arranged and in good order, the organ is useless and no sound escapes it; so with the soul. It has received the body wholly as an instrument. The various bodily members are "touched" by certain of the soul's activities. When these organs are normally constituted, the impulses of the soul find there a faithful echo; but when disarranged or diseased, the activity of the soul is either slowed down or even entirely disappeared. For not having the means whereby to exercise its powers, the soul ceases from those movements in which it moved the body through space and time.

"...sed in istis (membris) tanquam in organis agit (anima)...Cor, ut autem quod prius integrum tanquam organum constitutum et dispositum erat, ut velis musicum in se contineret et sonum resonaret, tale constructum et institutum esse oportet. Si vero...non habens ubi vires suas exerceret, remaneat et his rebus actibus, sicut a corpore per ipsum et ipsum movetur." 92

But above all these is human life. For God willed man to be, not a stone or a tree, nor simply an animal, but an animal endowed with intelligence; and therefore, to man He gave the power to live and feel and judge.

"...non lapide, non arbore, nec aves vel aliquod
de animalibus aliis sed hominem se voluit esse;
dedit mihi vivere, sentire, discernere..." 54

Therefore, man's spirit is wholly different from the animal soul. The latter is bound to the senses and is measured by sensation in its choice; the human spirit, on the contrary, governs the senses in matter and judges their impressions. It is distinct from the phenomenon of sensation, yet is capable of experiencing a variety of sensations. Its astonishing capacity makes it the treasure-house of everything in the world. Of the sensations conveyed by the sense organs, it conceives likenesses in the imagination. It records what is of interest in the memory, impressing more profoundly the ones which are to be received with care, while giving only a passing attention to some other objects.

In this way, sense gives birth to imagination; imagination to reflection; reflection leads to meditation. Meditation encourages those activities of the mind and reason which are proper to the soul and which prepare the way for its highest act of intelligence.

"Sensus parit illius imaginationem, imaginatio cogitationem, cogitatio meditationem. Meditatio acuit ingenium, ingenium rationem; ratio conducit ad intellectum, intellectus ad intelligentiam, intelligentia per contemplationem ipsam veritatem administratur et per charitatem in de collectur." 55

but this is the proper sphere of the spirit wherein the soul dispenses with the instrumentality of the body and functions independently as a rational spirit in its own right.

II

The Human Soul

From the wonderful agency of the organs of the human body, from the order and regularity with which they normally function, there is manifested the existence of an inner vital force which directs them. This power, by whose presence the material body is vivified and held together in unity, we have seen, is the soul. The soul, therefore, is the principle of bodily life and movement in man.

But the soul itself is not visible to us. We are made aware of its existence only indirectly, through its external manifestations in the body. "Animus invisibilis est...Videtur tamen in corpore per corpus, sicut sensus in littera sonat, et per litteram videtur."⁹⁶ However, the soul is visible to itself; it knows itself through its own powers and can see itself in itself. It does not need the help of bodily eyes, but rather, separating itself from the corporeal senses, the soul recoils within itself and beholds what it is in itself. In this it is held to be radically distinct from the body which it governs and inhabits.

"Animus corporis dominator, rector, habitator, videt se per se; per se ipsum sensitus videt. Non querit auxilium corporalium sensuum, nec vero ab oculis corporis sensibus iniqua impedientibus et perstreptantibus abstrahit se ad se, ut videat se in se, ut moveat se ad se..." 97

Just as the life and movements of the body reveal the presence of the sensible soul in man, so too, from the characteristic activities of the soul itself, do we come to learn something of its nature.⁹⁸

About the soul's origin there is uncertainty. It had a beginning; it will not have an end..."Ignoramus habens originem; initium habet, finem non habet."⁹⁹ Alcher believes that it comes from God by way of creation. The soul was created; it is not God nor is it of the same substance as God, for it is not possible for a mutable substance like the soul to be identical with the unchangeable substance of God.

"Anima non est pars Dei. Probat hoc mutabilitas quam incurrit. Deus enim immutabilis est: nec soepe mutatur, pro culpa quandoque deus, pro peccatis quoque fit miser..." 100

Nor was it formed from matter, else it would be corporeal. But the soul is not corporeal in the sense of having bodily dimensions or material limitations, because it lacks all quantity. "Non habet tamen corporalem dimensionem, nec corporalem circumscriptionem; quoniam corporalis quantitatis experta est."¹⁰¹

If, then, God did not form the soul from His own substance, nor from any pre-existing matter,¹⁰² it remains that He fashioned it from some pre-existing spiritual substance or from nothing. Alcker favored the latter alternative. The human soul was created by God ex nihilo.

"Non est credenda (anima) pars, sed creatura Dei, nec etiam de substantia Dei, vel de quolibet elementorum materia, sed ex nihilo creata..." 103

The moment of its creation is not certain. The author does not believe that it was created in the beginning, with the angels, nor that all souls were created together at one time. Rather, each individual soul is created by God, at a time known only to Him, apart from the body, and is infused into the body by God when the matter is properly disposed for its reception.

"Credimus animas non esse ab initio cum angelis, nec simul creatas, sicut Origenes fingit. Nec per coitus cum corporibus seminantur, sicut Luciferiani et Cyrillus, ut aliqui laborum praesumptores affirmant. Sed dicimus eas esse creaturas solius aeterni Creatoris noster;...Dei vero iudicio (corpus) conulari in vulva, et coipisci atque formari; ac postea in corpore, animam creari et infundi..." 104

Unlike bodies, which had their beginnings, hidden and all at once, to be developed along with their creation in time, souls are created ex nihilo every day. Each soul is a new creation; not new in the sense that a special divine decree is necessary to state what its nature shall be like; but new in the sense that each soul is created

separately. Therefore, all souls were, at one and the same time, preordained to God's image and likeness according to a similar form. They are not, however, created all at once according to their essence. For while bodies can be generated from other bodies, spirits cannot, in any manner, be generated from spirits.

"Dicimus autem rationales animas pro essentia fieri quotidie de nihilo novas, sed pro consilii natura ex institutione divina, non utique novas. Quales enim in exordio Deus die sexto masculo et feminæ dedit, tales quotidie inspirat singulis, novæ de nihilo creatione, non novæ institutione... Res vero corporeæ post primam sui creationem novæ nullæ creantur, sed simul in exordio conditæ temporali formatione propagantur. Animæ autem non simul essentialiter factæ sunt, sed pro natura consilii qua ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei fiunt, et simul factæ reputantur, et non simul editæ judicantur; non simul editæ pro essentia, sed simul factæ pro compari forma ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei prærogata. Caro de carne generando traducitur, sed spiritus de spiritu animæ propagatur..." 105

The several descriptions of the soul which Alcher offers agree in defining it as a spiritual substance, possessed of reason and free-will.¹⁰⁶ As spiritual, the soul is wholly different from the body and hence, lacks all those characteristics which are peculiar to matter.¹⁰⁷ From the outset, he insists that the soul is invisible and incorporeal. Because of its spiritual nature, the soul cannot be seen although it can be known in itself. It is without any admixture of concrete or earthly elements, hence it possesses neither weight nor shape nor color. Therefore, it is invisible. It lacks all corporeal dimensions; it is not circumscribed in

space nor limited by any members nor determined to any one place, because it is not extended through the intervals of space. Therefore, it is incorporeal.

"Ut cum sit spiritualis naturae, nihil habet mixtum concretumque terrenum, nihil humidum, aereum vel igneum; nullum habet colorem, nullo loco continetur, nullis membris circumscribitur, nullo spatio finitur; sed ita est cogitanda et intelligenda, sicut sapientia, iustitia, et ceterae virtutes ab Omnipotente creatae..." 108

On the other hand, although it is spiritual, the soul is not to be identified with God nor is it any part of His substance. The soul was created by God out of nothing; consequently, it is wholly different from Him ... as different as Creator is from creature.

"Animo vero...non habens ubi vires suas exerceat, requiescit ab his tantum actibus, quibus corpus per tempus et locum movebat, ipse per tempus illocaliter mota...Deus autem corpore non eget ut sit; nec loco ut alicubi; nec tempore, ut aliquando; nec causa, ut alicunde; nec forma, ut aliquid sit; nec aliquo genere subjecti in quo subsistat, vel cui assistat..." 109

The soul has its own proper nature which is more excellent than all the earthly elements, and which cannot be grasped truly in any of the phantasms of the corporeal images which we perceive with our bodily senses. It can, however, be understood by the mind and experienced by its life. It can be understood; it cannot be sensibly perceived.

"Nihil enim quoddam proprium naturae, omnibus his mundanis mole elementis excellentiores quam terrenae non possit in aliqua phantasia corporalium imaginum, quas per sensus carnis percipimus cogitari; sed

the fact that the Government has not yet decided on the
the question of the proposed extension of the railway line
to the north of the city.

The Government has also decided to build a new
road from the city to the north, and to build a new
road from the city to the south. The Government has
also decided to build a new road from the city to the
east, and to build a new road from the city to the
west.

The Government has also decided to build a new
road from the city to the north, and to build a new
road from the city to the south. The Government has
also decided to build a new road from the city to the
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east, and to build a new road from the city to the
west.

mente intelligi, vitæque sentiri. Intelligi potest, sentiri non potest. Non enim est corpus, nec sensus, nec vita sine sensu, qualis est in arboribus, nec vita sine rationali mente, qualis est in animalibus; nec vita et vita perpetua." 110

Now, the soul surpasses all other living things in being a rational substance. For it is by its reason, which characterizes it, that, instructed in the highest arts and disciplines, it may know what is divine and great of what is human. By nature, therefore, the soul is rational spirit. 111

Located, thus, between God and body, the soul is related to each. It has a two-fold life, one by which it lives in God; and one, by which it lives in the body, "duplex est quidem vita anime; alia qua vivit in carne, et alia qua vivit in Deo", 112 for the body was made for the soul and the soul is God. 113 Whence, from its position midway between the two, the soul can be said to be both mortal and immortal; corporeal and incorporeal. For in respect of God who is immutable and absolutely without change, the soul is subject to a certain mutability whereby it passes from a state of ignorance to knowledge, from willing to not-willing, from forgetting to remembering. In this sense, the soul is moved through time; it is not, however, moved through space because it is not extended in space.

"Anima inter eam et corpus perita per tempus movetur, vel resuscitando, unde collata fuerat, vel discedo quod ignorat, vel volendo unde voluit; per locum vero non movetur, quia per locum statim non distenditur..." 114

The soul is by nature immortal, lest it should be deprived of its likeness to the Creator. For if death could terminate it, the soul could not be the image and likeness of God. Our life does not end with the death of the body; but after it has left the body, the soul does not lose its own powers, it does not cease to live and feel.¹¹⁹ Therefore, according to its natural mode of life which it can in no way lose, the soul is immortal.¹²⁰

There is, nevertheless, a kind of death which the soul can suffer, since to God alone, who is immutable in His Being and will, immortality, in a strict sense belongs. Man's soul is naturally endowed with free-will, so that by its own power of choice, it can become either good or evil; and according to this mutability, whereby it becomes better or worse, the soul is mortal. *Anima est spiritus intellectualis, rationalis...hence estque voluntatis capax*¹²¹ and again, "...substantia rationalis...in bonum vel in malum convertibilis."¹²² Therefore, the soul is mortal in so far as it can be changed for the worse by becoming alienated from the will of God by participating in which it was made good. For God is the life of the soul; sin is its death. Scripture teaches that the soul which has sinned will die; whereas the soul which has done justice and judgment will live and will not die.¹²³ Still, this death does not affect the essence of the soul. It does not thereby cease to live and feel, since it cannot lose the

power of sense by which it will be made happy or otherwise after this life.

"Et ideo aliquatenus est mortalis in quantum in deterius malari, et a voluntate dei cuius participatione bona fit, aliter non potest; et aliquatenus immortalis, quoniam sensum, in seipso habet vitam vel beatitudinem vel esse sit, existere non potest." 119

Thus, the human soul is not absolutely unchanging as God is, but it is immortal in a manner peculiar to itself. It is immortal in such a fashion that it can die, and mortal in such a fashion that it cannot die, for the death of the sinner is unending. Being a spirit, the soul is in no way subject to the death of the body, "...ne quis putet animam corporis morte cessare,"¹²⁰ but as possessing free-will, it can freely abandon its life which is in God, though even then, it does not die. In its immortality, the soul is mortal; in its mortality, it remains immortal.

"Vita siquidem animae deus est, non animae creatura. Animae quae deus erit ipsa morietur; quae autem Iudicium fecerit et justitiam vivet et non morietur. Ita immortalis est anima ut mori possit; ita mortalis, ut mori non possit. Immortalitate mortalis est, et mortalitate immortalis est. Quia igitur miseris mors est sine vita, finis sine fine..." 121

Just as the soul is mortal when it loses its life-in-God (beate vivere), even though it cannot lose its life-in-misery (misere vivere), so likewise, in respect of the inner-soul God, the soul is incorporeal.

For there is nothing invisible and incorporeal by nature except God himself who is called invisible and

incorporeal because He is infinite and uncircumscribed, simple and wholly self-sufficient. He is the reason for His own existence. Hence, then, He is everywhere, He is judged to be invisible and incorporeal in Himself.

"Sicut mortalis est (anima) cum hunc vivere perdit, licet aliare vivere amittere non possit, sic respectu incorporei sui corporata est. Nihil invisibile et incorporeum est praeter suum locum, id est, patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum. Ne ergo incorporeus et invisibilis dicatur, quis infinitus et incircumscribitus, simplex et sibi omnibus modis sufficiens, se ipsum sustinet et idcirco. Et cum ubique sit in secessibus invisibilis incorporeus esse dignoscitur..." 113

In comparison with this absolutely unchangeable nature of God which is always and everywhere the same, another teaches that the soul is corporeal. For him, all rational creatures are corporeal even although they do not subsist in a body. They are corporeal from the fact that they are circumscribed within space. Now, the human soul is enclosed within the body, and in this sense, is said to be in some place or to be local; in some place, because it is either here or there; local, because it is present as a whole in one place and not elsewhere. Still, as lacking corporeal quantity, the soul does not have measurable dimensions nor bodily limitation. It is called local, then, from its presence and activity in space; yet, not local in the same sense as a body, which is confined within the definite limits of a beginning, a middle and an end. For the presence of the soul in a place is not such that it occupies more

space in the larger parts and less in the smaller; nor is it less in any one part than it is in the whole. It can, for all that, be in some parts more intensely than in others, inasmuch as it is more vitally present there.

Thus, the soul is whole and entire everywhere throughout the body as well as in each of its parts, not quantitatively but by a certain vital intensification. There is not more soul in the larger members, nor less in the smaller, but the whole is so infused into the body as not to be divided by the division of its members. *Hic infusus est corpori, ut non per membrorum partes tantibus sit divisa...*¹¹³ But just as God is everywhere in His totality, both throughout the world and in every creature, though He is in a very special way in Heaven, so too, in its own mode, the soul is whole and entire everywhere throughout the body as though in its own little world, but in some parts, it is more vitally present, as in the heart and the brain.

Omnia vero rationalis creatura corporalis est, angelus et omnes virtutes corporales sunt, licet non carne subsistant. Ex eo intellectualis naturae corpore esse dicimus, quia loco circumscribuntur, sicut et anima humana quae carne clauditur, quae idcirco et esse in loco et localis dici potest; in loco, quia aut hic aut alibi praesens est; localis, quia quod alibi praesens est et actus, alibi non est. Non habet tamen corporalem dimensionem, nec corporalem circumscriptionem; potius est illi quantitatis experta est. Sed quis per praesentiam et operationem in loco concluditur, localis et in eo dicitur; verumtamen non sicut corpus, cui secundum locum principium, medium et finis assignatur. Quia actu vero naturae incorporeae, quae omnia incrementabilis oblique est, corporalis est nihil; quia tamen aliquid non est insensibile; nec tamen per loci statum ita existitur vel

convetur, ut majori parte sui majorem locum occupet, et brevior breviores, minorque sit in parte quam in toto. Per omnes siquidem particulas corporis tota simul ad est, nec minor in minoribus, nec in majoribus major. Sed alicubi intensius, alicubi remissius et in omnibus tota et in singulis tota est. Sicut enim Deus ubique est totus in toto mundo, et in creatura sua; sic animus ubique tota in toto corpore suo, tamquam in suo mundo, intensius tamen in corde et cerebro, quomodo Deus precipue dicitur esse in caelo..." 124

Not being determined to any one part, the soul cannot be spatially extended; and since it pervades the body in this inextended manner, it cannot be corporeal.

Hence it follows that the soul is both invisible and incorporeal. For if visible, it would be corporeal; and if it were corporeal, it would be divisible and would have parts, nor could it all be in one place at the same time. A body cannot touch nor be touched in its entirety at one and the same time; whereas, in any of its actions or movements, the whole soul is present. The whole soul is present in each of the senses so as to feel in each of them, and likewise, whole and entire in all parts of the organism so as to give to the body, as a whole, life and sensation. The whole soul animates the whole body of man equally. As a whole, it is active everywhere throughout the body vivifying, moving and directing it.¹¹³ Therefore, acting always as a whole, the soul must be indivisible in itself; from which the conclusion follows that the soul must be a simple substance.

"Invisibilis et incorporea est anima; si enim visibilis esset, corporea esset. Et si corporea esset, partibilis esset et partes haberet, necne tota simul in uno loco esse posset. Nullus autem

corpus aut simul tacti, totum potest, aut simul
tingere totum potest. Quia vero in quibuscunque
suis actibus vel actibus tota simul adest. Tota
videt et tota viscerum sensit; tota audit et tota
sonorum reminiscitur; tota odorat et tota odores
recollit; tota per linguam et palatum asperse sentit
et discernit; tota tangit dura vel mollia; tota
simul appropinquat et recedat. Calida vero vel
frigida sumpsit tantum quillo tota discernit. Tota
est visus, tota est auditor, tota sensit et cum
tota sensit, tota est memoria; cum tota vult, tota
est voluntas; cum tota cogitat, tota est cogitatio;
cum tota diligit, tota dilectio..." 126

From the fact that it is present simultaneously and
acts always as a whole, since it is not divisible into parts,
the soul is simple.¹²⁷ Because it is simple and because there
is no diversity in a simple being, the soul is the same
whether it sees, hears, touches, remembers or whatever else
it does. It is, however, subject to the inconstancy of its
affections so that it does not escape having a certain muta-
bility. Unlike God who is utterly simple and unchangeable,
since His essence is identical with each of His attributes, so
that He is whatever He has, the soul has accidents.¹²⁸ It has
no quantity since it is not moved through space; but it has
quality inasmuch as by its own power of choice, which it has
from reason, the soul is moved by the diversity of its affec-
tions which are the objects of its willing. These, neverthe-
less, are not the soul but are accidental modifications of it,
so that from them, it is moved to desire what is good and
sometimes to rejoice; or to fear the evil and be continually
grieved.

"Deus animas...naturales affectus quosque indidit;
ut lateret unde bene illa posset egerere, et in eis
quandoque lassari; et rursum unde mala illa movere,
vel in eis etiam dolere perpetuo contristari...
Hinc etiam divina dispositione media inter eosdem
affectus constituta est ratio in eo de bonis, et
quam animus discernere et dijudicare possit unde
gaudeat seu doleat, hoc etiam quid cupiat vel mid
timeat..." 130

The soul, consequently is distinct from its affections;
it is not distinct from its powers. What it thinks is
accidental, that by which it thinks constitutes its very
substance; so, also for the will, for to think and to will
belong to the soul. "Actus namque et posse cupire et
ex parte diligere."¹³⁰ To will something is an accident for
the soul, but the actual willing is of the soul's very being.
As a whole, therefore, the soul thinks, being thought whole
and entire; as a whole the soul wills because its whole
being, its substance, is will. From this indivision in its
substance, the soul is one in essence, although it is
multiple in its functions. "Unica in essentia est simplex,
in officiis est multiplex."¹³¹

This simplicity of the soul, one of the main tenets
of Alcher's doctrine, became the focal point of interest in
the thirteenth century in the controversy between the so-
called Augustinians and Aristotelians.¹³²

Following the lines of the tradition stemming from
St. Augustine, Alcher posits no distinction between the human

soul and its faculties. The soul is a single substance and cannot, therefore, be divided into parts. Still, he recognized that this undivided soul is capable of various kinds of activities and must, consequently, possess a variety of powers. These latter are differentiated according to their functions. Such a multiplicity of function, however, in no way detracts from the essential unity of the soul, but merely represents its objective relations.

On this question of the soul's essential unity, the author is unyielding. Time and again, he reiterates: "unice est in essentia simplex, in officiis est multiplex"¹³³;
 "...proprietas (animae) quidem diversae, sed essentia una"¹³⁴
 "simplex substantia est animus...sed una eademque substantia secundum diversas potentias diversas sortitur vocabula..."¹³⁵

Thus, he explains the diversity of the soul's activities on the basis of the variety of its functions, but he adds, significantly, that the soul itself remains in substance one and the same working throughout. The several names simply indicate the variety of activities of which the soul, by God's design, is capable.

"Secundum potentias creaturæ quæ secundum sui speciem spiritus variis subiectis ministrant. Spiritus namque anima dum vegetat; spiritus dum cuncta lenit; sensus dum sentit; animus dum sapit; mens dum intelligit; ratio dum discernit; memoria dum recordatur; voluntas dum concupiscit. Ista tamen non differunt in substantia, quædammodo in positionibus; quoniam omnia ista una anima est; proprietates diversæ sed essentia una." 136

Because of the central importance of this doctrine of the simplicity of the soul in the *MA*, it seems advisable to devote a special section of this chapter to its consideration. Unfortunately, the details of the doctrine in Acker's own text are not too clearly marked off from one another, so that in order to gain an adequate picture of Acker's position on this subject, we must shape his material into some definite plan. Accordingly, we shall consider Acker's doctrine of the simplicity of the soul, first, in respect of the soul's diverse faculties and powers and subsequently, in respect of the several activities consequent upon such a diversity. From this, we shall conclude what are the relations, according to the author of the *MA*, not only of the powers of the soul to its substance, but also what are the relations of the powers among themselves.

For this, we must (a) view the soul and its various powers, and then, (b) divide these powers in a triple mode according as they relate (1) to the body which it perfects; (2) to the acts which the soul elicits and (3) to the objects which the soul beholds. It will become clear the triple activity of the soul which, first, functions through the body as its organ; then, acts independently in reason and the intellect; and finally, proceeds higher to those activities of the soul above itself wherein it functions through the intelligence.

Simplicity of the Soul

(a) The Soul and its Powers

The soul by nature is rational, concupiscible and irascible. From its rationality, it can know things which are above it, beside it, around it and beneath it. Its knowing power therefore, embraces everything, from God down to and including material bodies. From its concupiscibility and irascibility, it is moved to desire and love or to hate and reject all things. Thus, from rationality stems all the sensitivity of the soul and from the other two springs all its affection.

This affection is four-fold according as one rejoices at what is loved or at least hopes to rejoice at some future time; or as one grieves at what is hated or fears that it will so grieve. Therefore, joy and hope pertain to concupiscibility while sorrow and fear belong to irascibility. These four are the roots or principles of all the virtues and vices, for when ordered and directed to their proper end, the affections stimulate good habits in the soul and engender the virtues; otherwise, they degenerate into the vices. Thus, directed according to reason, love and hate become the four cardinal virtues from which all the other virtues spring.

"Est siquidem rationalis, concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Per rationalitatem habilis est illuminari ad aliquid cognoscendum infra se et supra se, in se et juxta se. Concupiscit siquidem Deum supra se, et in se, et angelum juxta se, et quidquid est ali habitu continetur infra se. Per concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem habilis est affici ad aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum, amandum vel odiendum; et ideo de rationalitate omnis sensus oritur animae, de aliis omnis affectus. Affectus vero quadripartitus esse demonstratur; duo de eo quod amamus, jam gaudeamus vel gaudendum speramus; et de eo quod odimus, jam dolorem, sive dolendum metuimus; et ab hoc de concupiscibilitate gaudium et spes, de irascibilitate dolor et metus oriuntur. Qui quidem quatuor affectus animae omnia sunt vitiorum et virtutum quasi quatuor principia et communis materia... et quoniam virtus est habitus bonae concupiscentiae, boni operandi et instituendi sique ordinandi sunt multi affectus ad id quod debent, et quando debent, ut in virtutes proficere possint; alioquin facile in vitia deficient..." 127

But virtue is a habit of a well-ordered soul; and a habit is something that a being has, not something that it is. Hence, as coming to the soul from outside itself, the virtues are accidents of the soul, and therefore do not belong to it essentially.

"Habet (anima) accidentalis, et ipsa non est. Sive vires est, sive virtutes non est. Non enim est sua prudentia, sua temeraria, sua fortitudo, sua justitia..." 128

The virtues, then, are accidental qualities of the soul arising from its natural power of tending towards or away from things, according as reason judges these things as worthy of love or hatred.

The power of sense, or sensibility, on the other hand, is a natural power deriving from the soul itself by

reason of its rational character and, as such, it is inseparable from its essence. In it, the one soul acts through five different instruments, hence, it is said to be five-fold. And because the soul functions in different ways, it has various names. So, it is called sense, imagination, reason, intellect, intelligence, but these five signify simply five different modes of action of the selfsame soul. They are as though properties of the soul differing in their individual workings, but identical in the essence, which, as properties, they reveal. As properties, they differ; in essence, they are the same. From their functions, they are many; from their essence, they are united in the soul and make but one with it.

"Sensus vero unus est in anima, et quod ipsum... unde ob numerum instrumentorum quinque-partitus dicitur, cum intus sit nisi unus. Verumtamen propter varia exercitia variatur et varie nuncupatur. Dicitur namque sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia. Et haec omnia in anima nihil aliud sunt, quam ipsa, alia et alia inter se proprietates propter varia exercitia, sed una essentia rationalis et una anima; proprietates quidem diversae, sed essentia una; secundum exercitia, multi sunt; secundum essentiam vero, unus sunt in anima et hoc quod ipsum." 129

Basically, then, there are three natural powers (Potentiae) of the soul, as we have seen, namely, rationality, corporeity and irascibility, and in these the whole substance of the soul is contained. But, since the soul is simple and undivided, it cannot be separated into parts; therefore, the whole essence of the soul is found in each one of them by itself. Reason, consequently, is neither

other nor less in substance than the soul itself; concupiscibility is not other nor less than the soul; and the same is true of irascibility. The three powers design to three different powers of one and the same substance; reason is the soul as judging between two alternatives; concupiscence is the soul as desiring something, while irascibility is the soul as rejecting a possible choice. Hence, the three appear as a triple instrument of the soul's activity. Further, these powers are of the essence of the soul since they belonged to it even before its union with the body. In them, the substance of the soul is completely and fully contained as in its trinity; the trinity, however, as a whole is circumscribed in a certain unity of the soul which is the soul itself.

"Per concupiscibilitatem namque appetit, per irascibilitatem contemnit, per rationabilitatem inter utrumque discernit. Tota anime essentia in his potentiis suis consistit, nec per partes dividitur, nec simpliciter sit ut individuum;... simplex substantia est anima, nec aliud, nec minus est irascibilitas vel concupiscibilitas quam anima; sed una eademque substantia secundum diversas potentias diversas sortitur vocabula. Has potentias habet antequam corpori miscetur. Naturales siquidem ei sunt, nec aliud quam ipse. Tota namque anime substantia in his tribus plena et perfecta consistit, id est, in rationalitate, concupiscibilitate et irascibilitate, quasi quadam sua trinitate; et tota haec trinitas est quaedam anime unitas, et igitur anima..." 149

These three, then, rationality, concupiscibility and irascibility, are connatural powers of the soul and, as such, are identical with it. From them, the soul has its capacity to know and to love all things and, in this way, has a

universal receptivity from which it can become a likeness of all things, even though it is but one.

"Habet in se vires quibus omnia apprehendit, sive investigat, et omnibus similis est istis, cum una sit..." 141

Hence, the philosopher has defined the soul as *"similitudo omnium"*, which likeness, indeed, results from the diversity of powers belonging to the essence of the soul.¹⁴²

Thus, we may summarize Alcker's teaching about the simplicity of the human soul as related to its powers and faculties. Man has one soul which, is a simple substance; it is endowed, however, by nature, with a triple power, rationality, concupiscibility and irascibility. These are not separable from the essence of the soul, but each, in its turn, is the soul itself viewed from a different angle. Thus, they are distinct from each other as being different instruments, as it were principles, of the several activities of which the soul is capable. The three powers, then, are as faculties or instruments of the one soul whereby it performs its proper activities of knowing and loving.¹⁴³ *"Vernatares facultates et quasi instrumens a cognoscendi et diligendi habet ex natura..."*¹⁴⁴

But just as the one soul has several faculties, so also, each faculty has diverse powers (*vires*) which, in their turn, are differentiated according to their functioning - but all remain essentially bound to the single soul. In this manner, rationality originates the power of reason which

functions in a five-fold direction, so that its five functions become properties of the soul. Likewise, concupiscibility and irascibility give rise to the four-fold affective, in which the act of willing (desiring) or willing-not (rejecting) pertains to the essence of the soul. So that the soul's capability for knowing is fulfilled through a five-fold progression, and for loving, through a four-fold progression¹⁴⁵ even while the acts of knowing and loving in themselves are simply two different activities of the undivided soul.

It is precisely because they can be identified ultimately within the essence of the soul that Alster states that the faculties and powers are interchangeable; the faculties can be called powers, and the powers, faculties.

"Potentiae animae sunt rationalitas, concupiscibilitas et irascibilitas. Vires sunt, sensus, imaginatio, ratio, memoria, intellectus, intelligentia. Potentiae tamen possunt dici vires, et vires potentiae..." 146

Among the powers themselves, however, there is a diversity, which is a consequence of the variety of the activities to which the soul, by its nature, is directed. Therefore, the powers can be divided on the basis of this diversity of activity. To this division of the soul's powers we shall now turn our attention.

(b) Division of the Powers of the Soul

Since the soul is spiritual and invisible, it cannot be seen directly; it reveals itself, however, through its powers and their activities, and from them, we may discern something of its nature.

"Cum sit subtilis et invisibilis, videri non potest; sed per potentias suas se extendit et ostendit." 147

1

Powers of the Soul in the Body which it Perfects

Among its powers, we note first that which it exercises in relation to the body which it perfects. This power is, as it were, external to the soul itself and is directed wholly in the interests of the body with which the soul is joined. This power is divided triply, so that we have three powers, the natural, the vital and the animal, which differ both according to the bodily organ through which they function, as well as from the end which they are intended to serve. However, while we relate them to a particular organ of the body, we must recall their mode of presence there. As being powers of the one, simple soul, they are diffused throughout the body not by spatial extension but by a vital intension, according to which they can be said to be in one place more vitally than elsewhere. 148

As directed simply towards the conservation and propagation of life, the power is natural and lodges in the liver; as providing for the support and sustenance of bodily life, it is called vital and resides in the heart; as intended for the perfecting of bodily life, it is animal and has its seat in the brain.

"Habet quoque animus vires quibus corpori cerni cetur; quarum prima est naturalis; secunda, vitalis; tertia, animalis....ex his tribus viribus per totum corpus diffunditur, non localis distinctione, sed vitale intentione." 149

By its natural power, the soul stirs up the liver and produces therein the blood and other humors which are transmitted to all the members of the body through the veins, in order that, from these, the members may be nourished and may develop. From this power, the liver becomes attentive to the needs of nature; whence, from the four organic needs of the body, the natural power is four-fold. When it seeks what is needful for the body, it is appetitive, as satisfying the appetites; as retaining what has been taken in until it can be properly and usefully digested, it is retentive; as rejecting what is harmful or superfluous, it is expulsive; while, since it passes on the good humors derived from the foods to the various parts of the body according as each has need, it is distributive. Inasmuch as these needs are concerned solely with the body, and not at all with the soul, these powers are common to all animals.¹³⁰

The VITAL power proceeds from the heart bestowing life and health on all the body. The heart is helped by the lungs which inhale air from the outside and then exhale it; in this way, the heat of the heart is tempered. By means of the air which has been purified, the vital power dispenses the purified blood throughout the body by means of the arteries or 'pulsing veins' from the movements of which physicians can detect the normality or the indisposition of the heart.

"Elicitor nescit a spiritus...flatus aeris qui a corde receptus est inde per totum corpus animalis mortalium vitae flatu necessario continet..." 151

The ANIMAL power resides in the brain whence it makes the five senses active; it further commands the voice to speak and the bodily members to move. Its functions are localised as follows. The brain is divided into three sections, from the first of which is originated all feeling and sensation; this is the anterior lobe. From the third section, the posterior lobe, all movement takes its rise; while the middle section, between these two, is the rational.

"Vis animalis est in cerebro, et inde viget facit quinque sensus corporis. Substantiam vocis edere, membra movere. Tres sunt ventriculi cerebri. Unus anterior, a quo sensus oritur; alter posterior, a quo movetur; tertius inter utrumque medius, id est rationalis..." 152

A certain fiery power tempered by air rises from the heart to the brain as though into the heaven of the body.

After it has been taken in and purified there, it proceeds outward through the eyes, the ears, the nose and the other sense organs. By its contact with external objects, the power of sense is formed and produces the five senses of the body, namely sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch. This power of feeling passes from the front to the back part of the brain, and descending thence through the neck and the spinal column, is diffused throughout the entire body. Moreover, this same power, which when formed exteriorly is called a bodily sense, when formed by the selfsame organs of sense through which it has issued and in which it was formed, by some inner working of nature is drawn back and returned within to the phantastic portion of the brain and, in this way, the imagination is produced. The imagination, in its turn, passing from the front to the middle portion of the brain comes into contact with the very substance of the rational soul and becomes the judgment; only now, although it still retains the nature and properties of a body, it is purified and made subtle in order that it may be joined immediately to the spirit itself.

"Quaedam vis ignea aere temperata a corde ad cerebrum ascendit, tanquam in oculus corporis nostri; ibique purificata et colata per oculos, aures, nares, caeteraque insensum sensuum, foras prorepat, et ad contactu exteriorum formata quinque sensus corporis facit; visus videlicet, auditus, gustus, odoratus, et tactus. Qui tandem sensus ab anteriore parte cerebri ad posteriores transiens, et inde per cervicem et medullam spinalem descendens per totum corpus diffunditur. Porro ipsa vis ignea, quae exteriorius formata per ipsos sensuum instrumenta, per

quae creditur et in quibus formatur, natura o creatura
interiorum ad eadem phantasticam usque retrahitur et
revertitur, atque interiorio efficitur. Cuiusmodi enim
imaginatio ab anteriori parte capitis ad medium
transiens, tamen animae substantiam continuit et
occipitali discretione; in tantum iam purificata et
subtilis efficitur, ut ipsiusmodi immediate conjungatur,
verumtamen tamen naturam corporis retinens et proprie-
tatem." 153

Rightly, then, is the anterior portion of the brain
placed in front of the hinder part, because the former takes
the lead and the latter follows. Perception precedes movement.
These can be called powers both of soul and of body since
they are produced by the soul in the body and could not be
without both. 154

Thus, the animal power as found in the first section
of the brain is called phantastic, or imaginative, because
in it the likenesses of corporeal things are contained; in
the middle section of the brain, it is called rational,
because there it seeks and examines what the imagination
represents; in the third section, it is called memorial,
because there it consents to memory what has been considered
by the reason.

"In prima parte cerebri vis animalis vocatur
phantastica, id est, imaginaria; quia in ea
corporealius rerum similitudine et imagines
continentur, unde et phantastica dicitur.
In media parte cerebri vocatur rationalis;
quia ibi censuit et iudicat ea quae per
imaginationem representantur. In ultima
parte vocatur memorialis; quia ibi conservat
et reviviscit ea quae antea sunt iudicata." 155

In this way, the soul uses these three parts of the brain as instruments through which to exercise its control of the body. For through them the soul rules the body so that it feels and moves and apprehends, in some degree, in the rational spirit itself. Inasmuch as the activity by means of which the natural, the vital and the animal powers are operative is derived from the soul as from its source, these three, though directed chiefly towards the welfare of the body, are, however, principally, powers of the soul; but of the soul, relatively, insofar as it acts in conjunction with the body.

Besides these, the soul has other powers which it exercises as an independent entity. 'According to essentially to the invisible nature of the soul, these powers are manifested effectively in those acts which are elicited by the soul in itself, in those activities, that is, which belong to the nature of the rational soul as such. Let us now consider this second group of the soul's activities and powers both as to their nature and their kind.

2

Powers of the soul in the acts which it elicits in itself.

The human soul is characterized by reason, for it is in its nature as a rational substance that it is differentiated from other living beings. Therefore, properly speaking, the

soul is a rational substance.¹⁵⁶ Accordingly, the soul has three powers which together constitute its whole substance and in each of which the whole essence of the soul is contained. These powers, rationality, concupiscibility and irascibility, therefore, are essential to the soul and are identical with it. From them, as from their sources, spring the activities which the soul performs as an independent substance in its own right.

These activities are thinking and willing. "Intellectus namque (anima) ex parte cogitare et ex parte diligere."¹⁵⁷ Whence Aquinas distinguished the cognitive power of the soul from its affective power.

"Sunt enim in anima duo, et sunt id quod anima, scilicet naturalis sensus, cognoscens anima et dijudicans inter anima, et naturalis affectus, quo suo ordine et gradu anima diligit anima." 158

Sometimes, the "suo ordine et gradu" requires that the soul turn towards an object; at other times, that it turn away, so that the affective power is exercised in a two-fold direction: as towards something to desire it - and this is the concupiscible power, or as away from something to avoid it - and this is the irascible. In this manner, the rational power of the soul is exercised in the cognitive part, and the other two, the concupiscible and the irascible, are employed in the affective part. These are not real parts in the sense of dividing the soul into separate segments, for the soul is simple and wholly indivisible; rather, if these

are called parts, it is by way of likeness to something divisible inasmuch as the soul is capable of the various activities, and not at all as implying any division within its being. *Ubi aliquando partes habere dicitur ratione potius similitudinis quam veritate compositionis intelligendum est.*"¹⁵⁹

(1) Cognitive Powers

It is from reason that the soul thinks; hence, thinking is an act which belongs to the substance of the soul as such. In this act, the soul has no need of any physical organ through which to function; rather, the body is a positive hindrance to the soul.¹⁶⁰ The thinking, which is attributed to the cognitive part of the soul, embraces all things which are knowable by reason. Located at the junction of the two worlds of spirit and of matter, the soul can, in some manner, know all things. It can know God, above it; things spiritual, angels and the virtues, beside it; itself, by reflecting within itself and the whole of material creation beneath it.¹⁶¹ All these things can be known by the soul's power of sense, which originates in reason, and is consequently, a property of the soul. As such, sense is inseparably bound to it. This power of sense is five-fold from the quintuple instrument through which it functions; it is called sense, imagination, reason, intellect and intelligence.

From this five-fold power Alcker describes a triple knowledge. The soul, through its exterior cognitive power of sensibility, perceives material bodies by means of the five bodily senses; through an inner sensitive power, imagination, it perceives the likenesses of these material things expressed in the spirit; through its intellectual power, reason, it knows purely spiritual beings.

But the soul is invisible, hence, it remains invisible in the body and issues from it only in an invisible manner. Through the bodily senses, it perceives bodies; thus, by means of the eyes it sees those external objects which are suited to the eyes, which are visible. "Visibilia per corpus videt..."¹⁶² In like fashion for all the bodily senses. The soul acts through them by means of the exterior cognitive power by which it knows bodies. Working through the spirit, the soul perceives the likenesses of bodies; for whatever is not body and yet is something, must be spirit. So that by an inner hidden power the soul grasps the likenesses of corporeal things expressed in the spirit. On the other hand, acting through the intellect, the soul has no need of any instrument but is able to behold things directly. Thus, by itself and in itself, the soul sees angels, the virtues, itself and finally even God.

In this triple knowing, wherein the power of sense is distinguished from the way it functions, there are entered

the various kinds of visions, each of which is determined according to the objects seen. In response to its three-fold power of knowing, the soul enjoys three kinds of visions. In the first, bodies are seen through the bodily senses; this is the corporeal vision; in the second, not bodies, but the likenesses of bodies are seen in the spirit; this is the spiritual vision; in the third, the intellect sees the pure spirits; and this is the intellectual vision.

In the corporeal vision, the soul is frequently deceived by the body. It mistakenly judges that what is taking place only in the bodily organ is actually happening in the object perceived. Thus, to one moving, something which is standing still seems to be moving, while the stars which are moving appear to be standing still. Again, by a double focussing of the eyes, one man can seem to have two heads, and so on.¹⁶³

In the spiritual vision, too, the soul can err inasmuch as it can suffer from an illusion. It sees things, at one time true, and at another, false; now, much confused, but again, quite tranquil. Things are true which, having been announced before related in an obscure way and by signs, are either openly expressed or are like to this and that.

On the other hand, in the intellectual vision, the soul is never deceived for if it understands something, the

thing is true; or else, if the thing is false, there simply is no understanding. The intellectual vision, therefore, is always a certain discovery of truth.¹⁶⁴

In this intellectual search for truth, there is a three-fold work entailed. The soul searches into things unknown by the ingenium; it examines and verifies the discoveries by reason; and it stores away the judgments for future reference by memory. Hence, a certain instinct (ingenium), reason and memory belong to the intellectual activity of the soul.

Over and above this work of the intellect, there is another vision in which the soul approaches truth without any deception. In ecstasy, the soul is withdrawn from every bodily sense, more than in sleep but less than in death; then, the soul is elevated by a good spirit and there is implanted in it, in some ineffable manner, the angelic vision. In that state, the mind is inspired and a great revelation takes place such as was vouchsafed to John in the Apocalypse.

Other ordinary and human visions, on the contrary, such as the various kinds of dreams and apparitions, are either the work of the imagination producing them in the spirit, or else they are imposed on the spirit in some way by the body. But no matter what their origin, the nature of these images is identical since they are all of the same nature as the spirit which produces them.

Therefore, neither the intellectual nor the spiritual visions cause Aether any concern, for in them the things seen are not bodies, but spirits, and as such are apt for immediate contact with the soul. But the corporeal vision is not so easily understandable. For there, the images of things seen with the bodily eyes are produced within the soul. The body itself could never produce a spiritual being and cannot, therefore, be responsible for its presence within the spirit. The soul alone can produce it. But how an intellectual and rational spirit, like the soul, can represent material bodies in the spirit is something of a mystery.

"Ego autem multo amplius admiro et vehementius stupeo, quanta celeritate ac facilitate in se anima fabricet imaginis corporum, quae per corporis oculos viderit, quam phreneticorum vel somniantium, vel etiam in ecstasi visiones quoscunque istius illius naturae videret esse, prorsus dubio corpus non est. Non enim corpora visa illis imaginis in spiritu faciunt, nec eam vis habent ut aliquid spirituale forment, sed ipse spiritus in se ipso celeritate mirabili, utroque spiritus intellectualis et rationalis." 185

For the moment, we shall leave the mystery, having simply noted the fact of its existence for Aether. The solution he offered will be pointed out in due course, when we consider the objects which the soul beholds in its acts of knowing.

Let us briefly resume what has been said of the acts elicited by the soul in its cognitive part, that is, from its power of rationality. The soul is capable of attaining to a

knowledge which is universal in scope, insofar as it includes all things, both spiritual and material. This knowledge is made possible through the power of sense wherein the rational soul functions in various ways depending upon the particular instrument through which it acts at any given time. Thus, the soul sees things in a three-fold vision according to their triple mode of visibility. In some ineffable manner, the soul perceives material bodies through the senses; these latter, however, are often an occasion of error for the soul. In the spiritual vision, the soul perceives the likenesses of bodies; these likenesses are spiritual inasmuch as they are produced by the soul in the spirit. In these, too, the soul is at times deceived. But in the intellectual vision, the soul functions as a purely spiritual being, directly and in its own right. Here, the soul perceives only spiritual beings. Inasmuch as the activity of the soul at this level is confined to the sphere which is proper to its own nature, without any external influence whatsoever, there is always truth. So that, in intellectual knowledge, the rational power of the soul most certainly attains its fulfillment.

(ii) Affective Powers

But together with its cognitive power, the soul has an affective part which is no less essential. For, besides knowing, the soul also wills. Its act of willing, we have seen, is determined in two opposite directions, according

as it judges something is good and therefore to be desired, or is evil and hence, must be avoided.

"Per concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem
facilis est (anima) ad illud appetendum
vel fugiendum, amandum vel odiandum." 166

The will, accordingly, can freely command two distinct acts; these, in turn, expose a duality of powers within this part of the soul. Hence, concupiscibility inclines the will to the good so as to choose it, while irascibility bends the will away from what is not good so as to defend the soul from evil.

Although concupiscibility and irascibility are both powers of the will, they are nevertheless distinct in their activity. Each produces an affection which is proper to itself, though it is the same soul willing in both instances. For in the same manner in which the one soul may have several faculties, so also, one faculty may have a diversity of powers.

"Affectus vero quadripartitus esse disposcitur;
dum de eo quod amamus, jam gaudemus vel gaudentes
appetimus; et de eo quod odiamus, jam dolemus, sive
doleamus metuentes; et ob hoc de concupiscibilitate
gaudemus et sive, de irascibilitate dolor et motus
oriuntur." 167

Just as the soul, in the act of knowing, embraces all things, so likewise, in the act of willing, it is equally all-embracing. All things are to be sought insofar as they are good. But in judging what is good, the soul acts entirely

on its own; it makes its decision freely. Therefore, the double power of concupiscibility and irascibility is perfected within the faculty of the will.

Therefore, in the two-fold distinction of its cognitive and affective parts, the soul manifests an independent activity in a three-fold direction. It knows all things, both visible and invisible and, following on that knowledge, it either loves each as good and therefore, desirable, or refuses its love, if it finds the thing unworthy. In every case, however, the activity of the soul is derived exclusively from some power inherent in the soul itself, so that the acts themselves may be truly said to have been elicited by the soul in itself.

So far, we have seen the division of the soul's powers determined at first, externally, by its relation to the body, and after that, internally, according to the acts which the soul elicits per se. There remains one further division in which the powers themselves will be formally distinguished in respect of their several different objects. To this final division we now turn, as we consider the nature of the objects which the soul is capable of beholding.

3

Powers of the soul from the objects it beholds.

This third grouping of the powers of the soul touches the powers themselves as being differentiated formally

according to the object which each one beholds. From rationality, the soul's power of sense is five-fold, since it functions through a five-fold instrument; each instrument evidences a corresponding power within the soul. The instrumentality of each of the five media is conditioned, in turn, by the objects which the soul beholds in the act of knowing, its powers can be seen to be distinct in their forms, even though the soul loses nothing of its proper simplicity thereby.

"Sensus vero unus est in anima, et quid ipsa...
Dicitur namque sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus,
intelligentia. Et haec omnia in anima simul aliud
sunt quam ipsa, aliae et aliae inter se proprietates
propter varia exercitia, sed una essentia rationalis
et una anima." 136

To understand how it is possible for such formally distinct powers to coexist and function adequately within the unity of this rational soul, we must glance once more at the nature of that soul as Alcher conceived it, this time with a view to locating therein both the powers themselves and their respective objects. Whatever else must be sacrificed, the unity of the soul remains inviolable. Not once does Alcher swerve from his firm conviction that the soul is simple in its essence. However diverse may be its activity, he insists that the soul itself, is always the same indivisible substance which, however, is able to reveal itself in a variety of modes. It is, moreover, according to this diversity of its activity that the soul is variously

named. Thus, when one considers the whole interior vital principle as animating the body, it is the anima; when it wills, animus; when it knows, mens; when it recollects, memory; when it judges, reason; when it contemplates, spirit; when it perceives or senses, sensus.

"Dum ergo vivificat corpus, anima est; dum vult, animus est; dum scit, mens est; dum recollit, memoria est; dum judicat, ratio est; dum spirat vel contempletur, spiritus est; dum sentit, sensus est;" 189

Thus, by reason of its varied activity, the soul has different names. These names are significations of its several relationships only, because ultimately, their differences can all be resolved within the unity of the soul. In this way, soul and mind are the same substance; it is called soul for one reason and mind, for another; soul, inasmuch as one intends to signify the being which is living; mind, when one means the being which acts in itself and through itself, that is, the soul acting independently. Spirit, too, is the same as soul, differing only by its relations. It is soul as being living, spirit, because of its spiritual nature or because it can contemplate even in the body. Likewise, soul and animus are the same in substance; but it is the soul as being the principle of life, animus, as the principle of counsel. Hence it seems that to know belongs properly to the mind, while to will belongs to animus.

In this sense, that which is most outstanding in the

soul, or which remembers, is the mind. Therefore, the mind is not the soul, but it is the highest part of the soul, as though its head or eye; whence, man is said to bear God's image in his mind.

"Quapropter non animam, sed quod excellit in anima, mens vocatur, nequeus esset vel oculum. Unde et ipse homo secundum mentem image Dei dicitur." 170

It is from this most eminent power of the soul that intelligence proceeds.¹⁷¹ Reason, on the other hand, is to^{be}_Λ distinguished as a motion of the animus, consisting within the vision of the mind and distinguishing what is true from what is false.

"Ratio siquidem est quidam animi motus visum mentis acutus, veraque a falsis distinguens." 172

The rational mind is capable of self-reflection. By its own power, it can recollect itself within itself and freeing itself from sensible images and every earthly consideration can reflect upon itself;¹⁷³ further, through its intelligence, it can attain gradually to a forgetfulness of itself in the contemplation of the divinity. Then, when the mind begins to see the brightness of this incorporeal light and taste the sweetness of the joys that are therein, it turns from the intelligence towards wisdom. In this state, it attains a peace which surpasses all understanding, so that a silence comes over the mind as that of midnight. The affections of the one contemplating are stilled so that he seeks nothing, dreads nothing and is disturbed by nothing.

Everything is quieted within the mind with an unusual calm which if it were always experienced would be a tremendous happiness. The powers of sense and imagination are stilled, and the lower powers of the soul are temporarily deprived of their functions. The purer and higher parts of the soul are led into the secret place of quiet intimacy and deepest tranquillity with joy.

Among creatures, there is nothing more wonderful than this division whereby what is essentially one and undivided is separated within itself; what is simple and wholly without parts is divided as by a certain partition. For, in one man, the spirit is not one thing by essence and the soul something else; but rather spirit and soul are one and the same substance of a simple nature. In this two-fold term a two-fold substance is not to be understood; rather, when such a distinction is made, a two-fold power of one single essence is designated; one, the superior power, is called spirit both from the nature of the substance itself as a spiritual being capable of contemplating and because of its activity within the body; the other, the inferior power, is called soul (anima) inasmuch as it has direct reference to the body which it animates. By this division, anima and what relates to it, the animal, remains at the bottom, while, spiritus and what relates to it, the spiritual, ascends to the heights. Hence the progress of the soul. It forsores the

lowest things to be elevated towards the highest; it withdraws from the senses to be united in spirit with God.¹⁷⁴

It is across this progression from lowest to highest that its rational power leads the soul - away from the things of matter to be joined with those of the spirit. And the progression is from the inferior to the superior, from sense to intelligence and thence to wisdom, even to the highest wisdom which is God.¹⁷⁵

For there is something in reason, divinely inclined there, as it were a certain power of foresight, whereby reason is directed to the things of the spirit, to high and heavenly things; this is wisdom. In addition, there is something else which inclines it to that is transitory and passing; this is prudence. These two movements or inclinations originate within from reason, and actually compose it, so that reason is, as it were, divided into superior and inferior, though itself remains undivided. Reason, in this way, has a two-fold office, as commanding the inferior powers of the soul, it governs them in what concerns their relation with the body which they animate; and, on the other hand, as directing the superior powers of the soul, it leads them towards the highest wisdom.

Within the powers of the soul themselves, there is a certain hierarchy according to which reason searches out wisdom by

a five-fold progression. Just as in the visible world, the elements are distinguished by a five-fold ordering, so in the invisible world of the human soul fitted to its proper body, there is a five-fold approach to wisdom through the soul's rationality.

"Et sicut mundus iste visibilis quinquepartitus quodam distinctione est ordinatus; terra scilicet, aqua aere, et aethere sive firmamento itaque super eo caelo, quod aegyptius vocant; sic anime in mundo sui corporis percipienti quinque pro sensus sunt ad sapientiam; sensus scilicet, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus et intelligentia. Quinque enim progressionibus rationalitas exerceatur ad sapientiam." 176

These five powers are sense, imagination, reason, intellect and intelligence. Sense is that power by which the soul perceives the corporeal forms of things when they are present. But the soul can also perceive these forms even when the things themselves are absent; this latter power is called imagination. Therefore, sense perceives things within matter; imagination perceives them outside of matter. The same power which is formed exteriorly from the things perceived, and which is then called sense, can also be formed from within, and then it is called imagination. Consequently, imagination originates from sense and varies with its diversity. Through the medium of the bodily eyes, the soul sees many things; in like manner, it conceives a multiplicity of phantasms within the imagination. Itself moved and fixed, the soul seems to move about and to fluctuate everywhere; it

does not pass outside itself but wanders around within as in a vast space. Neither does it go outside itself towards external things, but rather having come into contact with them, it represents them within itself.

"Sensus ex vis animae est, quae rerum corporum corporales percipit formas praesentes. Imaginatio est ex vis animae, quae rerum corporum corporales formas, ad praesentia. Sensus namque formas in materia percipit, imaginatio extra materiam, et ex vis quae exterioris formae, sensus scilicet, tendit usque ad intimam tractat, imaginatio vero. Imaginatio namque de sensu capitur, et secundum ejus divinitates ipsius praecepta est variabilis. Multa videt oculis corporalibus oculis, multa enim praesentia imaginatio concipit..." 177

Sense and imagination are common to men and to the animals, for the latter also both see things which are visible and remember what they have seen. In fact, in some of the senses, they even surpass us, for it seemed us just that where no understanding was given, none of sense should be granted.¹⁷⁶ But whereas, in animals, imagination does not pass beyond the phantasies stage, in rational beings, on the contrary, it is purified and borne aloft even to reaching the spiritual substance of the soul.

"Quae quidem imaginatio in brutis animalibus phantastica est et transcendit; in rationalibus animis purior fit, usque ad substantiam et in se ipsa referitur et proceditur..." 179

At that point, therefore, when there is found something which is not shared with animals, reason begins. For reason is that power whereby the soul perceives corporeal things not however, as bodies but rather in the intellectual

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nature, as forms, differences or accidents. Thus reason beholds all the incorporeal forms of things which do not subsist outside the bodies except in the mind, in thought. From bodies, it abstracts those things which are existent together with the bodies (fundament), not by any action but rather by a certain reflection and consideration thereof. For the nature according to which any body is a body is not body; it is a spiritual being.

"Ratio est vis anime que rerum corporearum naturas, formas, differentias, propria et accidentia percipit; omnia incorporea, sed non extra corpore, nisi ratione subsistentia. Abstrahit enim a corporibus, non fundum ut in corporibus, non actione, sed consideratione. Natura namque ipsius corporis secundum quam esse corpus corpus est, nullum atque corpus est." 180

Above reason, therefore, the activity of the soul is directed towards what is purely spiritual. Intellect is that power of the soul whereby it perceives invisible things having no corporeal form whatsoever. By it, the soul sees the angels, the virtues, itself and any created spirit. From this, in turn, the soul is led upwards till it beholds the highest spirit. By the power of intelligence, the soul is placed in direct vision of God who is true and truly unchangeable. And in this vision the soul is made happy.

Therefore, the soul through its power of sense receives bodies; through imagination, the likenesses of bodies; through reason, the natures of bodies; through intellect,

created spirits and through intelligence, the immortal spirit. Thereupon, Alchir recalls that last time had told that intelligence was a divine power like which was granted to but very few men. However sense perceives, the imagination represents, reflection forms, imagination searches into, reason judges, memory records, the intellect separates, and intelligence comprehends; and this in turn, leads to meditation and contemplation.

Now, inasmuch as the objects of all these powers differ wholly in themselves according to their forms, the powers by means of which the soul perceives them may be formally distinct from one another. In the other hand, since each of the powers represents a different stage within the act of knowing, they can be united within the essence of the soul.

By sense visible things are perceived; by imagination, the images and likenesses of visible things. To reason belongs the causes and the definitions of visible things and the examination into invisible things; to intellect and intelligence belongs the understanding and vision of things spiritual and divine. So that sense and imagination are helped externally by a sensible medium; reason is helped from within by an interior light; while intellect and intelligence are assisted from above by a divine light. And the ascent of the soul in knowing is from the lowest to the highest, for the lowest depend on the highest. The intellect bears a likeness of

intelligence; reason is like to intellect; the phantom of the spirit is like to reason, and to this phantom the highest body is joined by a certain likeness.¹²¹

In this way, the senses inform the imagination; the imagination informs reason and reason causes knowledge or prudence; then, by an additional divine help, reason is informed and produces intelligence or wisdom. Still, sense and imagination do not ascend to reason but remain beneath it, they can help it to some extent, and as it were from afar, can show it some things to which they cannot attain. By a similar proportion, reason remains below intellect and intelligence. It can assist them but cannot ascend to their level since it has boundaries beyond which it cannot pass.

Therefore, reason holds a mean position. Below it are things perceived by the senses and imagination; on its own level, things perceived by reason, e.g. what is good or bad, true or false, just or unjust; for reason is the seeing of the mind distinguishing the true from the false. Above reason are the things about which the senses do not teach, nor about which reason convinces but which are learned through revelation or accepted on faith. For that rational and intellectual light by which we inquire, understand and know is the mind, which is so made to the image of God that without any substance mediating, it is formed by Truth Itself.

Through intelligence, therefore, the soul knows Truth and through wisdom, the soul loves Truth. For wisdom is the love or taste (sapor) for the good, whence its name. The vision of the mind is intelligence, its taste is wisdom; the former contemplates Truth, while the latter finds its delight therein.¹⁵²

But this intellectual activity of the knowledge and love of Truth, the soul does not have from itself. The faculties, it is true, belong to the soul by nature, but the productivity of these in knowledge and love is the work of grace. Hence, the knowledge and love of the rational mind, effected through the intelligence, wherein the divine image is sealed, is the fruit of wisdom in the order of grace.

"Verumtamen facultates et quasi instrumenta cognoscendi et diligendi habet ex natura; cognitionem tamen veritatis et ordinem dilectionis nequaquam habet nisi ex gratia. Facit aliquid a se homo rationalis, sicut ejus imago suscepit, ista cognitionem et amorem. Vasa namque quae creatrix sapientia format ut sint, adiatrix gratia replet ne vacua sint, si strenuus cooperarius invenerit." 153

In these intellectual activities, therefore, the soul exercises powers which are above its own nature, insofar as their fruitfulness depends on a divine illumination wherein the soul, in some manner, is brought into immediate contact with God.

"rationale et intellectuale lumen, quo ratiocinamur, intelligimus et sapimus, merces divina, quae illi facta est ad imaginem Dei, ut nulla interposita natura ab ipsa veritate separaretur." 154

Therefore, we must inquire one step further, and try to discover what is the nature of that relation which cleaves apart between the rational soul and God.

D

The Soul and God

(a) The Soul as made originally by God to His image and likeness

To understand the dignity of the soul which can attain to this ineffable union through its intelligence, we must go back to the moment of its creation. God's creation did not follow the pattern of the original six days' work but, by a special counsel of the Trinity, God created man to His own image and likeness, which was granted to no other creature.

"Tanta dignitas humanæ conditionis esse cognoscitur ut non solum iuventutis ætate, sed etiam sex dierum opera, sed consilio sanctæ Trinitatis, et opera divine majestatis creatus sit homo... hoc est hoc solum quod consilio sanctæ Trinitatis sic excellenter a conditore conditus est, sed etiam quod ad imaginem et similitudinem suam Creator omnium eum creavit, quod nulli alteri ex creaturis dedit." 183

In this, God acted not from any necessity, nor from any self-seeking, since He enjoys perfect happiness in Himself, but solely out of love for man whom He destined to become a sharer in His happiness.

"Ad hoc stimulatus illius sola charitate, nulla necessitate creavit altissimus, ut eum beatitudinis participatione frueret." 184

Having determined man to that particular end, God was obliged to accord him the means of reaching it. This He did by infusing into man's body, the rational soul, the breath of life, to which belonged both sense and understanding. Through sense, the soul was to vivify the body and, through understanding, it was to rule and govern it; in a similar fashion, through sense, man was to behold around him the works of God's wisdom but, through intellect, he was to penetrate into and contemplate that wisdom in itself. So great was the dignity of man's soul that nothing less than the highest good could satisfy it.

"...Fecit Deus hominem...dans ei sensum et intellectum, ut per sensum istum sibi socium vivificaret, et per intellectum crearet; et ut per intellectum istum inrederetur et contemplaretur dei sapientiam et per sensum foris exrederetur, et contemplaretur opera sapientie...ante quicquam dignitatis est humana conditio, ut nullum bonum praeter sensum ei sufficere possit." 127

The rational soul, then, was made to be the source of all human actions; in this soul is found the image of God whereby man bore some affinity to the Creator. For just as God is everywhere present in the world, conserving, moving and directing all things, so, in its own mode, is the soul present in the body, sustaining its being and its activity at all times, and acting as a whole throughout. Just as the divine unity reveals a certain trinity, since God is and lives and knows, so too, the soul, in a similar way, is and lives and knows. Further, within its very nature, the soul

bears another trinity more closely akin to that of the trinity of Persons in the Godhead, for while it is one in its nature, the soul has three powers, intellect, will and memory. Without these three, the soul would not be complete, nor would any one be complete without the other two. But just as there are not three Gods, but one God with three Persons, so, neither are there three souls, but one soul with three distinct powers. Thus, the soul, the interior man, bears quite remarkably the image of God in its nature; and according to the trinity of its natural powers, it is commanded to love God with its whole mind and will and heart, so that, to the extent to which He is known, He may be loved, and to that same degree, He might be kept in perpetual remembrance. Therefore, intellect alone will not suffice, nor will the will, unless the memory be added so that we may always be mindful of God. This is the image of God in man's soul.¹⁸⁸

A likeness of God appears also in man's soul. As God is the perfection of every virtue, so man was created to be like Him. The more virtuous a man is, so much the closer is he to God and so much more like to Him; for the closer anything approaches its maker, so much the more does it resemble him. But man has free-will. By the attractions of vice and evil, he can fall away from his first condition and lose the form whereby he resembled God. Thus de-formed, man loses the divine likeness and becomes rather like to the irrational beasts.¹¹⁰

For Alcher, therefore, the Trinity is, in a very real sense, the form of the soul; its powers of intellect and will and memory each bear the imprint of the divine Persons. For he says that when God made the soul, He gave it a form according to which it was made in His own image and likeness.

"Anima non formatur ex materia inferiori, sed in sua creatione formam accipit, quæ facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. In quo si ueritatur, ceu anet inferioris...quia dissimilis; nec ideo tamen efficitur irrationalis; quia ueritat imaginem Dei, inde et potest reformari." 190

The soul was an image in so much as it was rational, and a likeness because it was spiritual. So that the soul possessed a knowledge of truth and a love of virtue; the knowledge from the image and the love from the likeness. As such, it was joined with truth with no substance intervening between them.

"Ille spiritus dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, in quo est cognitio veritatis et amor virtutis. Imago siquidem est in cognitione, et similitudo in dilectione. Imago, quia rationalis; et similitudo, quia spiritualis. Haeret siquidem veritati nulla interposita substantia." 191

At its creation, then, the soul possessed two kinds of life; one, by which it lived in God - we should call it a supernatural life; and the other, by which it lived in the body to vivify and govern it - a natural life. Therefore, the soul has also a two-fold power of sense directed to a two-fold good. The first was interior; the second, exterior. The interior sense was directed to the contemplation of the divinity and the exterior was directed to the contemplation of

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humanity. For the whole man, both interior and exterior, was destined to be happy. Man was wholly inclined to God and his whole love was towards Him, so that the whole good of man was to be found in God,

"Duplex est quidem vita anime; alia que vivit in carne, et alia que vivit in Deo. Huc siquidem in homine sensus sunt, unus interior, et unus exterior, et uterque bonum suum habet in quo reficitur. Sensus interior reficitur in contemplatione divinitatis, sensus exterior in contemplatione humanitatis. Propterea enim Deus homo factus est, ut totam humanam in se beatificaret, et tota conversio hominis esset ad Deum, et tota dilectio hominis esset in ipso." 192

In the beginning, therefore, the soul was perfect in its state; it had full human knowledge and knew everything it could know except for the burden of the body.¹⁹³ The soul was also perfectly free since, as a rational being, man was entrusted to the freedom of his will.

"Habens in se libertatem arbitrii, ut in sua substantia (anima) esset exaltatione quod vult. Libertati siquidem arbitrii sui concessus est homo." 194

(b) The Fall and its Effects.

But a major evil followed this original good. Man sinned. By his sin, he abandoned God. Hence, he became miserable as having cut himself off from God. He lost his wholeness and integrity and chaos descended upon his being. As a result of his intemperance, he became torrid and wretched; the body knew suffering; the passions were roused and death was lurking everywhere. Having forsaken God, man

was completely transformed by sinning, because he was at variance with God; he lost the nice balance of his being and object within himself his own punishment.

"Nihil (autem) ei tamen nocere posset nisi a Deo recessisset. recessit autem quando peccavit. Proinde turpatur misera, a Deo separata. Ab uno disjuncta a creatur ad multa, et pro sua integritate fit morbida, fit colata...inde caro patitur, languores oriuntur, et cum violentia pervagatur. Homo quidem a Deo aversus, peccato perversus, quia a Deo discessit, discedit et sibi, partemque in se ipso poenae de se ipso." 135

Not having lost the good which was within, the soul went forth to other goods which were external and foreign to its nature. Becoming engrossed with these it fell into a forgetfulness of its own interior good, so that, while the soul used its external senses, its interior life lay dormant. One who is delighted at the pleasures of external things has not experienced the interior goods. Thus, extended in the life of the body, the soul sacrificed its life in God.¹³⁶ The likeness to God which it had received at its creation was forfeited and the soul became senseless. It did not, however, become irrational because it still bore the image of God within itself, and from this it could be reclaimed.

"Unica...in sua creatione forma accepit, quae facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. A quo ei creatur, non est inferior;...quia dissimilis; nec ideo tamen efficiatur irrationalis; quia gestat imaginem Dei, inde et vocatur rationalis." 137

Therefore, after the fall, man was deprived of the

good of his nature, inasmuch as his knowledge was obscured by the body and the strength of his will was also impaired. Still, he did not lose his power of freely choosing; otherwise, the ascertainment for his sin would not be his. Rather, his rational liberty remained, so that he could freely return to God and seek his salvation, but with God first inspiring and admonishing. It is, consequently, in man's power to follow the inspiration to be saved, although to accomplish that desire is a gift of grace.

"Manet itaque ad recuperandam salutem arbitrii libertas, id est, rationis voluntas; sed adjuvante prius deo et inspirante ad salutem. Ut ergo acquiescamus salutari inspirationi nostrae potestatis est; ut adipiscamur quod adipisci desideramus, divini est munus..." 198

(c) Process of restoration in the present life.

In keeping with the traditional teachings of faith, Alcker indicates the lines along which the restoration of the divine likeness was made. When turned away from God, man's soul was de-formed by sin, though not irreparably. As in the beginning God had created through love, so once more He redeemed man and restored him to sonship with Himself. God came to man, assumed the form of man and even became man in order that man might live again with God's life.¹⁹⁹ God sent His Son to redeem us and the Holy Spirit whereby we are adopted as His sons and finally Himself gave us Himself as our portion. In this, the form of the Trinity was returned to man; through the grace of Christ, God made good man's loss,

so that the lost likeness was restored to the soul.⁸⁰⁰
Through Christ, indeed, the soul was even more wonderfully
reformed according to God's likeness.

"...mirabiliter eum (hominem) ad similitudinem
suum in primo homine condidit, mirabilissime in
secundo, id est, in se ipso reformavit." 801

But, in his present state, man still bears the wounds
of original sin. Although according to the law of
concupiscence, it was the body which contracted the debt of
the original sin, still, the soul which vivifies the body
was weighed down by its affections for that body. Thus, the
sin which the body contracted had its repercussions in the
soul. For in man, soul and body are united in such a way
that something of the body is added to the soul and something
of the soul is added to the body. Hence, the soul suffered
from the guilt of the sin which was contracted in the body
and referred back to the soul with which it was joined in the
unity of the person, although it is divided from it by nature.

"Ubiade fit anima originali culpe obnoxia, quam
caro contrahit, et anima refundit, cum anima unita
est in persona, licet divisa sit in natura." 802

It is necessary, consequently for the soul, while the
man is living, to be renewed by the sacrament of baptism;
otherwise, it will be subjected to the effects of the sin
even after it has left the body, unless these shall have
been expiated by the saving remedy. Therefore, the Creator
has prepared the sacraments for all time and has given

commands to be obeyed, to the end that the sacraments may be a remedy against sin and that the observance of temporal commands may bring the rewards of eternal gifts. "Therefore the mind, weakened by sin, must look into itself and seek the remedy in order that what was lost in Adam may be restored in Christ.

"sed ab his intuendis animas nostras, esse infirmas, quia peccatis obta, citius ad se ipsam redeat, sibiique remedium quaerat, ut quae in Adam ceciderit, in Christo resurgat..." 203

In this vision, the mind sees the present state of man's soul and with difficulty the soul can recognize itself. Perfect in its mind as God created it, the soul was corrupted when joined to corruption in fallen humanity. The complete human knowledge which it enjoyed in the first is lost to it, and the soul now cannot exercise its proper powers unless it has been shown by usage and experience or has been taught by another. Moreover, from its association with the body, it is drawn towards material things with such a strong attachment that it can see neither itself nor its own being without bodily images. Even when the objects themselves are absent, their images are present before the soul. So that, in its present condition, the soul finds great difficulty in freeing itself from these sensible images so as to come to a knowledge of itself. The soul is deformed by the phantasies of corporeal images, and so deeply impressed have these latter

because that, even after the soul has left the body, traces of them still remain within the soul. Therefore, unless the soul is cleansed here from the corruption of these bodily affections, it will be enchained by bodily passions hereafter, hence, the necessity for purification in this life.

The will must exert itself so that the soul may come to know and love itself more than the e bodily pleasures. When it will see that it never really loved itself so long as it never really knew itself, since, having loved other things, it has confounded itself with them. But, to withdraw from the objects to which it has clung so tenaciously, a tremendous effort is needed.

The means whereby this purification can be accomplished lie ready within the soul, but they presuppose a certain refining process through self-knowledge. Having withdrawn from all bodily senses through which it has been immersed in external goods, the soul must recollect itself within itself; in order that by its spiritual powers and its reason it may come to know and love itself. Through reflection and a certain ordered desire, it will once again be elevated; thereafter, by meditation and contemplation, it may ascend to God for it beholds all centered within itself.

"Cum ergo vult intelligere, vel divina, vel seipsum vel se ipsum, cuiusque considerari virtutes, non potest se ab omnibus corporis sensibus, quibus non adjuvatur nisi ad extrinsecas formas exteriorum sensibiles; et spiritu se ratione se complecti, meditatione et contemplatione ad deum accendit..." 224

Alcibiades crystallizes his whole teaching on this point of the soul's existence within the body, despite its comparative superiority, in a figure wherein he depicts the soul as the 'city of God'.

Both from its spiritual nature as destined for the vision of the highest good, as well as from its natural powers wherein it bears God's image and likeness, the soul is justly called the city of God. In a certain sense, the soul is the temple of God since he is its life; the soul has three classes of people; wise men, to whom it belongs to rule; soldiers, who defend it; and laborers, who work. Its citizens are the natural powers of the soul of which there are three distinct kinds; the superior powers, that is the intellectual sense which directs the soul towards what is divine; the inferior powers, which are concerned with visible perceptions, thus the animal sense; and the middle, the rational sense which judges and rejects these perceptions with its prudence.

Thus, the intellectual sense is as it were the wise men, guiding and directing the soul; the rational sense is like the soldiers fighting with the weapons of justice against the attacks of the enemies of the soul, the concupiscentia; the corporeal or animal sense are the mules or workmen, ministering to its bodily needs. Hence, this triple power of the soul is called its 'part', not integral but virtual,

for they are already essential to it.

Sensuality both takes care of the bodily sustenance in life and of sensible perceptions. For all the senses are referred to the soul as their source since from it they all have their power to feel. Reason embraces all human wisdom within the compass of its power; it distinguished truth from error which pertains to Logic; it separates the virtues from the vices, which pertains to Ethics; and it examines the natures of things by the sciences, which belongs to Physics. Under these three divisions, the whole of human wisdom, that is, Philosophy is included. Intellect and intelligence, on the other hand, teach about divine things insofar as these are accessible to the human mind. Not to penetrate into the heavenly secrets, reason by itself is not capable, unless it is assisted by some divine help. This power belongs to intelligence which is reserved almost exclusively to God but which in rare cases is given to very few men.

"Hanc triplicem vim animae, id est, sensualis, rationalem, et intellectuales, philosophi partes vicaverunt, non integrantes, sed virtuales; quia potentiae ejus sunt. Sensualitas ex vis animae est, quae corpus vegetat, et per corporis sensus ista exteriora sensit et discernit... Ratio vis est animae supra corporalis, et infra spiritualis collocata... Intellectus sive intelligentia, ex vis animae est, quae est divina, quoniam tantum possibile est, comprehendere." *ibid.*

Corresponding, moreover, to these three kinds of the

knowledge of the rational soul, there are three stages according to which the soul ascends into itself and thence is led towards God.²⁶⁶ In the first of these, the soul passes from exterior and inferior things into itself. It reflects upon what it has been and what it is; what it has lost and what it has gained; it considers how fleeting is life and how certain is death; it sees the sorrows and bitterness with which this life is filled. From these considerations of the sorrows and the transitoriness of earthly things, the soul is filled with a distaste thereof, and turns away, to enter into itself.

At the second level, the soul meditates. It understands how prone it is to evil and how weak in doing good; how much it needs the mercy of God to sustain it, or if it has fallen, to raise it; likewise, it understands that it has need of His grace in order to do any good whatsoever or to persevere in that which is begun. Thus, from a knowledge of its own weakness and the infinite goodness of God, the soul is led to despise itself and to ascend towards a higher good.²⁶⁷

The third stage is reached in the contemplation of God through knowledge and love. By a certain enrapture and elevation of the mind, the soul rises from visible things to the invisible. From the works of wisdom, the soul is led to wisdom; from the dignity of man, it reflects on the majesty of God who created man to His own image and likeness.

Thus, the mind is drawn wholly out of itself and is alienated from itself in order to be united immediately to God through contemplation. In this contemplation, the mind beholds God within itself as in a mirror. He who cannot be seen in Himself becomes visible to the soul in His image which is within the soul itself. And beholding His countenance within itself, the soul begins to love Him whom it has always present within itself through contemplation.

"Nemquam vero in speculo cordis sui, id est, in rationali mente se ipsum et Deum inspicit. Ita namque conditus est per hominem, ut in eo quasi in speculo hominis habiteret, et nemquam in speculo speculo suo reluceret; ut qui in se videri non poterat, in sua imagine visibilis appareret. Magna prorsus dignitas hominis est, portare imaginem Dei, et illius in se Junior vultus aspicere, atque eum semper per contemplationem presentem habere." 203

Therefore, in examining and acknowledging the powers both of its interior and its exterior life, the soul begins to see itself as bearing the divine image and likeness. For it understands that it has been made in God's likeness, then it begins to see itself as mirroring the divine perfections, and at last it comes to know Him whom it cannot see in Himself by knowing Him in His image. In this, the first trace of the Trinity is found, when the soul begins to know that it is in itself and thence, considers that which is above it. For it sees that this knowledge has come from itself, and it loves its own knowledge and from itself and its knowledge there

is produced a love by which it loves itself as produced from itself and yet remaining within itself, not separate from it. So that there appear in it these three, mind and knowledge and love; still, the three are one, so that there is at one and the same time trinity and unity. This is but the soul's reflection of the highest Trinity in which the divine wisdom proceeds from the Father and from their mutual togetherness, they produce love in the person of the Holy Ghost, all the while remaining one in the unity of the Godhead. 209

Whoever, then, contemns temporal things solely from the desire of supernal happiness; whoever loves nothing of this world but seeks the Fatherland alone, that one beholds God and in that vision, he is filled with a great peace of mind. There is nothing more present nor more hidden than God. Hence, withdrawing the soul from earthly desires and expelling the tumult of vain thoughts from the human heart, the soul enjoys the love of intimate quiet and elevates itself by contemplation into the heights of God.

"Qui enim a lo habitudinis superae desiderio
temporalia iste contemnit, et nihil hujus mundi
diligit, solaque aeternae patriae appetit,
mans mentis tranquillitate fovetur... Nihil
enim hoc praesentiae, et nihil hoc secretum. A
turba ergo terrenorum desideriorum accensus mentis
patitur, et inde a secreto cordis illicitum
est tunc tumultus excellentes... in illa dei
contemplatione non sublegetur." SIC

regulate the desires of the soul according to reason. Under the guidance of reason, the soul turns from what is beneath itself to consider what is above. Goodness begins to appear; the soul, therefore, seeks to cleanse itself from its attachments to earthly objects and prepares itself for purity; in the fifth stage, having freed itself from all sensible attractions, the soul has, at length, become master of itself and can preserve its purity without fear and in tranquillity. In this state of purity, the soul seems to recognize its own grandeur and filled with a mighty confidence, it enters into the contemplation of God for whom it experiences a tremendous longing; here, in this sixth stage of its life, the soul singly beholds the truth as in its first vision; at the final stage of its progressive ascent towards God, in the seventh stage of its life, the soul reaches the perfection of its spiritual activity; then, it rests in the vision of that truth in the contemplation of which, it finds its true happiness. For merely to fix the eye of the mind on the vision is quite different from being in it there unswervingly, but only in the fixed and permanent vision does the soul come to rest (quies). There in the face to face vision, the soul rejoices and experiences the sweetest delight. But in this life, we cannot rightly know how delightful it is thus to see God and find in Him the soul's beatitude.²¹² Such a vision is reserved for the life

(d) Supreme attitude reserved for future life.

There, in that beatific Vision by which the soul is filled with happiness, it is united to God through wisdom and love, so that its whole being is completely satisfied. God will fill the soul so that its every capacity will be realized in its perfection. The rational powers He will fill with wisdom so that it lacks no knowledge; the concupiscible, He will fill with justice and ^{to} the irascible, He will grant an overwhelming tranquillity.

"Constat enim animum esse triplicem naturam. Unde et sapientes cum huius animam humanam rationalem, concupiscibilem, et irascibilem esse tradiderunt; quam triplicem viam anime ipsa quoque natura et quotidianis experimentis nos docent... Implebit ergo Dominus rationale nostrum luce sapientiae; ita ut penitus nobis nihil esset in illa scientia. Implebit concupiscibile nostrum fante justitiae; ut omnino desideremus eam, et ea penitus repleamur... Jam vero eodem dicitur in nobis irascibile, cum replebit illud Deus, perfecti erit in nobis tranquillitas, et in omni iustitiam atque incandescens replebimur pace divina." 213

Man's body, too, will share in the soul's beatitude. It will possess immortality so as to die no more; nor will it fear suffering since God will grant it to be impossible. With the speed of thought, bodies will traverse space and go anywhere because they will have agility and lightness; and finally the beauty, which we associate with the fiery element, the body will have in abundance. Thus, God Himself will fill the soul so that there will be in it perfect knowledge, perfect justice and perfect joy; and His majesty will be

revealed in the qualities of the glorified bodies which are made in the likeness of His brightness.

"Sicut ergo respicit animas nostras, eius, eius fuerit in eis perfecta scientia, perfecta iustitia, perfecta laetitia; sic respicitur maiestate eius omnis terra nostra, cum fuerit corpus incorruptile, impassibile, agile, confluens in lumine, carnis claritatis luce. Et tunc veraciter dicet poterit quod quidam poeta dixit 'O ter ne quaerere laeti.' " 214

In this state of perfect and unending happiness, the soul enjoys God in a three-fold manner. It sees Him in all creatures and all creatures in Him; it has Him in itself; and since he is above all things else, it knows Him in Himself and contemplates Him with^{out} any medium. That, indeed, is the perfect life of the soul, to know the one, true God, the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit, that is, to see God as he is in Himself. And in that knowledge is the peace of God which surpasses all understanding. 215

If these rewards for the soul's fidelity appear great, equally terrible will be the punishments for its infidelity. For God will make the soul to partake of His own happiness or of eternal damnation depending upon its merits. And that most just and awful Judge, who has prepared true and unending joys for His children, has also prepared grief and perpetual punishment for those who deserve it. The death of the sinner will be un dying; he will be delivered up to the infernal fires where he will burn but will not be consumed; the fires will

burn but will not shake his darkness; he will be convulsed with agonies of grief and fear, but the torments will have no alleviation; he will live without hope of pardon or mercy, hence, he will give himself up to despair. His sins will be always before him to condemn - and this everlastingly. The fire will torment him exteriorly and the pains of blindness will obscure his inner vision; in these torments, he will see the things which he has loved immediately contrary to God's commands. But God, he will not see, which is the supreme misery. For who can tell how great the suffering of being deprived of the sight of that God, by whom we are and live and know?

"Quapropter miseria eris sine luce, finis sine fine, defectus sine defectu; quis eris semper vivet, et finis semper loci fiet, et defectus deficiere cessabit. Dolor periet et non extinguetur; dolor cruciabit, et pavorem non fugabit...Veris consociationem cor odet, ignis carnes coacturet; austerius ut auctari suo corde et corpore deliquerunt, eadem simul et corpore puniuntur...Peccata deliquuntur, rei puniuntur, et hoc totum perenne. Quisquis enim ad tormenta iit, jam non melius erit...Beati autem non videntur, quod est carum miseriarum miserius...et quod suavis, vitiosus et sapiens." 216

Therefore, when concludes, if in the course of life which God has allotted, the soul is constantly mindful of itself and of the truth towards which it is directed, by the grace of God, it will attain to that true and blessed God in which alone the soul can find a lasting peace. For here, at last, the soul has reached the end of all its strivings.

and sweetly comes to rest in the blessed vision of God.

Therefore, he counsels, we must work to fulfill the commands of God most vigilantly and religiously, since there is no other flight from such great evils towards so great a Good.

"Nos vero si curam vite, quæ nobis Deus precepit, non tenendum negligimus, cunctis illius iumentis, per quæ illa ad illud verum et suum terminum pervenimus. Incolendis ergo viciis, in rei religiosissime atque exactissime ac vigilantissime opera deus, quoniam non est alia fuga de tantis malis ad tantum bonum." 217

Here, then, at the conclusion of the IX, there is evidence of the same Augustinian inspiration which we have already noted at its beginning and which has manifested itself repeatedly throughout the gradual unfolding of Alcker's thought. The author, true to his master, professes his desire to know the nature of the soul and its homeland; the method he adopts is the same interiorization whereby man, as made in the image and likeness of God, comes to know God across his self-knowledge. Hence, he inclines readily to the superiority of the soul within man, and, within the soul, to the preeminence of the mind. At that point, however, we have seen that Alcker stopped short of the extreme mentalism of St. Augustine; while admitting the superiority of the soul in man, he hesitated to grant it a complete transcendence over the body.

Like his predecessor, Alcker regarded the soul as a

spiritual substance endowed with reason and designed to rule over the body. As a substance, therefore, the soul was capable of existing and acting by itself; further, as governing the body, it had certain relations with it. Having accepted the natural opposition between the natures of these two realities, soul and body, Alcher was faced with the problem of their union within the unity of man. Unlike Augustine who simply had accepted the fact of the composite nature of man, the author of the *De Anima*, whose interest was primarily philosophical, was forced to explain the mode of their union. The manner of presence of the soul within the body, where it acts as a whole by a vital intension, which Augustine had held, is found again in Alcher; he admits, besides, the same theory of the localization of the functions of the soul within the brain. But, when Augustine describes the operations of the soul within the body in such a fashion as to ensure its absolute independence, then, Alcher abandons him, at least temporarily. Like true Christians, they are reunited in the Vision of God, however, though the paths which led them both did not lie wholly within the same direction.

By the same seven-fold ascent which marked the progress of the Augustinian soul towards its perfection does the soul in the *De Anima* proceed towards union with God; and, on the other hand, in both doctrines, the same undying life of misery and frustration awaits the soul which fails to recognize its native

grandeur as made in God's image and likeness with its corresponding responsibilities.

Literally, therefore, from beginning to end, the doctrine of the IMA reveals a whole-souled dependence on St. Augustine. This could excuse, to some extent, the error of its being attributed to the saintly Doctor by casual readers. But not all readers were casual. It was not too long before certain differences in the doctrines began to be realized. For the IMA was to prove no exception to the general rule. Like every other representation, it added something new to the original thought of Augustine. In the following chapter, therefore, we shall attempt to characterize the Augustinianism of the IMA by showing the extent to which St. Augustine's teachings form the pattern for Alchor's psychology, and, to what extent, if any, the doctrine of the IMA represents a departure from the historical Augustine. Accordingly, we shall turn, now, to a comparison of the doctrinal content of the IMA with certain characteristically Augustinian themes, the chief source of Alchor's doctrine.

Chapter 4

CHIEF SOURCES OF THE DOCTRINE OF ALICER

From the foregoing analysis, the Augustinian origin of Alcher's doctrine is very obvious. Many of the characteristic themes of St. Augustine's psychological teachings are found scattered throughout with varying degrees of fidelity to the original thought of the Master. Now, while it remains perfectly true that the author of the *MM* is indebted to St. Augustine for his method and the principal ideas of his doctrine, as well as for the primary relations which he established among these, that, in itself, is no absolute guarantee that his doctrine remained true to the historic Augustin. In fact, that is precisely what we hold that the author of the *MM* failed to do.

It is not a question simply of the lapse of seven hundred years; Augustine would be the first to insist on the unchanging nature of truth. The reason for Alcher's failure is much more fundamental; it is in the order of a philosophical assimilation of what cannot in fact be reconciled. The problems which faced Augustine in 4th century Rome were not at all those that troubled 14th century Paris; whence, Augustine, meditating in the 4th century could not possibly have thought the thoughts of a 14th century thinker.

therefore, when interpreted by a man of the twentieth century, the psychological doctrine of the fifth century theologian almost inevitably underwent a serious transformation. Something of the nature and the extent of this transformation we shall now attempt to indicate.

The Augustinian view of the soul

A.

Distinction of Motives - Philosophy vs. Theology

That Aicher attached a singular importance to the study of the human soul is clear. To know the nature of the soul and its homeland is the desire which he confesses at the beginning of his work¹ and towards this end, all his efforts have been turned. The point of departure for his study of the soul is man, so that the main outlines of the author's search stem from the fact of the existence of the soul within the human composite. His thought proceeds from a consideration of the various kinds of activity which the soul performs to its proper nature which, in turn, is directed towards a final end. Thus, at the very outset, three great truths control Aicher, man, soul, end, and it is precisely the ordering of the various relations among these three which determines the location of his thought within a religious framework. From its two extremes, the

beginning and end of life, alcher's study becomes something dynamic; it is in the nature of a living search wherein man attains to his final end, union with God, only to the extent to which he has perfected the life of his soul. For, according to alcher, the soul is the life of the body just as God is the life of the soul." Therefore, it behooves the soul to liberate itself from the body in order to be free to ascend towards God. Such a conception of the soul, with the strong moral undertone that it already implies, forcibly recalls the basic pattern of St. Augustine's psychological teachings wherein the soul is considered almost exclusively from a religious viewpoint and in which the life of man is organized around and orientated towards the vision of God.

For St. Augustine, too, a knowledge of the soul had been of supreme importance, though his motive was perhaps not altogether the same. For him, the importance attaching to the soul derived from the fact that it offered the surest approach to a knowledge of God which was the most ardent longing of Augustine's mind. To know God and the soul was the goal towards which his thought and his whole being is constantly aspiring before all else, so that the well-known *"Inveritas, in veritas"* reveals the fixed direction of his thinking, and consequently, of his life as well. Augustine wanted to know God for His own sake, and the soul for the sake of knowing God. Such was

the deliberate ordering of his thought.

Since his motive in learning about the soul was of a purely religious character, his study of the soul was primarily a religious study. Like all his philosophical learning, it was ordered to the higher discipline of his theological vision. In this proper orientation of it, Augustine's whole thought to us is too, we cannot insist too strongly, since any other point of view simply does not do justice to his dominantly contemplative ideal. In describing this characteristic ideal, Regis writes :

"The Augustinian ideal... finds in mystical wisdom the answer to the classic Augustinian problems of truth, beatitude and certitude. That is why we must say that philosophical ideas are for Augustine ministers of the spiritual life; rather than teach the intellect, they enable it to unite itself more intimately with God." 2

Therefore, we may say that Augustine had no systematically developed philosophy of the soul; he wrote no special treatise of psychology. Rather his inquiries about the soul were pursued across the path of morals and theology with which they freely commingle. Thus, his insistence on the incorporeal nature of the soul serves to show its affinity to God and the possibility of union with Him through love; his interest in the soul's immortality was heightened by his desire to reveal man as destined for unending life with God; while his prolonged inquiry into the problem of the soul's origin, together with his renunciation of the theory of its pre-existence was directly in-

influenced by the Christian dogma of original sin.⁶ It is only within the framework of his exclusively religious ideal that the nature of man's soul, as Augustine conceived it, can be understood and justly appreciated. Nor should it be too surprising to find that such a religious direction was manifested, in varying degrees, by those who felt heir to Augustine's teachings. Consequently, the unmistakable moral and religious tendencies which we have remarked in the DSA are explained by the Augustinian origin whence Aleher drew much of his inspiration.

But Aleher's motive in studying the soul was somewhat different from Augustine's. His thought is based primarily on an economy of knowledge, not of love. That this is true we have on the reliable authority of his friend, Isaac of Stella. In his De Anima, to which the DSA is a reply,⁷ Isaac states expressly the primarily philosophical character of Aleher's interest in the human soul, which Aleher himself had confessed. He would learn about the soul, not from any theological viewpoint, as it is described in the Scriptures, but rather as to its nature, its faculties and its relations to the body; that is, from a purely philosophical stand.⁸ The direction, therefore, in which Aleher's thought will be turned from the beginning is clear; it has been indicated in no uncertain terms. Like Augustine, he will study the soul and its elements, but the motive which prompts his inquiry is a very different one.

His thought, as a result, while remaining under the dominant religious and moral influence of the saintly doctor, will assume a more metaphysical quality. Consequently, although his doctrine conforms exteriorly to the teachings of St. Augustine, the inner spirit is wanting; the words of Augustine, therefore, at times take on a meaning which their author never intended. So that, in a very true sense, it may be said that Alcher honors Augustine with his lips but his heart remains far from him.

From the outset, we must bear in mind this difference of motive which in turn conditions the difference of direction of Alcher's thought. For it is this difference of direction which ultimately determines the peculiar trend of the Augustinian doctrine such as it appears in the *UMA*. Embodying the doctrine of St. Augustine, therefore, Alcher inclines it to his own ends, perhaps even unwittingly, simply because he is going in a different direction from the saintly doctor. Alcher's thought is based on the reason of his logic; it is, before all else, philosophical; Augustine, on the other hand, had used his logic as an instrument of love; his thought was rooted in faith, hence, its primarily theological character. From this initial distinction, we surmise, the consequent idiosyncrasies of Alcher's Augustinianism are to be derived. We shall now turn to his conception of the human soul, as the author himself describes it, from which we

shall be better able to judge the measure of his authentic Augustinianism.

B.

Definition of the Soul

In reading through the text of the *De Anima*, a certain difficulty is encountered, at first, arising from the lack of any fixed terminology. Alcher uses several terms to designate the soul of man, each one of which represents a particular character which he attributes to the soul. In this lack of precise terminology, Alcher is but reflecting Augustine who had complained of the difficulty of finding a term which would properly specify the soul.

"Non possit inveniri nomen, quo proprie distinguatur ista natura quae nec certus, nec Deus est, nec vita sine sensu...nec vita sine rationali sententia... sed vita minus minor suam angelorum, et futura quod angelorum." 19

But, by whichever name he designates the soul, it is clear that Alcher always intends to describe it as a principle of vital activity. On the one hand, this activity is the simple animation of the body with which the soul is united in man; in this sense, he terms the principle of this activity, the soul or anima. Again, in a higher order, there is the vital activity which belongs properly to the mind itself and which it exercises in the act of thinking. Since thinking is in the order of a spiritual activity, therefore, the principle of that activity must likewise be

spiritual; hence, Alcher refers to the soul as the principle of spiritual activity as the spiritus. Spiritus and Anima therefore as referred by Alcher to the human soul signify simply the quality or function of which the rational soul alone is capable; it does not in any manner imply that there are two souls in man.

"Anima vero ex eo dicitur ut quod animet corpus ad vivendum, hoc est, vivificet. Spiritus est in eo anima pro spirituali natura, vel pro eo quod animet in corpore appellatus est spiritus. Anima et spiritus sunt idem in homine, non vit aliud notat spiritus, et aliud anima. Spiritus non ut ad substantiam dicitur, et anima ad vivificationem. Unde est essentialis, non proprietas diversa. Sed unus et idem spiritus ad se ipsum dicitur spiritus, et ad corpus anima. Spiritus est in quantum est ratione creata substantia rationalis; anima in quantum est vita corporis...Homo quidem anima, quia in corpore habet esse et extra corpus, anima pariter et spiritus vocari potest; non tamen anima, sensitiva et rationalis, altera ut homo vivat, et altera ut ut quilibet potest capiat, sed una et us eadem anima in semetipsa vivit per intellectum, et corpori vitam prebet per sensum."

To be sure, a soul which has reason is radically different from one which has not reason; hence, the human soul differs essentially from that of animals. Hence, he concludes that it remains in a class by itself.

"Ratio autem inde incipit, unde illi vis occurrat, quod nobis cum animalibus non sit commune." 12

This uniqueness in kind which Alcher claimed for the rational soul merely reaffirms the absolute distinction which Augustine had placed between the soul of man and every other vital principle. 13

In defining the human soul, therefore, Alcher classifies it as a substance; it is, however, distinguished

by its spiritual character of participating in reason from which it is designed to rule over the body.

"Substantia, unde ratio participat, separata a corpore" *Accidentia* 14.

As a substance, the soul is capable of subsisting in and by itself. Still, however, the human soul is the soul of a man. Now, since man is composed of body and soul, without which he could not truly be man, it is only by locating the soul within its reference to the human composite that it can be adequately defined. This at once raises a problem for Aicher. For while he considers man as a whole to be one substance, he insists no less on the fact that the soul, taken by itself, is also a substance. Thus, instead of defining the soul according to its function in man, as Aristotle, for instance, had done,¹⁵ Aicher describes it directly as a substance in itself in keeping with the platonian tendency of his illustrious predecessor. The effect of this procedure on Aicher's conception of human nature will be pointed out presently.

For the present, we shall turn our attention to the soul itself as Aicher has defined it above and consider the several implications which such a definition involves. When he calls the soul a substance, the author of the *De Anima* signifies that it is capable of subsisting in and by itself, with a proper mode of existence. It has no need of any subject in which to inhere. In thus characterizing the soul as a substance, he is opposing it to the body which it animates.

For unless the rational soul is present, there is no human body.

"Hominum non ne corpus nec vivere nec nosse potest sine anima rationali." 16

In thus proving the substantiality of the soul, Alcher is ipso facto proving its radical distinctness from the body. And from this, its spiritual nature follows immediately.

Alcher draws his proof for the substantiality of the soul from the fact of the self-knowledge which is proper to man. The human mind can turn in upon itself and become the object of its own reflection. In this act of knowing, it sees itself as a living being which reasons, understands, wills, thinks, knows and judges. Now, since all of these operations are entirely without reference to the body, the principle of this vital activity must be an incorporeal substance which cannot be perceived by means of an image. It can, however, be directly apprehended by the mind to which it is most present.

"Hinc ergo cui nihil se ipse praesentius est, quidam interiori, non simulata, sed vera praesentia, videt se in se. Nihil enim tam novit mens, quam id quod sibi praesto est: nec menti quid unum magis praesto est, quam ipse sibi. Mens cognoscit se vivere, se meminisse, se intelligere, se velle, cogitare, sentire, judicare. Haec omnia novit in se, nec imaginatur, quasi extra se illa aliquo sensu corporis tetigerit, sicut corporalia quicquid tangitur. . . nihil enim tam in mente est, quam ipse mens, nec quid unum sic mentem cognoscit, quomodoque mens. Qui enim querit mens, quid sit mens, profecto novit, quod se ipsam querit; et quod ipse sit mens, quia se ipse querit. Mens enim aliunde se querit quam se ipsa. Qui ergo quaerentem se novit, se utique novit. Et cum quid novit, tota novit; et ne ita tota se novit." 17

In the same act in which the mind recognizes its existence as a thinking being, it also knows its own substance; and further, since in that act of knowing its self, the mind is acting as a whole and upon itself wholly, therefore, Alcher claims that it is incorporeal. Thus, from the interior vision wherein the soul sees itself and understands itself to be incorporeal, its spiritual character is unmistakable. Accordingly, from the proper activities which the human soul performs independently of the body, Alcher concludes that the soul is a spiritual substance, having nothing in common with the nature of any body.

"Anima est substantia spiritalis, simplex et indivisibilis, invisibilis et incorporea, passibilis et inmutabilis, carens pondere, figura et colore." 18

Here, then, not only is the soul shown to be a substance, but it becomes a substance of a particular kind (quoddam); unlike bodies which are subject to division and multiplicity, the soul is incorporeal; while from its spiritual nature, it is, in a certain manner, comparable to God.¹⁹

One of the first attributes deriving immediately from such a conception of the human soul is its simplicity. Indeed, so strong was Alcher's insistence on the simplicity of the soul that when he came to explain its relation to the body, the question was almost vexing. For how can the soul be active throughout the whole body unless it is

extended in the body? And, if it is extended, then obviously, it is not simple. How Aicher solves the problem of the mysterious nature of the union of two such opposite beings in man, while at the same time safeguarding the proper nature of the soul, will be seen when we treat of the manner of the soul's presence in the body. 20

When he adds to his definition that the soul participates in reason, "rationalis participans", Aicher specifies the human soul distinctively. Herein lies the fundamental difference of man's soul. For, on the one hand, reason separates it from the brutes; while, on the other, as participating in reason, it is distinguished from God who Himself possesses properly that of which we bear the imprint. God does not need to be enlightened; He is the Light; whereas the soul can be enlightened only by its relations with God, the intelligible Sun who illumines spirits in the same manner as the physical sun illumines bodies.

"Deus igitur et lux est (1Joan.1,9) lux ergo splendorem emittens ex se, sicut refinet in se, illuminat intelligentiam ad cognitionem veritatis...Et sicut solem non videt oculus nisi in lumine solis; sic verum et divinum lumen non potest intellectus videre nisi in lumine lucis. Lucine, inquit propheta, in lumine tu videbimus lumen." 21

Thus, reason is characteristic of the human soul as setting man apart from the rest of creation. Alone among all creatures, man can reach out and attain to a knowledge of truth. 22

But that is not all. This spiritual soul has another title to distinction, according to Alexer, from the governmental attitude which it assumes in respect of the body. To this end, indeed, it has been specially fitted by its nature, 'organie corpori accommodata.' As governing it, the soul is destined to live within the body, not however, as though the latter were a prison in which the soul is enclosed. On the contrary, the soul has been adapted for this governance of the body, so that the latter, as a result, becomes as an instrument of the soul.

"Cum enim sit incorporea, per subtiliorem naturam corporis sui...corpus administrat...sed in istis (corporis membris) tanquam in organis agit et per hec consulit corpori...Corpus autem quod prius integrum tanquam organum contemneretur et dispositum erat, ut melos musicum in se contineret et tactum resoneret, tunc (anima recessa) confectum et inutile a regione jacet. Anima vero recurrentibus ad regiones suas elementorum partibus, non habens ubi vires suas exercent, requiescit ab his tantum motibus, quibus corpus per tempus et locus movebat.. quoniam etsi organum perit, sed non melos, nec quod organum movebat. Anima inter Deum et corpus posita per tempus movetur..." 24

Besides its relation with the highest being, God, therefore, the soul is also, in some ineffable manner, united with the body in such wise that it rules the latter, while itself is subject to the former. 25

In thus defining the soul and signalling its nature as a spiritual substance wholly distinct from the body with which it is joined in man, Alexer was faithfully reproducing the original thought of St. Augustine. For the latter, too,

had repeatedly insisted on the human soul as a substance in its own right.⁴⁵ He, too, had rigorously defended its radical opposition to the body.⁴⁷ That this had been one of Augustine's chief preoccupations in studying the soul is clear from the general direction of his thought as a whole. Augustine's psychology, we have seen, stemmed from and was wholly dependent upon his moral principles. His primary concern centred round the problem of the highest good; this good, being essentially spiritual, was to be sought within the order of the soul, although above it. Whence, the superiority of the soul over the body in man is one of the distinctive features of St. Augustine's teaching on the soul.⁴⁸ It is only by turning away from the body and fixing his attention on the soul that man can attain to this greatest good.

Thus, within this definition of the soul as a spiritual substance, endowed with reason and capable of ruling the body, which Alcher had taken directly from Augustine, the whole of Augustinian psychology is contained in germ. It includes the proper location of the human soul as a substance placed midway between God and body;⁴⁹ so that, by nature, the soul is seen to be inclined towards the body with which it is united by means of the senses, or again towards that is above itself with which it communicates through reason. Whence, by gradual unfolding of the activities implied within this definition, the main outlines

of Augustine's entire psychology, with its inherent dualism, begin to stand out in relief.³⁰ It is the same dualism, with some slight modification, which we have already discerned in the doctrine of the soul.³¹ That the character of this "slight modification" is will become apparent in the following discussion of the union of the soul and body in man.

Composite Nature of Man; his Definition

Such a definition of the human soul immediately poses one of the most difficult problems of philosophy, that, namely, of the union of the soul and the body in the human person. How can the soul, an independent, spiritual substance, having its own mode of existence be united to the corporeal body in a personal union? How can these two wholly unlike substances be joined within the unity of man?

Having determined the essential opposition between the natures of these two realities, soul and body, Aicher is faced with the problem of uniting them within the human person. In finding a solution, therefore, he logically looks in the direction of the composite nature of man. According to Aicher, man is a composite being, by his nature; he is a rational substance consisting of a soul and a body. The body is dependent on the soul both for its being and its activity, whereas, the soul, on the contrary, is wholly in-

dependent as respects its rational nature.

"In ductus substantia constat homo, anima et carne; anima cum ratione, carne cum sensibus suis; quos tamen sensus non movet caro absque animae societate; anima vero rationale suum tenet sine carne." 33

The body is made up of matter duly arranged and organized according to its several members and their functions; this whole, in turn, is governed by a rational soul which has been breathed into it.³³ The corporeal part of man, therefore, is under the dominion of the soul to which it is related as a servant or an instrument. This relation, however, is not a purely extrinsic one, for the body pertains essentially to the nature of man, since it is joined to the soul in the unity of the person.

"Sed nonne ita unitur anima, ut cum carne sit una persona. Fit enim auctore deo anima et caro unus individuum, unus homo." 34

Man, then, is one being. We know this unity from the testimony of our own nature. The soul, by its presence, vitalizes every part of the body while remaining itself whole in each part. Nothing of what takes place in the body escapes the soul, for all the rights which the body enjoys, its share in life and sensibility, descend to it from the soul.

"Vivificatione et sensificatione descendit anima ad corpus. Irresistentia non ut sua illud vivificet, colligit in unum, atque in uno tenet; defluere et contabescere non sinit, conservantiam ejus modum ut conservet, non tantum in pulchritudine, sed etiam in crescendo atque rigendo. Intendit se etiam anima in tactum, et eo calida et frigida, aspera et lenis, dura et mollis, gravis et levis sentit

atque discernit." 15

Therefore, whatever grace of order and form and beauty is in the body comes from the soul. From this, again, may be inferred its wholly superior nature. It is precisely by reason of this superior nature of the soul that aloner finds its union with the body so strange, and aithal so wonderful. Yet wonderful as such a union may appear to man, it is as nothing before that awe-inspiring Hypostatic Union in which God Himself assumed human form and joined to Himself an earthly body. How does the union of soul and body in man appear any more wonderful than that other union wherein man and the angels and God will be united in one spirit, when the rational soul will be elevated to the company of the blessed spirits and will even receive a share in God's glory.

"Hinc societas carnis et anime, spiritus vitas et limi terre. Sic enim scriptum est, Vocit Deus hominem de limo terre; et inspiravit faciem ejus spiritum vitas; dedit ei sensum et intellectum, ut per sensum latus sibi socium vivificaret, et per intellectum regeret; et ut per intellectum intus incedebatur, et contemplaretur Dei scientiam et per sensum foris egredieretur, et contemplaretur opera sapientie...Flemus fuit miraculo, quod tam diversa et tam diversa et invicem, ad invicem petuerunt conjungi. Nec minus mirabile fuit quod limo nostro Deus se ipsum conjunxit, et sibi invicem unirentur Deus et limus, tanta sublimitas, tanta vilitas...Mirabilis fuit conjunctio prima, mirabilis et secunda, nec minus mirabilis erit tertia, cum homo et angelus et Deus, unus erit spiritus...Si enim tam disparum carnis et anime naturam ad unam confederationem atque unitatem Deus conjungere potuit, ne unquam erit ei impossibile rationales spiritus, qui usque ad consortium terrena corporis humiliter est,... ad consortium beatorum spirituum,, exaltare et usque ad suam glorie participationem sublimare." 16

No ever extraordinary, therefore, any more the conjunction of spirit and matter in man, Alcher insists that it is a union for which there is ample verification in the Scriptures. The unity of man, therefore, is assured and the soul which has been directly infused by God is the principle of that unity. The soul, thus, is intermediary between God and matter. Alcher reaffirms his position when he accepts the opinion of those 'ancient wisdom' who held man to be 'an animal, rational and mortal.'

"Illud siquidem nos maxime movere debet quod a veteribus sapientibus ita homo definitus est: Homo est animal, rationale, mortale. Hoc generale posito, quod animal dictum est, addites duas differentias videmus, quibus adnotandus erat homo, et quo sibi esset redcundum, et unde fugiendum." 37

As rational, man has a relation to spirit and to God; as mortal, he has a further relation to matter.

This does not mean that there are two souls in man, one sensitive and the other, rational. On the contrary, Alcher insists, time and again, that it is the same soul which governs the body which also performs the functions proper to the life of reason.

"Hec duo animal et credimus in uno homine...unam animam qua vivitur corpus...alteram spiritualesque rationes ministrat. Sed dicimus unam eandemque esse animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificat, et sensitiuum sua ratione disponit, sicut in se libenter movet, et in se substantie elicit cogitationes quod vult." 38

The manner in which this union of spirit and matter

in man is effected is described by Aloner according to the law of attraction. The extremes of these two wholly unlike substances he finds to be most apt allies for each other. Between the lowest spirit and the highest bodily element there exists a certain similarity such that the two can be easily joined in a personal union without any change of their natures. Now, the lowest spirit, which is almost a body, the phantasm of the soul, that is, and the highest body, sensuality, which is a fiery vigor akin to spirit, are joined in the spirit, without, however, the nature of either one being changed. Thereupon, the union of the soul and body is effected in the spirit, for there, the soul, which is truly a spirit, and the body, which is matter, are joined in their extremities very conveniently and with ease. At this point, the author strengthens his argument by recalling that a similar effect is produced when the higher faculty of man's soul, his intelligence, is joined to God in a personal union without, however, suffering any change of its own nature.

*"Per sensus quoque progreditur anima ad corpus
movendum et vivificandum...Sunt etiam utriusque
quedam similia, scilicet corporis supremum, et
spiritus infimus, in quibus sine naturarum
confusione, personali tamen unione facile connecti
possunt. Similia enim similibus gaudent. Itaque
anima quae vere spiritus est, et caro quae vere
corpus est, in suis extremitatibus facile et
convenienter uniantur, id est in phantastico
anima, quod corpus non est, sed simile corpori;
et sensualitate carnis quae fere spiritus est,
quia sine anima fieri non potest. Sicut enim
superius animae, id est intelligentiae sive mens
inferioris et similitudinem gerit sui superioris,
id est Dei, unde et ejus susceptiva esse potuit,*

et ad unionem personalem etiam, quod ipse voluit, easque omnes demutationes naturae fuit assumpta; sic supremum carnis, id est, sensualitas animae gerens similitudinem ad personalem unionem ejus associationis suscipere potest.' 39

Not so content with having united the soul and the body in man, the author goes on to describe the union as being of the most satisfying kind. Although he insists that the soul holds a superior position in man, still, he does not place it beyond the reach of the bodily affections. On the contrary, he binds the soul somewhat closely to matter by conceding a certain natural affection and friendship for the body - her in the soul is as though imprisoned.

'animae affectiones et quales mixtissimae carni conjungitur, secundum quam amicitiam homo carnis sum odio habet. Societas namque illi, licet ejus societate praerogatur, ineffabili tamen conditione diligit illud; aut carcerem sum, et illic liberum esse non potest. Doloribus ejus vehementer afficitur...' 40

Therefore, although it is quite considerably burdened by its association with it, nevertheless, the soul loves the body and sympathizes with it in all its various needs. For the soul is bound to the body in such a manner that it can undergo certain actions on the part of sensible objects, whose presence is by no means distasteful to the soul.

'ut licet his rebus nullatenus ipsa utatur, gravi tamen moerore affligitur, si subtrahantur.' 41

From which Alcher concludes that this friendly union of the soul with the body and its senses in no way whatever detracts from the spiritual nature of the soul as a knowing substance. Now Alcher explains this is determined by the

nature of the relations which he places between the soul and the body. Before examining these relations more closely, however, let us go back and take notice of the position of St. Augustine on the question of the union of the soul and body in man.

Having defined the soul in the same terms as Aicher, (who was simply repeating his formula, as we have seen), Augustine must have been faced with the same problem. If the soul is an independent, spiritual substance, having its own mode of existence, how can it be united to the corporeal body in a personal union from which an individual human being, a man, is constituted? Of the existence of the problem and its mysterious nature Augustine seems to have been fully aware. His answer to the problem is equally definite. How this can be is unintelligible. The Saint had simply accepted the mystery and had stated quite frankly the manner in which the spiritual soul and material body are joined in man is beyond human understanding.

"*ut et isto alio modo, quo corporibus adherent spiritus et animalis fuit, omnia miris est, nec comprehendi ab homine potest.*" 42

But he did not conclude that it is, therefore, to be denied. On the contrary, St. Augustine insisted upon this two-fold element in human nature, which became the basis for his distinction of the interior and the exterior man. 43

In much the same fashion as Aicher, after him, the Saint had taught that man was a composite being by his nature.

"Homo est substantia rationalis composita ex anima et corpore" 41

side up of body and soul together, these two are so arranged that the corporeal part is governed by the rational soul which has been infused into it, and to which it is related as instrument.

"In corpore humano quaedam moles carnis et ferrea species et ordo distinctisque membrorum, et temperatic valetudinis; hoc corpus inspirata anima regit, eandem ne rationalis." 42

This relation, however, is not a purely extrinsic one, for the body pertains essentially to the nature of man⁴³ since it is joined to the soul in the unity of a person.

"Miscetur anima corpori, ut una persona fiat hominis. Non sicut in unitate personae anima unitur corpori, ut homo sit...in illa ergo persona mixtura est anime et corporis...ergo persona hominis mixtura est anime et corporis." 44

Moreover, the point had turned, it is folly for anyone to try to separate the body from human nature, since the complete man is constituted only from the conjunction of soul and body in a personal union.

"anima uis ergo a natura humani corpus alienare vult, despit." 45

Augustine's emphasis on this unity of the person had placed his doctrine here in sharp contrast to the exaggerated dualism of Plato who regarded man as a spirit joined to a body accidentally, according to the well-known figures, as a driver to his chariot or a sailor to his ship. Now, it is true that Augustine had used a formula in defining man which bears a close resemblance to that of Plato.

"Homo igitur ut homini apparet animae rationalis mortali atque terreno utens corpore."⁴⁹ Here, however, the use of the body does not necessarily imply its conception as an alien substance. Rather, as Gilson suggests, when Augustine called man a rational soul using a mortal and earthly body, he was emphasizing the transcendence of the soul over the body in man.⁵⁰ Here, as elsewhere, the stress is on the primacy of the soul in man, for what the saintly bishop was trying before all else to make clear was that the soul is the superior part of man. That this was really the direction of Augustine's thought is evidenced by his definitions of man, in all of which he underlined the superiority and complete transcendence of the soul over the body. 51

Here, then the true position of St. Augustine appears. For whatever be the difficulties arising from the metaphysical implications of such a conception of man, as such, they were of no importance for the saintly Doctor. His concern was not with human nature in the abstract, but with man in the concrete. The Augustinian notion of man was not that of a barren philosophical concept; it is founded rather upon a living search for human liberty in God by means of an interior purification of the soul. Likewise the Augustinian notion of the soul is not that of an abstract metaphysical entity, but rather, the point of departure in this living search. Therefore, Augustine's con-

cept of man and the consequent relations existing between the soul and body within man are to be explained on the grounds of his world, not his metaphysical preoccupations.⁵²

From these considerations, one fact of great importance for us becomes clear. Following their definition of the soul as a spiritual substance wholly distinct from the body, both Alerer and St. Augustine were faced with the same problem, that, namely, of joining them together within the unity of man. But whereas the latter could be content with accepting the fact of the composite nature of man, without offering any precision as to the manner of the union between soul and body,⁵³ Alerer, on the other hand, whose interest was primarily philosophical, was forced to explain the nature of this union and the manner of its accomplishment in man. Here, we suggest, Alerer's initial tendency away from Augustine is beginning to express itself. Whereas Augustine had inclined most readily to the absolute superiority of the soul over the body in man, Alerer stopped short of this extreme position; while admitting the superiority of the soul, he hesitated to grant it a complete independence of the body. Without denying, therefore, the essential superiority of the soul, Alerer bound it to the body more closely than his predecessor had done. The immediate effect of such an action on the relations between the two will presently become apparent. We are prepared, at this moment, to turn back to the doctrine of the soul to examine more in detail the relations which Alerer permits between the soul and the

body in man.

D.

Nature of the Relations between Soul and Body in Man

His theory of the union of the soul and body in man provided Acher with a solid basis on which he established, with not a little consistency, certain relations. Since the author of the *DA* held that the soul was the superior part on which the body depends for its being and its activity, "*animus corporis dominator, rector, habitator videt se per se*",⁵⁴ we shall attempt to follow this division; accordingly, we shall consider the relations under two headings; first, the manner of presence of the soul in the body, and secondly, the manner of its governance thereof.

(a) Manner of presence of soul in the body

According to the doctrine of the *DA* the soul and body co-exist in man. The soul vivifies the body and is bound to it in such a way that it cannot separate itself from it, once the Creator has willed their union. For the life of the body derives from the life of the soul inasmuch as the soul, from the fount of its nature and as the properly disposed matter with life and makes it to be living.

"animus presentia sue corpus vivificat, et sic colligat est ei, ut nec eum velit, se inde segregare possit nec retinere, cum sui Creatoris

jussione audierit. In vita siquidem anime consistit vita corporis...Sicut enim anima vita sua facit carnem viventem, et de fonte naturae suae irrigat animanda..." 55

But the soul itself is wholly spiritual, and hence, incorporeal. "Anima est substantia spiritalis, simplex et indissolubilis, invisibilis et incorporea."⁵⁵ Now, then, can it be present in a corporeal body? To answer which Aicher distinguishes two kinds of presence, a local presence and a presence by action. The former, he denies to the soul, inasmuch as it is an incorporeal substance; the latter he admits.⁵⁷ Thence, he proposes the explanation of its presence by vital intension.

Held within space (as being bound to the body) as to its being and its operations, the soul is, however, not circumscribed by space so as to have a beginning, a middle and an end, as though it were a body. On the contrary, the whole soul is present as a whole, and as a whole it acts in performing any of its activities. The soul is incorporeal, and therefore, indivisible. For, if it were corporeal, it would have parts and would not be whole and entire in any one place at one time. But the whole soul is equally present in all parts of the body at one time; it is present as a whole in all parts and in each single part. There is not more soul in the larger members and less in the smaller, but, rather, the whole is equally present in all parts, because it is undivided. Still, although the whole soul is present as a whole in all parts and in each single

part, it can be said to be in one place more intensely than in another, in the sense that it exercises a greater vitality there. To illustrate which Aicher refers to God's Immensity. Just as we believe that God is whole and entire throughout the world as well as in each individual creature, yet hold that He is in a special way in Heaven, so too, the soul is everywhere throughout the body, as though this were its private world, but it is more intensely in the heart and the brain, whence issues life to the body.

"Sola per penetrationem et immolationem in loco immittitur...verumtamen non sicut corpus, cui secundum locum principium, medium et finis assignatur...nec tamen per loci spatium ita sistitur vel movetur, ut majori sui parte majorem locum occupet, et breviori breviores, minorque sit in parte quam in toto. Per omnes siquidem, particulas corporis tota simul adest, nec minor in minoribus, nec in majoribus major. Sed ubicubi intensius, ubicubi remissius, et in omnibus tota et in singulis tota est. Sicut enim Deus ubique est totus in toto mundo, et in omni creatura sua; sic anima ubique tota in toto corpore suo, tanquam in quodam mundo suo, intensius tamen in corde et in cerebro, quemadmodum Deus precipue dicitur esse in caelo." 53

From which Aicher concludes that the soul is diffused throughout the body not as though spatially extended, but by a certain vital intension. Pressing his figure further, Aicher points out that this presence by vital intension reveals a likeness to the triple presence of God in creatures. God is both three and one, and in His triune nature, He sustains and conserves all things in their due measure of being and activity by His three-fold power. In like manner, the soul has a trinity of powers by which it is totally diffused throughout the body which it sustains in being and activity.

It sicut Deus trinus et unus, verus et perfectus
omnia tenet, omnia implet, omnia sustinet, omnia
supere cedit, omnia circumplectitur; sic anima
his tribus viribus per totum corpus diffunditur,
non locali distensione, sed vitali intensione." 58

From this diversity of powers, therefore, the soul, when it acts in the body can produce a variety of effects though the soul itself remains simple as to its nature. Thus, the whole soul sees, hears, remembers, thinks and wills, for in whatever activity it is engaged, it is the whole soul which acts. In all the diversity of its activities, it is the simple soul acting throughout.

"Anima vero in quibuscumque suis actibus vel actibus tota simul adest. Tota videt, et tota visorum meminit; tota audit, et tota sonorum reminiscitur..." 59

In a similar vein, the author finally concludes that the soul's presence in the body is analogous to God's presence in the world. God is at once interior and exterior, superior and inferior; the same, in its proper mode is true of the soul in respect of its body. It is interior as vivifying the body, exterior, as enclosing and regulating it; it is inferior as supporting the body, superior, as governing it. For, in some ineffable manner, the soul is present within the body in such a way as to be wholly free from the limitations imposed by its matter.

"Ex hoc re intelligitur quod ita est anima secundum modum suum in suo corpore, sicut Deus est in suo mundo. Interior adest et exterior, superior et inferior est; regendo superior, portando inferior, replendo interior, circumdando exterior. Sic est intus, ut extra sit; sic portat ut praesident." 61

Having determined the manner of the soul's presence in the body, we turn, now, to the manner of its governance thereof.

(b) Manner of governance of soul over body.

In describing the manner in which the incorporeal soul acts within the body, we are reminded of the manner in which Acher had effected their union in man. He had based his argument on the principle that likes attract from which he had concluded that their union is accomplished in the spirit, where the extremes of soul and body are joined in a personal union. Accordingly, when he comes to explain how the soul governs the body, the author of the *USA* again has recourse to the law of attraction. The spiritual soul rules the body through those more subtle bodies, fire and air (ether), which are most like to spirit. Of all material elements, these two are closest to the incorporeal nature of the soul; therefore, according to their immediate functioning, the whole body is governed, for without these two, there would be neither sensation in the body nor any spontaneous movement of the body by the soul.

"Cum anima sit incorporea, per subtiliorem naturam corporis sui, id est, per ignem et aërem quae in tota quævis parte præsentia sunt corpori, et ideo magis spiritui similia, corpus administrat ...ad eorum proximum ministerium tota moles administratur. Nullus sine his duobus vel in corpore sensus est, vel ab anima spontaneus corporis motus." 62

Now, the powers both of sense and movement proceed from the highest part of the body, which is the brain; consequently, Acher localizes the functions of the soul there.

To this end, he divides the brain into three ventricles which form the centres of the various activities which the soul performs in its governance of the body.

The front lobe, we have seen, is the area of sensation and feeling; there, too, imagination is originated. The middle portion is the locus of reason; while the posterior section is the motor area. From the activity of the soul in each of these portions of the brain does that particular portion receive its name.⁶³ Thus, the anterior part is called

phantastic or imaginative, for there, the soul's power, having been formed exteriorly through its contact with sense objects, produces sensation, or again, formed from within, produces imaginations or phantasies. The hindermost part of the brain is called memorial, for there, the soul commits to memory what reason has already judged; while the middle section of the brain is called rational, for there, the reason becomes active.⁶⁴ The power of sense passing

from the front to the central lobe comes into contact with the very substance of the rational soul and stimulates judgment; there purified and made subtle, it is joined immediately to that spirit, while retaining itself the nature and properties of a true body.⁶⁵ In this fashion,

one and the same power of the soul functioning in diverse ways produces the power of sense, which, functioning in a five-fold direction through the various channels of the five-fold bodily organs, is diversified accordingly; sense, in turn, gives rise to imagination, and the latter

in due course, stimulates the reason. Thereupon, the soul has passed into the realm of those spiritual activities which belong to its proper nature and which do not, consequently, bear any relation whatever to the body.

"Ipsa namque vis ignea, quae extrinsecus formata sensus dicitur, ordinem formae usque ad interiora trahit, imaginemque vocatur. Sensus itaque parit imaginem, imaginis cogitationem, cogitationis meditationem. Meditatio acuit ingenium, ingenium rationem; ratio conduit ad intellectum, intellectus ad intelligentiam, intelligentia per contemplationem ipsam veritatem administratur et per charitatem in ea delectatur." 67

Before concluding this section, however, in view of its fundamental importance to our purpose in this present chapter, we think it well to state concisely Aicher's conception of the manner in which the rational soul can function through the material body as instrument, while at the same time safeguarding its proper spiritual nature. From this consideration, certain truths regarding the doctrine of the soul will become clear.

How the soul exercises its governance over the body is explained by Aicher in exactly the same way as Augustine had taught,⁶⁸ by localizing the functions of the soul-in-the-body within the highest part of the body, the brain. The rational soul, according to both thinkers, administers the body proximately through the instrumentality of the brain and remotely through a medium which is akin to spirit. The brain is divided into three sections, of which the front portion is the area of sensation, the posterior, commands

movement, while, between these two, in the middle, is the rational portion, the seat of memory. These three are not the soul but serve merely as instruments by means of which the soul controls the body.⁶ Throughout here, the two men are still in agreement. For St. Augustine, too, had explained the presence of a spiritual soul in the body by means of a vital intension.

*"per totum cuius corpus quod animat, non locali
diffusione, sed quadam vitale intentione
porrigitur."* 70

The seat of the soul is the whole body, for, as simple, the soul cannot be divided according to the partition of the bodily members. Therefore, diffused throughout the body, it is the whole soul which acts everywhere in each of the bodily parts as is clear from the phenomenon of sensation, wherein Aicher described how the spiritual soul, in certain of its powers, is dependent on the body without thereby suffering any diminution of its proper mode of being. Here, however, we note a rather serious departure from the Augustinian teaching! For, we have remarked that one of the characteristic tenets of St. Augustine was the radical and complete independence of the soul from the body. The phenomenon of sensation, therefore, could never even imply such a dependence for Augustine; on the contrary, this very experience had provided him with a tangible proof of the soul's interest in, but at the same time, absolute transcendence over the body which it governed.

"Nec sane putandum est facere aliquid corpus in

spiritu, tanquam spiritus corpori facienti, materiae vires subleatur. Quam enim modo praestantius est qui facit ea re de qua aliquid facit; ne, ut ille modo spiritu praestantius est corpus; imo perspicuus modo spiritus corpore.' 71

To ascertain how each of these thinkers justifies his separate conclusion, we must consider their individual conceptions of the phenomenon of sensation.

(c) Sensation

In the opinion of the author of the *UMA*, sensation is a fact of human experience. In accounting for this fact, Alcher is conditioned by his theory of the union of soul and body in man and its accompanying relations. Accordingly, he describes a mutual benefit deriving from this union, such that the soul certainly helps the body, while it remains no less true that the body helps the soul, at least in one of its functions. For, in his view, the soul really descends to the level of the body in one of its powers, namely, its sensitivity; consequently, it can easily undergo some action on the part of a sensible object.

By animation and the power of sense, the soul descends to the body and the corresponding ascent from body to soul is accomplished by means of sensation and imagination. On this point, Alcher's teaching is very clear; it is, besides, strictly consistent with his theory of the union of body and soul, a question which, we have seen, St. Augustine had not felt himself called upon to answer with any great precision.

"Vivificatione et sensitivitate descendit anima ad corpus...Corpus autem sensu et intellectus ad spiritum ascendit." 72

In sensation, Alcher assigns to the soul a certain passivity. He conceives this phenomenon as a kind of passion which the soul experiences from things which are happening outside as a result of its union with the body. Therefore, to him, sensation is a passion of the soul consequent upon its union with the body; it is the soul-in-the-body which suffers.

"Sensus est passio anime in corpore ex qualitatibus extra accidentibus." 73

But Alcher is mindful, at the same time, of the superior nature of the soul whose proper dignity he intends to safeguard. Therefore, he goes on to explain the nature of this passion more in detail. For while it is true to call sensation a passion of the soul, still, that is not the whole truth. Sensation is a passion of the soul but it is not that alone; it is something more. For corresponding to the action of the external body, there is a prompt reaction in the soul inasmuch as the power of sense perceives and judges the content of the sensation. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are not distinct from its substance - and on that point Alcher has been insistent⁷⁴ - the sensitive power of the soul discerns and judges at the very moment that it undergoes the action of the sensible object. Indeed, then only is there sensation. Sensation arises, according to the author's explanation, when the soul, acting through the

bodily senses, perceives the various objects of these senses and judges the variety of their differences.

"Intuitus ut crassus in tactus, et ad calidum et frigidum, asperum et lenis, durum et molle, grave et leve sentit; ut res discernit. Quibus innumerabilibus differentiis colorum, odorum, sonorum, atque formarum, gustando, olfaciendo, audiendo, videndoque adiungit; 75

From this, the true character of sensation is seen to follow. It belongs primarily to the powers of the rational soul, for it is the soul which bestows upon the body its capacity for sensation. Therefore, the *22d* concludes that, in sensation, it is the soul which is exercising its power of sense through the instrumentality of the body; the same soul, however, can exercise its various other powers independently of the body.

Briefly stated, then, Alsher's explanation is as follows. The soul is a single substance passing down into a body which it animates, without, however, losing itself therein, as well as an intelligence which can suffer the action of the sensible without being submerged in it. For in one of its functions, the soul approaches the level of the sensible and is, consequently, susceptible of its influence in one of its operations. Hence, according to Alsher, the theories of the union of soul and body and that of the relation of the soul and its powers are each taken into account in defining the nature of sensation. Herein he has admitted a certain dependence of the soul on the body

of man without endangering its essential superiority.

But St. Augustine, on the contrary, had expressly forbidden such a dependence. Having constituted himself a zealous guardian of the soul's absolute superiority, the relations which he allowed but seen the soul and body in man were characterized by an extreme spiritualism. In the dignity of its nature and its destiny as well as in the manner of its presence and activity in the body, the soul enjoys this transcendence.

Following faithfully the Platonic tradition, the saintly Doctor had joined the soul to the body in man in such a manner that the latter alone benefited by the union. The body could in no way act upon the soul, for a superior being can neither receive nor suffer anything from an inferior. Accordingly, he conceived sensation as essentially passive on the part of the body and essentially active on the part of the soul, inasmuch as the latter produces itself and from within its own substance the material of which sensations are made. Contrary to all appearances, in sensation, it is not the body which acts on the soul; rather it is the soul which exercises a particular attentiveness to the body as something which has been placed under its domination by God.

"*... enim ab anima hoc corpus saltem animato, nisi intentione facientis. Sed ab isto quidquam illarum non arbitror, sed deus de illo et in illo tanquam subiecto divinitus destinati ni vult.*" 73

For the soul was given to the body to animate it. But it could not fulfill this function properly unless it was continually aware of whatever was taking place in the body; this implies a constant vigilance on the part of the soul and a modifying of its attention according to the various bodily changes. Therefore, when the soul senses, it does not merely receive the affections of the body, as though it were passive; instead, roused by the disturbances in the body, the soul becomes more aware of its own activity so that it produces from within itself actions which correspond to the impressions in the body. This concentration of attention is what Augustine calls sensation. In this, the completely active role of the soul appears.

"Videtur mihi animus eum sentit in corpore, non ut illic aliquid pati, sed in ejus passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eum latere; et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur. Sed iste sensus, qui etiam dum nihil sentimus, inest, tamen, instrumentum est corporis, quod ea temperatione agitur ab anima... Cum autem exhibentur ea quae sensuunt, ut dicam ita, alteritate corpus efficiunt; exerit attentiores actiones, suis quibusque locis atque instrumentis accommodatas; tunc videre, vel audire, vel olfacere, vel gustare, vel tangere sentire dicitur... Has operationes passionibus corporis prout animam exhibere eum sentit, non easdem passionibus recipere." 77

Sensations, therefore, to him, are intensified actions of the soul in the body. But since they are actions of the soul in the body, there is nothing absurd in thinking that when the soul senses, it can be aware of its own actions or operations.

"Non igitur absurde credimus metus suos animum,
vel actiones, vel operationes, vel si quo alio
nomine commodius significari possunt, non istam
esse sentit." 73

According to the Bishop of Hippo, consequently, sensation was in no sense a passion of the soul; on the contrary, it was one of the principal activities which the soul exercises in respect of the body which it had been given to govern. For it is through its watchful vigilance over the body that the soul is affected, not by the body, but by its own operations within the body. Hence it is true to say that the soul accommodates itself to the body, in sensation; for then, the soul is less with itself because it is more with the body, and the body is always a lesser reality than the soul.

"Cum autem ab eadem suis operationibus aliquid patitur, a seipsa patitur, non a corpore; sed plane cum se accommodat corpori; et ideo apud seipsam minus est, quia corpus semper minus quam ipsa est." 73

Such a conclusion was admirably suited to the Saint's moral interests as well. For he had discovered that this very act of sensation in which the soul exercised its governance over the body became a source of danger for the soul itself by reason of this accommodation of itself to the body.⁷⁴ Still, no matter how dissipated the soul becomes in giving itself to the body, it always retains its native superiority; for, however intimate the union of the two or in whatever manner it has been contracted, there is

no confusion of the two natures. And from its superior nature, Augustine had insisted on the soul's independence of the body within the act of sensation. No less than Aicher's, therefore, Augustine's conception of sensation had been conditioned by his notion of the union of soul and body in man and the relations following. The differences in their explanation of sensation, therefore, can be directly referred to differences in the underlying relations.

Thus, because St. Augustine had thought of the union of soul and body exclusively in terms of the superiority and radical independence of the former, he was of the opinion that the soul had no need of the body either for its being or its activity. He could see no benefit for the soul arising from its union with the body. Logically, therefore, in sensation, when the soul is acting in the body, he was forced to assign to the soul an entirely active role and to reserve for the body a purely passive function.

But Aicher's position, we have seen, was not so fully so selfless as Augustine's had been. Without denying the essential superiority of the soul and without contradicting the principle of Augustine's reasoning of the relation between an inferior and a superior being, he thought in terms of a mutual benefit arising from the union of soul and body in man. Aicher found the soul more closely to matter than Augustine had done without, however, betray-

ing its proper spirituality. While the soul does not need the body in all its activities, he held, there was at least one of its functions in which the soul does need the body; at least one, therefore, in which it can be affected by the body. With equal logic, as a result, Alcher described a certain passivity in the soul when he explained sensation, although its predominantly active role was likewise what he emphasized.

At this point, in view of future developments within the doctrine of the soul as well as with an eye towards the more ultimate horizon of its historic significance in the thirteenth century conflict between the rival schools of thought, we wish to call attention to the quietly widening breach between St. Augustine and Alcher as well as to point, once again, to the direction in which Alcher's thought is turning. Here, we suggest, there is a gentle turning, very gentle but none the less very real, away from the platonic position of St. Augustine, whose opinion was that the soul had no need of the body in man, but that the latter alone is benefited by the union in the direction of an opposite conviction, based on aristotelian principles, which St. Thomas Aquinas in the following century will hold. Aquinas' position will be that the human soul does need the body; it is incapable of doing its work as an intellectual substance unless it is joined to the body and therefore the soul also benefits greatly from its union with matter.¹

How far Alcher will go in the direction of St. Thomas remains to be seen; what influences helped or harmed his progress must always be considered. Now, we simply intend to signify the general direction in which his thought seems to be moving itself. The progress of the breach between himself and Augustine, which we have remarked upon here, will become even more accentuated in the section immediately following. There, we shall treat of the soul's sensible faculties which, in the opinion of the author of the *Summa*, originates in sensation by the action of the imaginative power of the soul.

(d) Imagination:

When St. Augustine described the manner in which the soul operates in the body so as to ensure its absolute independence, we have seen that Alcher abandoned him, at least temporarily. For the latter believed that the soul needs the body in sensation which he explained as an act wherein the soul, through its power of sense, approaches the level of the body and functions through its instrumentality. Moreover, in Alcher's opinion, the soul's power of sense is not fully exhausted in sensation. It has a second power whereby it can form likenesses of the sensible objects which have been impressed on the sense organs and perceived in the act of sensation. These images are, in a certain sense, independent of matter inasmuch as they can exist apart from the object within the

imagination, this second of the soul's powers. Accordingly, imagination is that power whereby the soul perceives the corporeal forms of corporeal things when these things themselves are no longer present. It is the same power of the soul, called sense when formed exteriorly by the sensible objects which it perceives in matter, that is called imagination when formed from within by the likenesses of these objects.

'Imaginatio est ex vis animae, quae rerum corporarum corporeas simul ita formae, sed absentes. Sensus autem formae in materia percipit, imaginatio extra materialitatem ex vis quae exteriora formata, sensus licet, sed non ex ut interiora tractata, imaginatio potius. Imaginatio autem ex sensu oritur, et promittit vnde diversitates ipsius quod est variabile. Multa videt animae carnalibus oculis, multa aliam phantasia imaginatio concipit;' 22

Thus, after having discussed the action of the soul's power in the body at the moment that it actually perceives the sensible objects and discerns their differences, Aicher goes on to describe its action in this second and higher power wherein the soul is less strictly bound to matter though it is still in contact with what is corporeal, namely, the corporeal forms of things. According to his theory, after the soul withdraws from the bodily senses, it can still remember their various movements; repeating these movements at its own pleasure, the soul considers in a multiplicity of ways the variety of the images it has acquired through the senses.

'Removet se ab his sensibus certe intervallum

temperum, et corpus sicut simul per similes rationes
separata, ratione in illis non per se habet,
sed per similes et similes rationes." 24

In this manner the likenesses of corporeal objects are
formed within the imagination by means of the soul's
power of sense. Therefore, imagination, while retaining
the nature and position of a body, and somehow contact
the substance of the rational soul to which it joined
immediately in the spirit. In rational beings, conse-
quently, imagination is purified and spiritualized and
hence is borne aloft even to the spiritual substance of
the soul.

"Imaginatio...ipsam animae rationalis substantiam
contingit et excitat discretionem; in tantum jam
purioris et spiritus effectus, ut ipsi spiritus
immediate conjungitur, veraciter tamen naturam
corporis retinens et appropriatam. Quae quidem
imaginatio...in rationalibus autem purior fit,
usque ad rationem et incorpoream animae
substantiam contingendam defertur et
progrederetur." 25

For Icher, this second power, imagination, is a
convenient means of connecting the lower powers of the
human soul, by which it functions through the body as in-
strument, with its higher power wherein it performs an
activity which is properly spiritual. For, it is from the
likenesses of the bodies which have been produced in imagi-
nation that the soul, through its power of reason, abstracts
these incorporeal natures of the bodies which are the
proper objects of reason. Being spiritual, these natures,
the essence, form, properties and accidents, inhere in

(fundantur) bodies, but they have no separate existence except in reason. Reason, therefore, this third power of the soul, is dependent upon the power of imagination in respect of its object. In respect of its functioning, however, there is no such dependence, for the power in which the higher performs abstraction determines the purely spiritual character of the activity. Reason, he states, abstracts these essences, not by any action but by reflection or consideration, an operation which engages the soul alone inasmuch as the cognition is begun and completed within the soul itself. Here, then, the soul functions with its own spiritual freedom.

"Natura autem est vis animae, quae rerum corporearum naturas, formas, differentias, proprias et accidentia percipit; anima immensa, sed non extra corpora, nisi ratione substantia. Abstrahit enim a corporibus, quae fundantur in corporibus, non actione sed consideratione. Natura namque ipsius corporis secundum se est esse corpus certum est, sed ut utique corpus est." 85

With this subtractive power of reason, therefore, the soul has passed into its own proper realm, that of pure spirit, where it functions freely as a rational substance. Although he has successfully bridged the gap between the lower powers, wherein it reveals a certain dependence on the body through which it functions, and the higher powers wherein it enjoys its active independence. In thus bridging this gap, he also automatically reduces the distance between reason and sensible knowledge, between the worlds of spirit

and of matter in man.

We look in vain for any similar doctrine in St. Augustine. On the contrary, the radical divorce he placed between spirit and matter carried over into the world of man, where the natures of soul and body stood equally opposed so that the soul functioned in all its activities with a complete independence. It was this extremism, we have seen, which Alcher's teaching avoided. Instead of emphasizing the distance between the soul and body, as Augustine had done, Alcher's psychology is moving in the direction of a continuity wherein the world of matter is joined to that of spirit and wherein the lower powers of the soul are directly connected with the higher powers and are penetrated with their influence. To this end, he discerns among the powers of the soul an ascending scale, the hierarchic structure of which is determined by the immateriality of their objects, so that the lowest are seen to be joined to and to depend upon the highest.

'Sic igitur animus sensu percipit corpora, imaginatione corporum similitudines, ratione corporum naturas, intellectu spiritum creatum, intellectus spiritum increatum. At quidam sensus percipit, imaginatio repraesentat, cognitio format, ingenium inventivat, ratio judicat, memoria servat, intellectus separat, intelligentia comprehendit, et ad meditationem sive contemplationem adducit. Sic fit ascendens ab inferioribus ad superiora, et una a summis dependent. Intellectus namque quaedam imago et similitudo intelligentiae est, ratio intelligentis, rationis phantasticum spiritus cui etiam corpus corporis corpus, id est, ignis quidem similitudine jungitur, et igni aer, et aeri aqua, et aqua terra.' 36.

Such a conception as this is fairly eloquent witness of the probable direction in which Alcher's thoughts tend-
ing. 67

K.

Reason and Sensible Knowledge

At this stage, therefore, in the development of his doctrine, the author of the *Metaphysics* seems to have been inspired by an influence other than that of St. Augustine. Without any doubt, Aristotle's theory of abstraction was used to bridge the gap between the worlds of spirit and of matter in man's knowledge, but the mode in which this abstraction is accomplished, namely, by "consideration" is easily indicative of the source of Alcher's aristotelianism. The whole economy of his thought here seems to have been inspired by an interpretation of Aristotle such as was being taught in arabian circles. 68

Significant, too, as confirming this direction of his thinking, is the fact that it is just at this point in his doctrine that Alcher introduces the augustinian division of reason into superior and inferior, which, however, seems to have undergone some modification. Alcheria that the senses inform the imagination, which, in turn, informs reason, it is this reason, he says, which produces science or prudence; again, on the other hand, a divine inspiration

descends to reason and informs it, thus causing understanding or wisdom. Hence, there is in reason something whereby it is inclined towards what is supernal and heavenly, and this is called wisdom; and there is something else looking towards what is transitory and passing, and this is called science or prudence. These two are from reason and subsist therein; whence, reason is divided into superior and inferior according as the knowledge it produces is wisdom or science (prudence). On the one hand, a help comes to it from above itself and, informing reason, directs its knowing towards what is supernal and intelligible; the knowledge thus produced is wisdom; on the other hand, the objects which inform reason come from beneath itself, from the imagination, and are, therefore, sensible; the knowledge, in this case, is of what is mutable and unstable, and is called science or prudence. Therefore, the two-fold division of reason which Alcher posits derives from a distinction in the nature of the objects which determine the power of the soul in its activity of knowing. There is one power of reason specified by a two-fold object, one, intelligible and the second, sensible. From this distinction in the objects of its knowledge, Alcher claims a distinction in the power of knowing, such that he can speak of reason as both superior and inferior. Reason is superior when what it knows is above itself and belongs to the intelligible world of spirit; it is inferior when its knowledge is derived from what is beneath itself, the sensible world of the body. Therefore,

wisdom and science are the two kinds of knowledge, intellectual and sensible, corresponding to the division of reason as superior and inferior according as the objects known are in themselves intelligible or are made so by the soul's knowing power. From which it is clear that Alcher's whole conception here is located within the realm of the soul's act of knowing and is an attempt to explain the presence in the soul of sensible as well as intellectual knowledge.

"Sensus informat imaginationem, imaginatio rationem, facitque ratio scientiam sive prudentiam. Rursum rationi occurrunt divina prudentia, informat eam, et facit intelligentiam sive sapientiam. Est itaque in ratione quiddam ad superna et coelestia intendens, et id dicitur sapientia; et est quiddam ad transitoria et caduca respiciens, et id vocatur prudentia. Haec duo ex ratione sunt, et in ratione consistunt. Et dividit se ratio in duo, scilicet in superiorum et inferiorum; superiorum in sapientiam, inferiorum in prudentiam; quasi in virum et mulierem, ut vir sit superior et regat, mulier inferior et regetur."

Now the insertion here, in such close proximity to his treatment of sensible knowledge, of this division of reason, with the definitely moral implications which it had in St. Augustine, and withal the care with which Alcher adds the double alternative, "scientiam sive prudentiam" and on the higher level, "intelligentiam sive sapientiam" suggests that he intends to signify that it was the whole rational soul, with its twin faculties of knowing and willing, which is engaged and not alone the faculty of knowing. To this effect, he identifies sensible knowledge, that is,

science with prudence; and a aim, intellectual knowledge, that is, intelligence with wisdom. Thus, Alcher reserves wisdom to the superior reason, thereby indicating the wholly spiritual origin of the soul's knowledge, while he assigns prudence or science to the inferior reason which has drawn its knowledge from the world of sensible objects. His division, in this manner, recalls a distinction which Avicenna had placed between the active and contemplative virtues of the intellect. 50

But this is not at all the location of the original thought of St. Augustine. His division into superior and inferior was not concerned with the origin of man's sensible knowledge, but signified rather the two-fold office of the human mind, the two-fold direction of its thought. His interest in the objects of knowledge lay in the fact that they conditioned the ends towards which that knowledge will be directed, whether above or below; therefore, not the origin of knowledge so much as the end to which it leads had been his chief concern. Augustine's division, consequently, signified primarily the functional role of knowledge as directing man towards a two-fold end, towards contemplation, on the one side, and towards the life of action, on the other.

"Illud vere nostrum quod in actione corporalium
atque temporalium tractandum ita veretur, ut
non sit nobis cum pecore, rationale quidem est,
sed ex illa rationali nostrae mentis substantia,
que subiacet intelligibili atque incorruptibili

veritati, sanguinem ductum et inferioribus tractantibus gubernandis ut legatum est... menti nostrae quae supernam et internam consulimus veritatem, nullum est ad usum rerum corporalium, quantum naturae hominis satis est, simile adiutorium ex animae partibus quae communes cum pecoribus habemus." 11

But, it is one and the same human mind which is in operation in both cases.

Properly speaking, for Augustine, the human mind is directed towards contemplation; in this, its thought is concerned with what is purely intelligible. But, the mind is the mind of a man, therefore, its thought can also be directed towards human action. From which it follows that man can direct his thought to ends other than pure contemplation without his thought thereby ceasing to be itself; he simply applies his thought to an end other than its proper object. In this manner, the Saint discovers a duality of function within the mind which is, by its nature, one.

"Cum igitur differimus de nature mentis humanae, de una quadam re differimus, nec eam in haec duo quae commemoravi, nisi per officia geminamus." 12

Illustrating his argument with an example drawn from the biblical account in Genesis wherein the dignity of the human being is described, the saintly Doctor explained how God differentiated man from woman within the unity of human nature, so that there are two kinds within one nature; they are two in one flesh. In like manner, the human mind is so constituted that, while it tends naturally towards the contemplation of eternal truth, it can also exercise a secondary

function theory it provides for the temporal necessities of life in human action.

"In mente unuscujusque hominis quosivimus quoddam rationale conjugium contemplationis et actionis, officium per quoddam singula distributum, tamen in utroque mentali unitate servatum." 33

Contemplation and action, therefore, become two in one thought, "duo in mente una."³⁴ As two distinct functions of one and the same mind, they are designated respectively as superior and inferior. They are so specified because it is the part of the superior reason to judge of things in the light of the intelligible and unchanging nature of the divine ideas which are above the mind and in whose light alone man can truly judge of lesser things;

"Sed utilitatis rationis est judicare de rebus corporalibus secundum rationes incorporeales et sempiternas; quae nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent; atque his nisi subjungeretur aliquid nostrum, non secundum eas possemus judicare de corporalibus." 35

whereas, it is characteristic of the inferior reason to be concerned with the governance of that is mutable and changing, the temporal welfare of man.

"Quiddam vero rationale intentionis nostrae, hoc est ejusdem mentis, in usum mutabilium corporalium ut rerum, sive quae haec vita non agitur, dirigendum." 36

From this it seems to follow that whenever reason considers the intelligible aspect of its object, it is called superior; on the contrary, when it considers the sensible aspect, it is inferior. In the first case, reason is

virile, to Augustine's way of thinking; in the second, it is effeminate, because according to the scriptural account, it is the role of man to rule and of woman to be ruled.⁴⁷ Therefore, the inferior reason must remain subject to the superior reason since human action is directed to contemplation as the final end of human thought. 92

Corresponding to this two-fold division in thought, St. Augustine describes a two-fold division of knowledge within that thought according as the truths are of the eternal or the temporal order. The superior reason produces an intellectual knowledge of things eternal; this pertains to wisdom; the product of the inferior reason is a rational knowledge of temporal affairs; this is science. Further, the same principle of subordination is effective, for science must be directed towards wisdom in the same manner as action is directed towards contemplation.

"Si ergo haec est sapientiae et scientiae recta distinctio, ut ad sapientiam pertinent aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectualis; ad scientiam vero temporarium rerum cognitio rationalis; quid aut praeposendum sive postponendum sit, non est difficile judicare." 93

For St. Augustine, as a result, wisdom bears the same relation to science in the speculative order as contemplation does to action in the practical order. Indeed, that is the essential difference between wisdom and science, that in turning man towards the divine and eternal ideas, contemplation directs to wisdom, which is the knowledge of Truth Itself; in setting him towards external and human things,

the life of action leads to science, the knowledge of truth as participated.

"In hac differentia intelligendum est ad contemplationem sapientiae, ad actionem scientiam pertinere." 100

Hence it is that the two names, superior and inferior, signifying the two-fold orientation of man's thought towards contemplation, on the one side, or towards action, on the other, are given to two functions of reason according as they dispose towards the interior or the exterior man. In St. Augustine, therefore, the division of reason signifies primarily a two-fold disposition of the will as conditioned by knowledge. It is principally a religious device as is made clear from its pointed relation to Augustine's interior and exterior man wherein he places a distinction analogous to that which he made between wisdom and science, contemplation and action, the eternal and the temporal.

"Distat tamen ab aeternorum contemplatione actio quae bene utitur temporalibus rebus, et illa sapientiae, haec scientiae deputatur;" 101

In each case, the distinction carries, as its essential import, the moral teaching of the due ordering of means and end; hence the distinction between wisdom and science seems to be founded in a location which is other than that in which it appears in the D.A. For the author of this doctrine, the distinction was in the direction of knowledge simply; it marked the two-fold character of man's intellectual knowledge as opposed to

his sensible knowledge; for Augustine, on the contrary, the distinction implied something more; it marked a certain progress within rational knowledge itself according as the truths penetrated were of the eternal or the temporal order and the instrumental role of knowledge in directing man's thought towards the contemplative or the active life. For knowledge in Augustine's program is a progress from participated truths to the necessary truth which they reveal; and the progression within knowledge from lower to higher introduced his distinction between wisdom and science. But since, in either case, the knowledge presupposed human activity, there followed Augustine's distinction between the contemplative and the active life in man. The Saint's whole thought in these several distinctions is seen to be centred, not on human knowledge as such, but rather on the ordering of man's life, according as that life is directed towards eternity or time, towards God or man himself.¹⁰² For from personal experience, he knows that man becomes as he lives; he lives as he loves; he loves as he knows - either God or body.

Now, in the context in which Alcher had in reduces the division of reason as superior and inferior so as to mark the distinction between wisdom and science, his intellectual and sensible knowledges, respectively, there is no reference whatever to contemplation and action;¹⁰³ here, the religious implications of Augustine's distinction between wisdom and

science have given way almost completely before the more speculative character of Alcher's thought. Such a difference, in turn, involves another and more fundamental disagreement in their two conceptions of a distinction which seems to underlie their various emphasis on all these related issues. We refer to the distinction between the interior and the exterior man, about which Alcher was not in complete harmony with his predecessor. It seems advisable, therefore, briefly, at least, to indicate this source of their basic differences upon which their two interpretations depend.

According to Alcher, the distinction between the interior and the exterior man arose on the composite nature of man; his concept followed the two-fold element of the human constitution between which there was a distinction. Man is a being composed of a body and a soul; of these, the former is visible, and the latter is invisible, except indirectly, in its effects. In Alcher's view, the exterior man represents simply man's body; considered however, as a human body, that is, as vivified by the soul;¹⁰⁴ in like manner, the interior man signifies man's soul. Alcher's position is stated several times in terms that leave little doubt as to his exact meaning. In describing the soul as the vital principle of the body, he refers to it as the interior man,

"Anima nominatur totus homo interior, qua vivificatur, regitur et continetur latus illi massa..." 103

Again, discussing the dignity of man as made in the divine image and likeness, the author claims that this resemblance is found wholly within the soul to which he refers once more as the interior man:

"Quae imago effigies in interioris hominis
dignitate et nobilitate consistens est." 116

Elsewhere, Aicher contrasts the two in such a fashion that his meaning is abundantly clear.

"Homo sicut exterior homo circa ista temporalia
quinque- actis sensu afficitur, id est, visu,
auditu, gustu, odoratu et tactu; sic interior
homo in beata vita circa quinque ineffabilia Dei
ineffabili amore afficitur." 107

Further witness that Aicher thought of man's body alone as the exterior man is furnished in his description of the complete fulfillment of man's being in the beatific Vision. Having related the perfect satisfaction of the powers of man's soul, the author writes.

"Sed in his omnibus nihil homo noster exterior
accipit. Ipse ergo, et inhabitet gloria etiam in
terra nostra, et juxta alium prophetam, repletur
majestate Domini omnis terra, quatuor sunt quærentia,
quæ constat ex quatuor elementis constructum est." 108

whereupon he continues with a description of the qualities of the glorified body of man. From these instances, we think it safe to conclude that Aicher employed the distinction between the interior and the exterior man to symbolize the distinction he found between the soul and the body of man, respectively. He was simply contrasting the two essential constituents of human nature, the spiritual part of man as opposed to the

material. At this point, it might be well to recall the relation, besides, in which Acker had seen fit to allow these two elements to appear in man. There is a mutual dependence, though in a very limited sense, although the soul maintains its essential superiority.

Such an interpretation was surely foreign to Augustine's thought, inasmuch as he had located the distinction between the interior and the exterior completely within the soul. In a sense, it is true to say that his distinction also bore on the composite nature of man, but we have seen how St. Augustine's concept differed from that of his disciple. He had vacated for the absolute independence of the soul even in those activities which it accomplished in the body towards which it is attracted and to which it accommodates itself. It was precisely this two-fold direction of the soul's actions which prompted Augustine's distinction, for from their two-fold direction, he speaks of an exterior and an interior man.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, all those activities wherein the soul functions in conjunction with the body, that is, all those in which both man and animals have something in common, including sensation and imagination, pertain to it. Augustine's exterior man; therefore, not the body alone, but rather the functioning of the soul-in-the-body. In a corresponding fashion, the exterior man he ascribes those specifically human actions which originate in reason and which are accomplished only by the purely spiritual activity of the soul working

independently; these activities, that is, which belong to the mind properly speaking, that is, thought. Now, for the Saint, to recall, again, man is essentially a mind, for it is thought which is the distinguishing activity of the human being; therefore, this activity of the soul, namely, thought, constitutes his interior man.

"Age nunc, vitiosus sit quasi quoddam hominis exterioris interiorisque confinium. Nihil enim habemus in animo commune cupere, recte adhuc dicitur ad exteriora hominem pertinere. Non enim solus corpus homo exterior deputabitur, sed etiam sensus et cuncta quae sunt in corpore corporis et cunctis sensus vigent, quibus instructus, est ad exteriora sentienda; eorum sensorum imagines infixae in memoria, cum recordando revivuntur, res adhuc agitur ad exteriora hominem pertinens;...sed...aniam, qui substantia spiritualis est, ad ea quae sunt in spiritualibus excelsa erigendus est."110

This, restricted to the actions of the soul itself, the exterior and interior man of Augustine had to be ordered within its unity. Here, the characteristic moral pattern is set forth. Man, in his opinion, is essentially a mind, although one which is under the spell of the bodily senses. This is the real sense in which the Saint had introduced his distinction. Precisely to free itself from the exterior man, the sensible attractions of the body, the soul turns within itself, into the world of thought, the interior man. Thus, the exterior man was subservient to the interior man, in an analogous manner to that in which, within thought, action is directed to contemplation and science to wisdom.

From these considerations, it should be clear that the different significance which Alcher and St. Augustine each attached to the symbolism of the interior and the exterior man was rooted in the underlying difference in their basic concepts of human nature. While admitting the superiority of the soul in man, Alcher does not yet go so far as to grant it a complete independence of the body; Augustine, we have seen, had adopted a more extreme stand and had insisted on its absolute independence; then, within the soul, he had held the supremacy of the mind. Therefore, his moral teachings were likewise characterized by this extremism and he distinguished the interior from the exterior solely within the sphere of the soul's activities according as they were performed in conjunction with the body or simply by the soul acting independently. Alcher, on the contrary, could not afford so to ignore the body to which, in however limited a sense, he had bound the soul. As a result, having described the human body as the exterior man, the whole soul became the interior man; but, he, too, was aware that the soul exercised some of its activities through the instrumentality of the body, such as sensation and imagination, on the one hand, which were distinct from those which it exercised by itself alone, as knowing and willing. Therefore, he was forced to find a further distinction within his interior man, the soul; this distinction, consequently, fell along

the higher powers of the soul and are based on the objects by which they are severally determined. In this way, Aicher could use Augustine's words while the direction of his thought remained different from that of Augustine. Something of the direction in which Aicher's mind was turning we have already suggested from his pointed use of the Augustinian division of reason outside of its original context.

To sum up their respective positions according as we have indicated them here. By his division of reason as superior and inferior, Augustine had signified primarily two functions of thought according as they dispose towards the interior or the exterior man; whence, his division refers by preference to dispositions of the will as conditioned by knowledge. On the contrary, according as we think Aicher conceived the division, these moral implications are somewhat subdued. With him, the division of reason into superior and inferior is beginning to be offered in the direction of a theory of knowledge; in turn, the interior and exterior man received a distinct interpretation in keeping. The division, here, is not intended to signalize the instrumental functions of the lodge; it is rather to reveal the several knowledges among the soul's powers and to indicate their continuity. In order that the saying of the philosopher be understood, Aicher attempts to show that the human soul is capable of a unitary real knowledge,

inasmuch as it becomes in a certain manner all things, 'similitudo omnium'.¹¹¹ But he is striving to do, therefore, is to order a hierarchy of the various powers of the soul within a perfectly continuous scale, as we have already remarked. To this end, he keeps insisting on the variety of the powers of the soul within an essential unity; its several knowledges can be ordered within the unity of the rational soul by a regular progression towards wisdom.

"Hæc omnia in anima nihil aliud sunt, quam ipsæ, alie et aliæ inter se proprietates propter varias exercitias, sed una essentialis rationalis et una anima; proprietates quidem diversæ, sed essentialis una... It sicut mundus iste visibilis quinquupartita quodam distinctione est ordinatus; terra scilicet, æquæ, ære et æthere, sive firmamento ipsæque suprema coele...; sic anima in summa sui corporis præparata quibus præparatis sunt ad sapientiam; sensus scilicet, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia. Quibus enim progressionibus rationalitas exerceatur ad sapientiam." 112

So far, we have noted the steps in this progression from the moment in which man has become sensibly aware of external objects in sensation, until that awareness has been transformed into sensible knowledge through the exercise of reason abstracting the incorporeal forms from the likeness of the object within the imagination. In this alcher has indicated the dependence of the soul on the body at least for the matter of its sensible knowledge. But he has further shown that once reason begins to be active in its own right, the soul enjoys its proper freedom. Sense-knowledge, therefore precedes intellectual

cognition, since man's knowledge of the invisible, his own Soul and God, must start from without, as Aicher has several times repeated. The ascending degrees of human knowledge in relation to the immateriality of their objects in the hierarchy of world, soul, God, gives us the key to Aicher's theory of knowledge. For they introduce us to a distinction between reason and intelligence which Aicher develops in a manner that keeps him definitely in the tradition of St. Augustine. In the passage from sense knowledge to intellectual, the opposition between the corporeal and spiritual natures of man is put in relief; man is seen once more as the middle point of creation, located between the two worlds of the angelic natures and brute creation; through imagination, he looks out to the material objects below him; then, withdrawing himself from these external objects, and recollecting himself, he becomes conscious of himself through introspection. This is as far as reason by its unaided powers can go. But reason has within itself the capacity of being informed from above by the illuminating grace of God. It can transcend itself and contemplate God. It is, therefore, to this further progression of the soul of the soul within this higher reason, wherein we shall consider reason and intelligence as distinct sources of man's knowledge that we must now give our attention.

Reason and Intelligence

The Distinct Sources of Man's Knowledge

With the abstractive power of reason, according to the author of the *Summa*, the soul enters into its own sphere and begins to function independently of the body. Its activity here is of a purely intellectual nature, for the higher powers of the soul perform those specifically human operations which distinguish it as an intellect or an intelligence, capable of understanding even divine things. At these higher levels, its activity is purely spiritual, since the manner of its functioning as well as the objects of its knowledge are wholly incorporeal. These objects are those pure spirits, created and Uncreated, which are above the soul itself in its present condition as inhabiting an earthly body; therefore, the soul must be drawn upwards until it knows what is purely spiritual. Nor is it satisfied until it had actually attained to that which is the highest truth and wholly unchangeable. Its knowledge then becomes wisdom.

"Intellectus ex vis animae est, quae invisibilia percipit, sicut angelos, daemones, animas, et cunctos spiritus creatos. Intelligentia ex vis animae est, quae immediate supponitur Deo; cernit siquidem ipsum suum verum et vere incommutabilem." 113

In this, the soul receives a help from outside itself, from

above.¹¹¹ For the power of the soul has reached such a degree of perfection that no created substance has power to give it its proper perfection. Therefore, in turning towards this highest object of its knowledge, reason must be divinely illumined. The soul receives a direct illumination from God, through its intelligence, in the light of which alone divine things are understood according to the measure of man's capacity. Reason, therefore, appears in a dual role in knowledge. On the lower level, it acquires sensible knowledge by making intelligible what has been abstracted from corporeal forms; while, on a higher plane, it also leads to that higher cognitive activity wherein the intellect understands spiritual things, and finally, is perfected in intelligence, through which, by a special help from God, the soul is divinely illumined so that it can contemplate divine truths in the light of Truth Itself. This highest knowledge, wisdom, belongs properly to God and is but rarely attained by man, according to the opinion of Boethius whom Alcher cites as his authority on this point.

"Intellectus sive intelligentia, ea vis animae est, qua de divinis, quantum homini estibile est, cognoscitur. Ad celestia animae arcana penetrando ratio per se non sufficit, nisi a Deo adjuncta fuerit. Hunc finis ejus, si bene viget, cum ad notationem sacramentorum, quae diu investigando quaesivit, pervenerit, intellectus seu intelligentia nuncupatur. Boethius tamen dicit intelligentiam solius Dei esse et admodum paucorum hominum." 112

In thus naming Boethius, Alcher gives us a further

clue as to the ultimate source of his inspiration for his account of the genetic history of man's mind from sense cognition to science to wisdom. Here the echoes of Aristotle are stronger than those of Plato for Alcher's account excludes any Platonic reminiscence of innate ideas. Here, the history of man's intellectual development is described within the religious framework of the historic fact of man's fall; the first man was born with perfect human knowledge, but through his sin, the faculties of his soul were injured, so that now his cognitive powers need to be stimulated to action. Man's learning process now, with difficulty only through experience in using his faculties or through the teaching of another, in something of the manner in which darkness is dispelled only by means of the presence of light.¹¹⁶ Thus, according to the different natures of the objects which inform the cognitive powers of the soul, Alcher distinguishes two kinds of knowledge, which he calls science and wisdom. But this two-fold knowledge implies also a two-fold power of knowing. Accordingly, when the objects of its knowledge come from beneath the soul itself, reason produces sensible knowledge or science; on the other hand, when the objects known come from above the soul, intelligence produces intellectual knowledge or wisdom.

In asserting the traditional suzerain distinction between wisdom and science, with, however, his own modification which we have noted, Alcher fell heir to the correspond-

ing distinction between reason and intelligence as the two-fold faculty of the soul. This distinction, introduced by Boethius, figured frequently in the development of the theory of the *lumen* of Christian philosophers in the twelfth century.¹¹⁷ For it is Boethius who seems to have inspired Alcher's thought at this point, at least insofar as Alcher's distinction between reason and intelligence bears some resemblance to their description in the *de consolacione philosophice*, which was one of the most popular philosophical works of the Middle Ages.¹¹⁸

Boethius had set himself the impossible task of translating and reconciling the philosophy of Aristotle with that of Plato and of presenting their doctrines as complementary to the Latin West. "*Aristotelis Platonis sententiae in unum quodammodo revocare concordiam.*"¹¹⁹ He never achieved this end, but his failure was inportant in that it perpetuated the confusion which he had introduced into the division of the intellectual faculties. For, in his proposed synthesis, Boethius superimposed an intelligence on the faculty of reason,¹²⁰ so that he admitted a hierarchy of human knowledge from sensible cognition to intelligence which he describes as fourfold.

"*Ipsum quoque hominem, aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia contactur.*"¹²¹

Between reason and intelligence, there is a sharp distinction of object as well as of mode, for reason finds its

objects on a lower level in sensible things, known under a universal aspect by reasoning :

"Ratio vero hanc (imaginacionem) quocumque transcendit, speciem ut ipsam quae singularibus inest universali consideratione perpendit." 122

Intelligence, on the other hand, attains its proper object, the vision of God, only in the highest point of the mind. It transcends all created objects to lose itself in the contemplation of the divinity; hence, its mode surpasses every other human knowledge, for without any organ, the intelligence beholds all things directly in their intelligible forms (formaliter).

"Intelligentia vero celsior oculis existit; supergracae namque universitatis amplitudo, ipsam ille, simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur...Nam (intelligentia) et rationis universum et imaginacionis figuram et materiale sensibile cognoscit, nec ratione utens nec imaginacione nec sensibus; sed ille uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta prospiciens." 123

Therefore, intelligence, possessing something of a quasi-divine quality, is, therefore, called a divine faculty.

To denote its proper object, Boethius coined the term "intellectabilia". Just as reason belongs properly to man, so intelligence belongs properly to God. "Ratio vero humani tantum generis est sicut intelligentia sola divini." 124 Therefore, this kind of knowledge is attained by a spiritual ascesis wherein man disengages himself from the material and changeable and turns towards what is immutable. Only the elect can attain it; but all men should make the effort.

Now, this distinction between reason and intelligence which we find in Boethius' de Consolatione Philosophiae reappears in the doctrine of the scholastic. In contrast with Augustine and Boethius, the author admits that not all man's knowledge begins in the senses. On the contrary, there is an essential distinction between sensible knowledge, which is acquired by reason through the medium of the senses, and intellectual knowledge which is attained without their cooperation and in the acquisition of which the senses even prove to be a hindrance. Corresponding to these two categories of knowledge, consequently, Alcher describes the two faculties of reason and intelligence in such a manner that reason is suited to lower things while intelligence is reserved for the higher objects of knowledge. His distinction parallels that between scientia and sapientia and is analogous to St. Augustine's division of reason as inferior and superior, as we have previously suggested.

In this way, Alcher's division of the cognitive faculties into sense, reason and intelligence, and his apparent preference for the activity of the higher faculty of intelligence, keeps him in the line of the Augustinian tradition of Christian Platonism, wherein the term "ratio" was employed to describe a psychological faculty which did not strictly accord with the Aristotelian conception of the unity of the human person. The confusion introduced into

the philosophical vocabulary of the twelfth century by the Augustinian "ratio" and its interpretation in Boethius was to be discreetly eliminated in the thirteenth century by St. Thomas in his elimination of the corresponding Platonic theory of a personality.

Alcher of Clairvaux, however, was not concerned with the problem of the soul which was to trouble thirteenth century thinkers. His psychological doctrine was in the line of those Christian thinkers of the Platonic tradition whose dualism coupled 'intelligence' to the knowledge of the incorporeal and spiritual and attributed supra-sensible concepts to it; for this, the intellect, in some manner, is as it were divinized. Further, it should be noted that for Alcher, reason and intelligence, though directed to different objects, are not two separate faculties, but are rather two aspects of the rational power of the soul which elevates man above the beasts. Thus, Alcher would agree with St. Thomas that reason and intelligence are not separate faculties; they are but two aspects of man's intellectual activity. He follows St. Augustine and Boethius who taught that man should remain in the higher plane of reason which is intelligence, and should not descend to the lower plane of the soul's sensible knowledge wherein reason is engaged with images arising from sense and memory. For the soul that by losing something of its own simplicity has it becomes interested,

as it is prone to do, in the images presented by the sense to the lower reason.

"...nunc per hunc (animam) ducitur; ut uia
qualitate rerum satiari non potest, sed
varietate satietur." 125

True happiness comes only when the soul recollects itself and ascends to the contemplation of itself and of God which is the proper sphere of the intelligence.

"Nihil enim ad beatam vitam presentius videtur,
quam velut classicis carnalibus sensibus extra
carnem mundum ac effectum quendam intra
sensituum converti, alium ac effectum a
mortalium cupiditatibus sibi soli et deo
loqui". 126

Reason and intelligence, consequently, are powers and also acts of the intellect. When formed from beneath, reason produces science; from above, wisdom. So that, as we have already discovered, in alcher's doctrine, these two intellectual virtues are located primarily within his theory of knowledge, according as that knowledge is directed towards a two-fold objects, the works of the Creator, on the one hand, or the Creator Himself, on the other. 127 Thus, the movement of knowledge is that which St. Augustine had recommended "ab exterioribus ad interiora et ab interioribus ad superiorem."

In this manner, despite a definite aristotelian tendency within the sphere of its sensible knowledge and lower rational cognition, the soul, in the doctrine of the SIA is still left open at the top, in its higher intellectual knowledge, for the reception of a divine illumination

wherein it is known by Truth itself without any substance intervening.

"Rationalis et intellectualis lumen, quo ratiocinamur, intelligimus et sapimus, sententiam habemus, quae illi facta est et imaginem Dei, ut nulla interposita natura ab ipsa veritate formetur. Nunc enim ex eo dicta est quod cognitum in animis: praestantior si nihil vis animae est, a qua procedit intelligentia." 189

With these higher powers of the soul, the mind and its proper activities, the prodigal returns to his father's house; Alcher returns to the guidance of St. Augustine in his theory of a divine illumination for his explanation of the ultimate source of knowledge. Therefore, we shall end this section on reason and intelligence with an examination of the theory of a divine illumination as it appears in Alcher's doctrine.

7.

The Divine Illumination in the DDA

From the relations which Alcher describes between sense and reason and intelligence, it is apparent that his theory of the Intellect is no consistently developed doctrine such as St. Thomas would expound. On the contrary, Alcher's doctrine contains elements drawn from Aristotle, St. Augustine and Boethius, among others, with a consequent lack of integration. The lack of synthesis is explained partly from Alcher's historical position within the transition period of the twelfth century. It would not be

wholly true, however, to conclude from its eclectic character, that the author of the text had no metaphysical foundation for his theory of knowledge. How a reason, in Alcher's opinion, discovers the principle of order in its knowledge in the hierarchy of God, spirit, world. For Alcher followed the Augustinian theory of illumination as the basis for his study of created essences in relation to God, the creating Intelligence. 129

While Alcher accepted the basic explanation of St. Augustine as the metaphysical foundation for the hierarchy of being which human reason discovers in the universe, he did not employ the whole theory of illumination. His use of it, indeed, is restricted to the highest knowledge which the soul possesses, namely, man's knowledge of God Himself. And even here, the use which Alcher makes of the illumination theory, though couched in Augustinian terms, seems to reveal an Augustine who is becoming secularized. For at this higher level of its intellectual knowledge, it is no longer a question of how the soul knows, since its knowledge is received from outside itself by means of a divine illumination; here, the question turns rather on what the soul knows, on the content of its knowledge.

Accordingly, as Alcher conceives the divine illumination, it is the special privilege of those few mortals to whom it is given to contemplate God directly by grace.

It is a kind of mystical knowledge in which the highest power of the soul, the intelligence, is raised above itself so that it becomes, in some sense, deified. For as recall that Acker had explicitly mentioned this assimilation of the intelligence to God, when invoking his principle that like things are known by like.

"Sicut enim supremus animus, id est, intelligentia sive mens imaginem et similitudinem gerit sui superioris, id est Dei, unde et ipse mensuratur sibi ipso, et ad unitatem personalem etiam, quando ipse voluit, absque ulla demutatione naturae fuit assumpta:" 139

Intelligence, to be sure belongs to the soul, but of itself, it is powerless to see God. For just as the eye requires the light of the sun before it can see, so too, man's mind must be illumined before it can reach Truth.¹³² This illumination takes place in the highest point of man's soul, his intelligence. The moral purification effected in self-knowledge, wherein the soul frees itself from the senses and the attractions of the body, is a preparation for this vision; something more, however, is needed. The intelligence has to be illumined by divine grace before man can contemplate God, for it is only in the divine light of grace that man can enjoy such a vision. In this way, Acker denies that contemplation is a function of natural reason, although he admits that intelligence is a connatural power of the soul. For contemplation means, not the knowledge of God by discursive reason, but intelligence raised to a higher power by God who "informes it from above."

When, therefore, the soul withdraws from the distractions offered in the imagination and collects itself in the contemplation of its own true nature, as mirror of the divine perfections, then, it begins to become like to God, and becoming like to him, the soul is raised to the power of a god-like vision by means of a divine illumination in which it beholds truth directly.

"Mente supra sensitives organos (non rationalis) et se ipsum desertit, atque quiescit in oblivione sui visus, et se contemplationi sui Creatoris humiliter et devote subiecit. Cum enim superius bene per puram intelligentiam sensitives excedere, et illius incorporare lucis claritatem bene intrare, et ex his quae intrinsicis visui quendam intus suavitatis separata trahere, et ex ea intelligentiam suam condere, in sapientiam vertere..." 102

In substantiating the opinion that it is a secularized Augustine who appears at this stage in the doctrine of the ACA, we must consider the context in which this Augustinian illumination is found. In Alchor's view, the illumination inclines towards a position that the divine help which is bestowed is as it were a source of the higher the light of the mind which could otherwise be vacant. For while he agrees that the soul has the natural capacity for knowing, in its intelligence, still, for the fulfillment of that capacity, the soul requires a special help from God.

"Veritatem Facultatem et Intellectum instrumentis cognoscendi et diligendi habet ex natura; conditiones tamen veritatis et ordinis dilectionis nequaquam habet nisi ex gratia... Tamen huius quae creatrix sapientiae format ut sit, adiatrix ratio revelat ne videri sit." 103

Therefore, this illumination centers on the intellect of man the rare power to comprehend spiritual beings in a manner which is above its natural capacity, though in the same spiritual order. It is as though the human soul, in the highest reaches of its powers which Alcher embodies, does not possess within itself the capacity to fulfill these powers, and is, consequently, in some sense, incomplete. Without pressing the matter too far, we wonder if there is not something here vaguely foreshadowing the notion of an incomplete nature which St. Thomas would reject in the case of the aristotelian physics? But to think of the divine illumination, however indistinctly, as informing the mind with the intelligible objects of its knowledge is to be untrue to the original intention of St. Augustine. In his teaching, the theory of divine illumination appeared in quite a different location; it was not offered as a solution to any problem of knowledge as such.

On the contrary, Augustine's illumination dealt with the question of the truth of man's judgments, not the content of his concepts. The intellectual act of judgment, however, is distinct from the intellectual act of apprehension; and the historic Augustine's teaching centered about man's participation in the world of truth in the divine ideas. For reason could only judge truly, according to Augustine, when its judgments were made in

the light of such principles which are above the human mind, but accessible to it.

'*sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare... secundum rationes incorporeas et sempiternas; quae nisi supra sententiam humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent; atque his nisi subiungatur alii uis nostrum, non secundum eos possumus iudicare de corporalibus.*' 134.

Therefore, too, I think, there is not an isolated activity of the human soul, however excellent; rather, it has an immediate reference to the world of truth. It is a progress, we have seen, of the human soul towards God; a progress from participated truth to the necessary Truth which all things reveal and which the soul attains most fully in contemplation. But for the soul to reach the direct Vision of Truth was more than its nature possessed; such an illumination could be effected only through the grace of God. Therefore, for St. Augustine, the divine illumination expressed the supernatural union of the soul with God in contemplation.

We have previously marked the distinction between the vision of Alcher and that of St. Augustine; a proportionate difference seems to characterize their conceptions of the divine illumination. To prove the distinction between the illumination such as Augustine had conceived it, on the one hand, and such as certain of his disciples had interpreted it, Gilson aptly remarks that there are certain doctrines - among which we think that Alcher's may not be too much out of place -

"...celles que on a vus d'extraits de la solution augustinienne du problème de la vérité une réponse au problème aristotélicien de l'abstraction." 133

Here, then, in the doctrine of the *III*, we are brought face to face with an interpretation of Augustine wherein something more than just Augustine is beginning to appear. The illumination towards which Aicher inclines is one in which certain elements are included whose inspiration seems to be foreign to St. Augustine and which betray, therefore, an influence which is introducing into Aicher's thought a non-Augustinian spirit. The effect of this new element was to modify the Augustinian doctrine such as Aicher conceived it. Consequently, in the Augustinianism of the *III*, there is evidence of a gradual turning from the doctrine of the historic Augustine in the direction of some new influence. The new notions, of course, are only indistinctly expressed in Aicher's work; they have not yet been crystallized into any definitely formulated pattern. But the evidences of a change of direction of Aicher's thought from St. Augustine are as unmistakable as the direction itself in which that thought is turning. In seeking to identify this new influence, we shall briefly enumerate the several new principles which we have discovered to be shaping the outlines of Aicher's modified Augustinianism, and after that we shall look for a possible source of the new influences such as they appear in the doctrine of the *III*.

The new orientation in the doctrine of the soul.

Conditioned by the philosophical motive which prompted his inquiry into the nature of the human soul, Alcher's doctrine is beginning to show something more than just the teachings of St. Augustine, which formed the chief source of his doctrine. There is a certain change of spirit which is as yet not very clearly expressed but which is definitely turning the direction of Alcher's thought away from St. Augustine into a more philosophical location. Evidences of this new spirit appear in the following instances.

(1) In describing sensation, the author of the *De Anima* allows a certain passivity within the soul which he makes to be dependent on the body in certain of its functions.

(2) Sensible knowledge, in his view, is acquired through the abstractive power of reason; at this level, the cognitive power of the soul derives the material objects of its knowledge from sensible images which are beneath it-self. But the activity of the soul is spiritual since the abstraction is accomplished by means of consideration, which is proper to reason. This is the interior aspect of reason and the knowledge it produces is science.

(3) But reason also has a superior activity which functions in intellectual knowledge. This latter knowledge is acquired by means of a special help in which the mind is informed from

above through a divine illumination; in this illumination, man's intelligence is formed directly by Truth itself, and the knowledge thus produced is wisdom. Therefore, wisdom and science represent the two-kinds of knowledge, intellectual and sensible, of which the human mind is capable; they are distinguished ultimately by reason of the two-fold source whence the knowledge proceeds, whether from beneath the soul or from above. In this way, the division of reason in the *MA* has moved away from the spirit of its Augustinian model.

(4) The manner in which *Declaratio* characterizes this illumination as a kind of edification of the intellect in which the highest power of the soul is raised to a certain Godlike vision indicates the mystical quality of this superior knowledge. In this way, the intelligence comes to be regarded as a quasi-divine faculty of the soul which functions only in a quasi-divine manner through grace.

Now, all these various points wherein the doctrine of the *MA* seems to be turning away from the position of St. Augustine are concerned with the theory of knowledge. Moreover, the modifications appear to reveal certain affinities to the doctrine of Aristotle, whatever be the proximate source of its inspiration. Faced with these new Aristotelian tendencies, then, such as they appear in the doctrine of the *MA*, the question naturally arises, what is the immediate source which inspired them? In seeking to

discover the sources, we must be mindful of the varied elements which are found: the notion of abstraction by consideration; the division of reason as superior and inferior, and consequently, of wisdom and science, is a primarily speculative location; the mystical character of wisdom, or the knowledge which is pronounced by the superior power of the soul, the intelligence, which is informed from above by means of a divine illumination.

The historical location of these several tendencies which are beginning to express themselves in the doctrine of the *Summa* suggests quite naturally an Aristotle such as was currently being interpreted by the Arabian philosopher, Avicenna. There are, at least certain similarities between the Aristotelian doctrine which the Arabian thinker was proposing and the newer tendencies which appear in Alcher's psychological teachings. But can we find an Avicennian doctrine in which the teaching of St. Augustine is combined with that of Aristotle in any manner resembling that of the *Summa*? Without wishing to appear too premature, we think that we may safely answer this question in the affirmative. By reason of a chronological proximity as well as from certain doctrinal similarities, we felt entitled to establish some relationship between the *Summa* and another treatise on the soul in which an exposition of Avicennian psychology is blended with a doctrine of mystical wisdom deriving most certainly from

a christian source.¹³⁶ This work, the De Anima, generally attributed to Gundissalimus, wherein the way is prepared for the reception of the arabian philosophy into christian thought, exercised no small influence on mediæval philosophy.¹³⁷ Incorporating as it does, for the first time, the doctrine of Avicenna within the traditional christian thought, the De Anima marked the beginning of what has been called "avicennized augustinianism".¹³⁸ It should prove of extreme interest for our present purpose, therefore, as having certain features in common with the doctrine of the *MA*. In the following section, consequently, we shall consider the De Anima of Gundissalimus as a possible source of the modified augustinianism of the *MA*. Our inquiry will be made under two main headings; first, we shall look at the question of the authorship of the De Anima and the quality of its doctrine; and from that, we shall be led to consider its possible influence on the doctrine of the *MA*.

II

The De Anima of Gundissalimus - Possible Source of *MA*

A.

Its Authorship and Doctrine

Although no conclusive proof of its authorship has yet appeared, it seems not unlikely that the general ten-

dency in favor of Gundissalinus is correct. This man was especially well situated to be able to produce such a compilation from the nature of his literary activities at Toledo; there, under the direction of Archbishop Raymond, he was engaged in translating into Latin the works of the arabian and Jewish philosophers.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, it is an accepted fact that Gundissalinus, in company with his colleague, John of Spain (Ibn Jacub), had translated from arabic into latin the Liber VI Naturalium of Avicenna,¹⁴¹ with which the De Anima shows unmistakable affinities.

"The De Anima is a compilation of Gundissalinus himself...he borrowed numerous elements of it from his own translation of Avicenna, Liber VI Naturalium, and from Ibn Gebirol, Pons Vitae..."¹⁴²

In a recent work, Father Théry has thought to solve the question of the authorship of the De Anima with the introduction of a wholly new figure in the person of John, Archbishop of Toledo. Following DeVaux, who indicates that there was a certain John occupying the episcopal chair at Toledo from 1131 to 1136,¹⁴³ Théry goes on to draw his own conclusion. The former writer had merely suggested the fact while adding that St. Albert had also made mention of a "John, Bishop of Toledo" who had to his credit a De Anima.¹⁴⁴ However, DeVaux expressly states that he has no intention of identifying these two Johns, since Albert could have been mistaken.

"Je ne veux pas affirmer que notre De Anima a pour auteur Jean, archevêque de Tolède de 1131-1136, parce qu'Albert le Grand a pu se tromper." 144

Father Théry, on the contrary, is not nearly so hesitant. He goes much further than Devaux whose information he invests with a certain authority.

"R.P. Devaux fit faire...un pas en avant en prenant comme base de son raisonnement le témoignage d'Albert le Grand...Ce Jean, évêque de Tolède, aurait composé un traité de Anima, qui est précisément le traité que cite Albert le Grand sous le nom de Collectanus et Pletanus...Ainsi donc, le témoignage d'Albert le Grand est formel; notre traité aurait été composé par Jean, archevêque de Tolède." 145

This conclusion, however, appears to be somewhat gratuitous, since the reasons which make it imperative that John composed the treatise are not indicated. If the testimony of Albert is formal, his citations of the work of Collectanus are most informal. Here, then Théry has put forth a conclusion which the earlier author had judged it prudent to withhold. It is quite possible that he has acquired pertinent information to justify his opinion, since the publication of De Vaux's work,¹⁴⁶ but, in that event, we could wish that he had shared it with his readers.

Of the said John, Archbishop of Toledo, we have been able to discover nothing beyond the merest official recognition that he filled the episcopal office at Segovia, from 1142-1151, and then at Toledo, from 1151-1156.¹⁴⁷ Again, without indicating any additional source of information, Théry formulates his hypothesis that John is French and a Cistercian, as well, on the grounds, apparently,

of his acquaintance with certain writings deriving from Cistercian sources. Certainly, as he affirms,

"si on admet cette hypothèse, il ne subsiste plus aucune difficulté sur l'attribution et la rédaction du Tractatus 146

but we fail to discover any solid grounds provided for such an admission. These sources could, indeed, suggest a probable provenance for the work as a whole, but in themselves, they are hardly sufficient to warrant the conclusion that an individual who was acquainted with them was both French and a Cistercian. At least, such a position seems a rather tenuous one. Yet, no more probable reason for the conclusion has been offered. 146

Even granting Father Théry's hypothesis that John was a French Cistercian, which would account for the Christian character and mystical excursus of the final chapter, one naturally wonders why this Cistercian influence is completely withheld until the very end of the De Anima? The conception of the soul such as it is described throughout the rest of the treatise, as well as the language in which it is expressed, seem far removed from a Cistercian milieu. On a somewhat related question, the author himself appears to waver. At least, it looks as if Father Théry has veered slightly in deciding whether or not the christianizing of Avicenna was deliberately intended by the author of the De Anima.

Thus, in one place, he holds that John had absorbed the arabian teaching to such a degree that his substitution of the Christian God for the Agent Intelligence of Avicenna in the process of illuminating souls was not the result of any logical reasoning so much as of a christian instinct; consequently, the christianizing of the arabian doctrine occurred rather without John's full consciousness of what was taking place. Intellectually, therefore, John never really renounced Avicenna.

"Intellectuellement il (Jean) est avicennien. S'il cesse de l'être, ce n'est pas dans son intelligence, c'est plutôt dans sa subconscience. La réaction contre Avicenne ne se produit pas en pleine lumière. C'est par instinct chrétien plus que par raison raisonnée, que l'évêque de Tolède, quand il s'agit de l'illumination de notre âme, substitue Dieu à l'intelligence première d'Avicenne." 120

Elsewhere, however, Father Théry would seem to imply, at least, that the transformation and christianizing of the avicennian teaching was not unintentional. 121

If the former is true, that Avicenna's christianizing was effected by John "à son insu", as the author claims, one is forced to admire the providential disposition of certain very apropos additions to the text of Avicenna, which make explicit mention of the Christian God.¹²² From which, we feel more inclined to believe that the transition from the Agent Intellect of Avicenna in the early part of the De Anima to the Christian God of St. Augustine in the closing chapter, was made with the full recognition both of

the end being done as well as of the manner of its accomplishment. We hesitate, therefore, fully to endorse Father Théry's hypothesis, until, at least, we can find some more substantial verifications for the conclusions which he has drawn.

In this event, we are inclined to follow the more traditional attribution of De Anima to Avicenna and others wherein the De Anima is considered to be the personal work of Gundissalvus; a work in which he manifests an obvious dependence on the thought of his arabian and jewish models, especially Avicenna, whom he follows as far as his own christian faith will allow. The ultimate limit there, as a christian, Gundissalvus parts company with Avicenna touches the problem of man's highest intellectual knowledge in which the intelligible forms are received from some external source. The nature of this source as the arabian philosopher had conceived it, the Agent Intelligence, involved consequences which could not be acceptable to a christian thinker. It was, therefore, at this precise point in his doctrine that Gundissalvus introduced a mystical psychology of a wholly different inspiration in which the God of Saint Augustine is substituted for the Agent Intelligence of Avicenna.

"Gundissalvus s'est souvenu en temps opportun qu'il n'était pas seulement le traducteur du liber VI. de animalibus, mais encore un chrétien capable de puiser au trésor du platonisme des idées, et c'est là qu'il a trouvé de quoi sortir d'embarras." 123

when treating of the proofs for the existence of the soul, and of its nature as a spiritual, and consequently, immortal substance, Gundissalimus faithfully reproduces his arab model. In the relations he establishes between the soul and the body, it is still Avicenna who guides him, though there are occasional borrowings from the Fons Vitae of Ibn Arabi;¹³⁴ but when he comes to the characteristic powers of the human soul, the christian compiler must leave his musliman guide to follow a theory of knowledge, which, while it uses the same method of an illumination by means of intelligible forms infused into the soul from outside, stems, however, from an entirely different source and therefore, can at best lead to a wholly different end.

The avicennian doctrine which reduced the acquisition of knowledge to the habit of joining one's self to the Agent Intellect¹³⁵ is embodied in the treatise of Gundissalimus.¹³⁶ But the Agent Intellect, in each case, is not the same. The source of Avicenna's intelligible forms was a separated agent Intellect which was the same for all men. As a christian, therefore, Gundissalimus could not accept such a doctrine which suppressed the individual intellect of men and rendered personal immortality impossible. Yet, there was a seemingly possible solution and Gundissalimus found it. He was cognizant of a christian conception which could supply the deficiencies

very adequately, and at exactly the right moment, he substituted Saint Augustine's theory of Divine Illumination for that of Avicenna to explain the origin of man's intelligible knowledge. (Incidentally, in effecting this substitution, St. Gundissalvus became the initiator of the so-called 'avicennized augustinianism', and therefore, possibly, a proximate source of inspiration for the author of the *De Spiritu et Anima*.)

"En réalité, il suffit de le suivre jusqu'au bout pour constater que, dans sa (Gundissalvus's) pensée, l'illumination de l'âme par l'Intelligence agissante d'Avicenne fait place à l'illumination de l'âme par Dieu. C'est pourquoi, conservant jusqu'à la lettre même le son modèle, il n'a pas un seul instant l'impression de s'engager dans une voie nouvelle, et c'est avec une étrange inconscience qu'il devient l'initiateur de l'augustinisme avicennaisant." 187

Whatever be the source of this new element which Gundissalvus here introduced - whether it be original or not - we do not know. One of one thing we can be certain, namely, its wholly augustinian inspiration. Here are the principal elements in summary.

Knowledge is the comprehension of the form of a thing. The form may be grasped either by the imagination, which results in sensible knowledge, or by the intellect which produces intelligible knowledge. In this latter case, the form must be joined to the intellect which grasps it. Now, the soul, which is spiritual, cannot grasp the sensible form without some intermediary; while, on the

other hand, being of the same nature, it can directly attain the intelligible. Therefore, in discovering the truth of sensible objects, the intellect acquires knowledge, whereas, in apprehending the truth of intelligibles, intelligence acquires vision. The intellect and its knowledge, therefore, are as means towards intelligence and vision. At this supreme degree, the soul abandons all its proper operations and gives itself up to the divine illumination of God as a mirror offers itself to the rays it reflects.¹¹⁵ Here, as find the avicennian theory of the Agent Intelligence is placed in juxtaposition to a mystical interpretation of Augustinian wisdom. The consequences which result are of an incalculable character. For once made so available by its combination with christianity, the doctrine of Avicenna was bound to exert a profound and widespread influence. This juxtaposition of the two doctrines, which Gundissalimus allowed, called for an earnest work of interpreting and adapting the teachings of Avicenna - a work which was not to be realized until the following century.¹¹⁶

B.

The Influence of the De Anima on the DDA

Among the first to feel the impact of the new doctrine, we feel we can safely claim, was Richard of Clairvaux. His work seems to reveal some influence,

however modified, of the newly christened avicennian doctrine as it appears in the De Anima of Gundissalvus. Evidences of certain definite connections between this treatise and the ISA are not wanting, though they have not thrown too much light on the exact nature of the relations between the two works. In the present state of our knowledge, therefore, we dare not claim any direct dependence of the ISA on the De Anima. On the whole, the works represent their different provenance and a seemingly separate inspiration. There are, nevertheless, striking similarities which tempt us towards the conclusion of a direct filiation. But our inexperience imposes certain cautions; whence, we prefer to see in the various analogous passages indications of an unexplained doctrinal parallel.

We are not unmindful that there is a possibility of dependence deriving from the direction of the chronological composition of the two works,¹⁸⁰ as well as of the gradual infiltration of avicennian notions into the ISA which would normally be expected at the outset of Alcher's adopting the new doctrine. Still, we do not feel that the evidence which we have at present is sufficiently adequate to establish any definite relationship of dependence. Rather, we shall content ourselves with noting the number and character of the various similarities within the two doctrines, without any attempting of conclusions beyond their common likenesses. The similar passages, in fact, are restricted within fairly definite limits

in each treatise. It is only in the concluding chapter of the De Anima, where Gundissalvus treats of the characteristic powers of the rational soul, that we find certain resemblances to the corresponding parts of the doctrine of the MA.

At the outset, we must note that the most significant and longer passages which leave no doubt about the seeping in of Avicenna's doctrine, whatever be their source, are copied directly from Isaac of Stella's De Anima. Thus, the process of rational abstraction by means of the consideration of reason is clearly stated;¹⁶¹ the continuity, as it were, of the powers of the soul in the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is indicated;¹⁶² and the possibility of the rational soul to contact the sensible form through the intermediary of the spiritus is abundantly set forth.¹⁶³ Before proceeding, we must recall the possibility, claimed by some, that Isaac's Epistle might have been a source for Gundissalvus;¹⁶⁴ and in another direction, that Alicher had come to Isaac for enlightenment on the soul in its more specifically philosophical character. Had Isaac, therefore, in his conference, which occasioned Alicher's request, expressed the new conceptions already? It does not seem too unlikely, since they are certainly to be found in his Epistle.

Be that as it may, Isaac is certainly the immediate source for some of the avicennian tendencies in the MA. He

does not, on the other hand, explain all. Far over and above what Alcher has drawn from the De Anima of Isaac, there are similarities which suggest a more direct contact with the work of Gundissalimus. Moreover, these similarities all have reference to the workings of intelligence and wisdom, as we shall see, which keeps both in the line of the Augustinian tradition, at least.

Faithful to the Avicennian doctrine of the two faces of the soul,¹⁶⁵ Gundissalimus describes the two powers of the soul, namely, the active and the contemplative.

"Ad ex eo quod est infra eam scilicet intellectu activo generantur mores et scientiae, et ex eo quod est supra eam, scilicet intellectu contemplativo acquiruntur sapientiae..."¹⁶⁶

We have noted, however, that "scientiae" is the author's own addition, which does not appear in the text of Avicenna.¹⁶⁷ Explicit mention of the two, in turn, reappears in the De Anima where, however, the "mores" has become "prudentiae".

"Ratio facitque scientiae sive prudentiae".¹⁶⁸

Is it too much to see in this an indication of the tradition within which both writers are working?¹⁶⁹

Further, both authors are moved to trace a certain correlation between the etymological derivation of the mind and its two-fold activity.

"Mens autem dicitur a mensura. Mens autem Graece, latine dicitur luna. Et sicut luna crescit et decrescit, et varia vicissitudine mutatur, in id tamen quod fuit quidem perfecta novitate se restituit; sic mens mensurans et mensurata in se restituitur."

nunc decidit in infimam, nunc se referens
sibi, veris falseretur; it; modo ad corporalia
repanda collectitur, modo aeternis rationibus
inspicendis vel calculandis adherescit..." 170

This description of the instability of human mind is drawn ultimately from Cassiodorus.¹⁷¹ It is found substantially the same in Gundissalinus, although he emphasises in a slightly more scientific manner the figure of the moon as deriving its light from the sun; and therefore, capable of its dual activity, the mind resembles the moon,¹⁷² according as it turns towards or away from the source of its enlightenment.

The same notion of the physical sun as the source of natural light to portray the illumination of man's intelligence by a divine light is used by Alcher elsewhere. Affirming that both the intellect and the intelligence, which, he remarks are often used interchangeably, are helped from above, he writes,

"Ut sicut olem non videt oculus nisi in lumine
solis; sic verum et divinum lumen non poterit
intelligentia videre nisi in insus lumine.
Domine, inquit propheta, in lumine tuo videbimus
lumen." 173

But this passage is taken word for word from Isaac of Stella's *Little*,¹⁷⁴ The relation between this citation and the thought of Gundissalinus¹⁷⁵ is noteworthy, as certain authors have found.¹⁷⁶

Again, as De Vaux mentions, there is a rather pertinent resemblance in the characterisation of wisdom as an immediate and direct experience of the divinity in the two writers, and

especially in its relation to intelligence.

"Le rapprochement entre sapientia et scientia est
 d'ailleurs, d'après Boethius, intelligibile
 l'est moins." 177

Of strictly Augustinian origin, there is a doctrinal coincidence
 between the teaching of the De ordine¹⁷⁸ and the text of the MA.

"Sapientia namque est amor boni sive amor boni,
 sapere siquidem dicitur. Mentis visio est intel-
 ligentia; gustus sapientie est." 179

In thus relating wisdom and intelligence as distinct
 from science which is acquired by the intellect, Gundissalinus
 signalizes the mystical character of the intelligence. Here,
 he invokes the witness of Boethius according to whom wisdom
 belongs to the divinity and only to very few privileged men
 besides.

"Sicut autem per intellectum scientia sic sapientia
 per intelligentiam requiritur, prout secundum Boethium
 paucorum admodum hominum est et solius Dei." 180

With minor changes the text is repeated in the MA, though its
 position is not quite the same. In defining the secrets of
 that discipline which is higher than philosophy, Alcher states
 that they are reserved for the intelligence.

"Boethius tamen dicit intelligentiam solius Dei
 esse et admodum paucorum hominum..." 181

Of interest, in this connection, is Father Tuckle's observation
 relative to the source of this reference, which he claims he
 does not find in Boethius. He cites, however, an analogous
 passage from Chalcidius' translation of the Hymnus, of which
 he judges it to be an abridgement.¹⁸²

In much the same manner, we remarked the transposition of another quotation which appears both in the De Anima and the Enchiridion. In describing the means towards the "happy life", i.e. the contemplation of the divinity, the two authors seem to have had in hand a common source. For while, in the case of the De Anima, the text explicitly states that such contemplation,

"tam hic quam in futuro, quæ est vera sapientia
can be acquired by the necessary liberation from all sensible and carnal concerns, so that the soul is free to converse with God alone,¹⁸³ the Enchiridion, in its turn, refers equally explicitly to the process of self-knowledge as a means to this liberation.

"Cum enim ad beatam vitam præstantius videtur,
quam velut clausis carnalibus sensibus extra carnes
mundique effectus quædam loci sensibus nonnullis
alienisque effectus a mortali cupiditate sibi
soli et Deo loqui." 184

Originally, the passage comes from St. Gregory Nazianzen; the translation of Rufinus seems to be the source which the writers have used; and, of the two, Alcher's text reveals that of his model more closely.¹⁸⁵

From these similarities, what conclusions may be drawn? While we do not feel justified in arguing a direct filiation between the two treatises, we do, however, think that they indicate that Gundissalinus' De Anima was somewhere within reach of Alcher when he was composing his Enchiridion. Whether Alcher actually used the work of Gundissalinus himself is more safely left unanswered; but that the doctrine in Gundissalinus'

de Ania was beginning to find an echo in Icher's work is beyond any doubt.

In attempting to account for such a possible influence, we are reminded of the rather novel suggestion of Father Théry respecting literary connections between Cistercian writings and the centre of studies at Toledo. On his supposition that John of Toledo was a French Cistercian, Father Théry implies that he would have brought with him to Toledo this new literature which stemmed from Cistercian sources, such as St. Bernard and Isaac of Stella, and others.¹⁸⁶ In any event, he is quite ready to offer fairly convincing proof that these sources, and others, of which various Cistercians had made use, could easily have been known at Toledo.¹⁸⁷ But whether or not John of Toledo is responsible for its introduction there is another question which we do not feel called upon to answer.

But, to suppose that Cistercian literature had penetrated into Toledo is fairly safe and, even, not unlikely. The works of Cluny had already been in Spain for some time and Cistercian houses were not unknown there. Could not there normally have been intercourse with the priories there? Hence, Gundissalinus might have easily been brought into contact with the Cistercian literature. This would explain his acquaintance with the doctrine of St. Bernard and the indirect similarities in his work.¹⁸⁸ And, if recent speculation on the question of

the actual relations between Cistercian houses in Spain and France has any foundation,¹⁸⁹ since Gundissalinus knew and utilized sources already known to Isac of Stella and Acker, the passage of his doctrine into their own work could have been readily effected.

Whatever obscurity remains of the exact manner in which the doctrine of the De Anima has passed into the MA, of one thing, we are convinced, that the MA stands very close to the source of this avicennizing of augustinism, which explains, in some degree St. Thomas' concern with the thorough denunciation of the work. This denunciation and the reasons which prompted it will form the subject matter of the final section immediately following.

III

St. Thomas' Criticism of the MA

A.

His Criticism of its Authenticity

That he did reject the work, in no uncertain terms, is evident from St. Thomas' writings. It is true that the several passages in which the Angelic Doctor discredits the "authenticity"¹⁹⁰ as a work of St. Augustine are found in those particular questions wherein he was disputing about the singularity of the soul and its identification with its various powers.

Now, if this subject was the principal theme of the so-called "pre-thomist augustinianism" is generally agreed;¹⁹¹ consequently, the adversaries of the saint, on this particular issue, were Augustinians who persisted in taking refuge behind the authority of St. Augustine while invoking the doctrine of the DDA.¹⁹² Thus, it must be made clear that in rejecting the DDA, Aquinas is not necessarily opposing the doctrine of St. Augustine; he is rather condemning augustinianism such as it appeared in the thirteenth century. But the augustinianism of the thirteenth century seems to have derived largely from the DDA which its partisans cite so freely. Therefore, it was only natural that the DDA should have been singled out as the object of the special criticism which St. Thomas levelled against it.

The reason, indeed, for his manifest disregard of the work lies in the fact that he considered that the author of the DDA misrepresented the original thought of St. Augustine by inserting the saint's own words into contexts to which they were ill-suited, and wherein they even falsified his thought.

"Liber de spiritu et anima est apocryphus...et sunt ibi multa vel falsa vel improprie dicta; quia illa qui librum composuit, non intellexit dicta sanctorum a quibus accipere solitus fuit." 193

In some such wise, might St. Thomas fairly have answered the objection of St. Bonaventure who seems to have been aware that certain ones were in doubt as to the genuine authorship of the treatise.¹⁹⁴ Aquinas saw that such a misconstruing of the

true meaning of the Bishop of Hippo could have paved the way for further abuses at the hands of later disciples.¹⁹⁵

Consequently, it was only by pointing out that the doctrine of the *ESA* was not in accord with the thought of St. Augustine that the angelic doctor could weaken the position of his opponents and establish solidly his own claim that the work was practically without value and could, therefore, be discounted "with the same facility as that with which it was written".¹⁹⁶ Beyond the question of the simplicity of the soul which seems to have occasioned the controversy, Aquinas would seem to have seen further into the beginnings of a certain profanation of the spirit of St. Augustine which can be found in an incipient stage in the doctrine of the *ESA*. For to this work could be traced one of the first effective encounters of the doctrine of Augustine with that of Avicenna. While the quasi-companion piece, the *De anima* of Gundissilius, had succeeded, at least to some extent, in christianizing Avicenna, in its concluding chapter, still, St. Thomas was by no means convinced that the final result of the *ESA* had been so equally blessed. For while, on the one hand, as a result of such a juxtaposition, Avicenna was being augustinized, a contrary reaction was also being felt and St. Augustine, in turn, was also being avicennized. And the effect of the latter on the Christian thinkers of the day was of far more consequence, in the eyes of Aquinas.

In other words, St. Thomas saw that the early beginnings of an avicennized augustinianism, such as appeared in the DDA, which his opponents quoted so readily, was a very fruitful, if unintentional, source of the graver errors to which the historic Augustine's doctrine had fallen victim in the course of the thirteenth century.¹⁸⁷ The character of the more important of these errors is forcefully described by Gilson.

"Aussitôt connue, et en vertu de leur commun néoplatonisme, l'illumination-vérité de saint Augustin a tenté de se combiner à l'illumination-concept d'Avicenne; de leur union sont nées la doctrine égarée de Dieu intellect agent et, en général, toutes celles qui ont essayé d'extraire de la solution augustinienne du problème de la vérité une réponse au problème aristotélésien de l'abstraction..." 188

Since therefore, the DDA was located historically at the point of departure of the synthesis of the doctrines of Avicenna and Augustine which made possible the thirteenth century augustinianism, it falls under the condemnation allotted to that doctrine by St. Thomas. In signaling this work with special words of reproach, the Angelic Doctor is merely attacking the evil at its source. The precise sense in which the errors arising from this juxtaposition of doctrines are attributable to the author of the DDA remains to be considered. It is in this further consideration that we have to emphasize not only the rectitude of St. Thomas' position in respect of the DDA, but also, though somewhat more indirectly, the

historic importance attaching to the work from its location at the junction of the two worlds of the newly-acquired Arabian philosophy and the traditional christian thought. For, to the S.A., thirteenth century theologians, partisans of the avicennized augustinianism, looked for confirmation as well as for inspiration: for confirmation of their traditional beliefs, and for inspiration in another direction.²⁹⁹

B.

St. Thomas' Criticism of its Doctrine

In defending the historic Augustine from those of his disciples who were among his own contemporaries together with their immediate predecessors in the late twelfth century, St. Thomas had to show that the combination of their avicennian notions with the teachings of the Bishop of Hippo led to consequences which, on the one side, falsified the latter's meaning and which, besides, were inadmissible in the light of christian philosophy as such.³⁰⁰ In his defence, St. Thomas treats mainly of two problems both of which are intimately associated with the augustinian theory of the divine illumination.³⁰¹

According to Aquinas, one of the immediate effects of the synthesis of avicenna and St. Augustine was the identification of the separated agent Intelligence of the pagan

philosopher with the Illuminator God of St. Augustine. Descended from Aristotle in the line of his first arabian interpreter, this separated intelligence fairly invited such an identification at the hands of christian thinkers, and thus, came, in time, to compromise the true position of Augustine. This compromise can only be explained on the grounds of certain likenesses between the augustinian illumination and the corresponding concept in Avicenna, wherein the human intellect is enlightened through the reception of intelligible forms directly infused by the Great Intelligence. Even though the kind of the illumination varies in each of the doctrines, still, the common conception of an external illumination to explain the acquisition of intellectual knowledge was bound to result in a certain confusion. Hence, it was an easy step to substitute the one for the other. But, it was also a fatal step inasmuch as it jeopardized the true interpretation of Augustine, on the one hand, and the true philosophy of Aristotle, which it was supposed to represent, on the other. In both counts, it was the presence of Avicenna which proved the most serious obstacle to a clear understanding of the distinct problems involved.¹⁰²

Historically, therefore, St. Thomas was committed to denying any real compatibility between the augustinian illumination in search of truth and the avicennized augustinianism of his contemporaries. But since the first

movements in favor of such a possible union, however inchoate they actually were there, had been suggested in the ISA, its doctrine with justice, became the special target of the Thomistic opposition. What were these initial suggestions in the ISA which led away from the true Augustine in the direction of Avicenna? They are, we may suspect, concerned with the theory of knowledge, such as Alcher described it. Here, we have found elements which bear a striking resemblance to the avicennian doctrine forming a nice harmony with the traditional augustinian psychology, the influence of which remains very predominant throughout the work as a whole. The first intimations of the new spirit appear in the description of sensible knowledge. That the forms of sensible objects are made available to the intelligible nature of the soul by means of abstraction, suggests, at first, the influence of Aristotle; it is, however, an Aristotle introduced by Avicenna since the abstraction in question is further described in terms of the latter's characteristic 'consideratio'²⁰³ in which the denatured platonism of Avicenna's doctrine

appears.²⁰⁴

Nor in the sphere of higher intellectual knowledge is the influence of the arabian thinker entirely wanting. For here, in a similar manner, the author of the ISA allows that man's knowledge is perfected at this level of intelligence through a special divine illumination, which the intellect is

powerless, of itself, to realize. For man's turning towards the source whence this illumination proceeds is from grace; whence, for this knowledge, man requires a special help. It is at this point that the shadow of the agent intelligence of Avicenna disappears before the Christian God of Augustine who comes to fulfill the natural tendencies of the human soul with a supernatural illumination, through grace.

"Veritates facultates et cuncta instrumenta
deformationis et similitudinis habet ex natura; cogni-
tiones vero veritatis et ordinem dilectionis
nequaquam habet nisi ex gratia. Facta siquidem
a deo homo rationalis, sicut ejus inclinatio
succedit, ita cognitionem et amorem. Vacat
neque quae creatura sapientia formata ut sint,
adjutrix gratia replet ne vacua sint..." 205

But the effect of this special supernatural illumina-
tion, for St. Thomas, is to suggest that the human soul is
incapable of performing, by it self, its own proper functions.
This is to turn the soul in the direction of becoming an
incomplete nature and to highlight the opposition between
Aristotle and St. Augustine.²⁰⁶

Thus, at the two distinct levels of human knowledge,
an inclination in the direction of an avicennian influence was
beginning to manifest itself in the doctrine of the 13th. On
the one hand, the properly rational activity of the agent
intellect, such as Aristotle had intended it, was beginning to
be accepted but under the guise of the more platonic
Avicennian notion of abstraction as a consideration; while, on

the other hand, the concept of a special illumination from above, common both to Augustine and Avicenna, was beginning to replace one of the natural perfections of the soul. In time, therefore, the temptation to identify the illumination of Augustine with that of Avicenna, and to make of God our agent intellect was one before which certain Augustinians of the thirteenth century yielded in varying degrees.⁵⁰⁷

But we repeat that this was a position which St. Thomas could not allow either as a Christian or as a philosopher. Therefore, in seeking to establish the truth, he was forced to disengage St. Augustine from the company of Avicenna. But in rejecting Avicenna, he was also bound to reject that platonic element in the Augustinian doctrine which the Bishop of Hippo held in common with the arabian thinker; thus, in eliminating the agent intellect of Avicenna, St. Thomas was obliged de facto to eliminate an important aspect of the illuminator God of Augustine. For Aquinas could not insist, as a philosopher, on the complete efficacy of the human soul to accomplish its natural functions of intellectual knowledge within itself, unless he rejected the special collaboration of any external agent, including even Augustine's God.⁵⁰⁸

Such seems to have been the frame of mind in which St. Thomas entered into the controversy with the thirteenth century disciples of St. Augustine and in which he sought to defend Augustine against those of his disciples⁵⁰⁹ who had submitted

to an influence inspired by the doctrine of Avicenna and more, consequently, professing a denatured Augustinianism. Moreover among these we rank the author of the *Summa* whose work, from its chronological position at the beginning of this denaturing of Augustine's doctrine as well as from the influence which it exerted on the Augustinian disciples of the following century, holds a unique place in the thirteenth century struggle. The possibility of such a synthesis between the doctrines of St. Augustine and that deriving from Avicenna stems from the neo-platonism with which the two traditions had been commonly inspired;²¹⁰ whence, in directing his attack, St. Thomas aimed it primarily at their latent platonism. Now, the most effective weapon in combatting platonism, such as it appeared in these Augustinian circles in the thirteenth century, was his own version of Aristotle, that is, Thomism, properly so called.

In thus choosing the Aristotelian philosophy as the basis of his conception of human knowledge, Aquinas rejected the Augustinian theory of Divine Illumination as an explanation of man's knowledge, at least in those terms in which Alcher and his Augustinian successors had conceived it.²¹¹ Knowledge, for St. Thomas, is no longer possible in terms of a platonic world of intelligibles exterior to thought; it is possible only by an Aristotelian immanent intellect within each soul, endowed with a natural light which itself produces the

intelligible. Here, then, was an entirely new conception of human knowledge, one which stood strongly opposed to that of the ISA; here, for the first time apparently, St. Thomas was teaching that the created agent intellect is the sufficient reason of human knowledge, every special divine illumination having been eliminated.²¹² In the history of philosophy, this development was an event of major importance.

With the introduction of this new conception of man, an old order was beginning to give way to a new; the doctrine of the deified Augustinians, initiated in part by the ISA in the latter half of the twelfth century and successfully fostered by the disciples of St. Augustine in the early thirteenth, was about to yield before the direct attack which St. Thomas levelled against it. By proving its lack of authenticity, the Angelic Doctor emphasized likewise the ahistorical character of the doctrine of the ISA, which, on many points, even falsified the real intention of St. Augustine. And by this complete rejection of its doctrine, St. Thomas showed the weakness of the actual position of those thinkers who found in its erroneous interpretation of St. Augustine's doctrine the support for their philosophical arguments.

Consequent upon the rejection of its doctrine at the hands of St. Thomas, the ISA was returned to the oblivion from which it had been originally called. The real importance

of the work, therefore, came, in time, to be recognized for what it truly was - simply, a decisive factor in the transmission of St. Augustine's doctrine as well as a crucial moment in the development of mediaeval psychology.

CONCLUSION

Before concluding the present study of the Liber de Spiritu et Anima, we shall resume the more salient features of its doctrine so as to determine its exact location within the development of the Christian thought of the Middle Ages, since it is primarily from its historical position within that development that the work derives its importance.

The fact of its false attribution to St. Augustine under whose name the work circulated freely was responsible for the popularity and the prestige which the LBA enjoyed during the early thirteenth century, as well as for the influence which it exerted on the more outstanding thinkers of that period. But from evidence, both internal and external, we have shown that the LBA is not a genuine work of St. Augustine. On the contrary, it was composed in the latter half of the twelfth century, very probably by Alcher, a Cistercian monk of the Abbey of Clairvaux. The presence of certain unmistakably Cistercian characteristics in its doctrine, together with the personal relations of its author with Isidore of Stella, ensure its provenance from a Cistercian milieu. In spite of its Cistercian origin, however, the thought of St. Augustine

has remained the dominant influence throughout the treatise. Historically, the doctrine of the DAA is to be located within the current of traditional Christian stemming from St. Augustine into which, however, the mystical current of Cistercian spirituality has already been introduced. It is precisely this historical location of its doctrine which becomes the chief point of interest in the study of the DAA, for while it is not authentically a work of the saintly doctor himself, still the doctrine of the DAA does represent the thought of St. Augustine at one of the decisive moments of its history. It is Augustinianism, such as it was accepted by the Christian thinkers of the early thirteenth century, whose thought it influenced so readily, but which was later rejected, in Augustine's name, by St. Thomas Aquinas.

The reasons which justify St. Thomas' thorough-going critique of the DAA are two; first, the unauthentic character of its doctrine which, he claimed, falsified the real thought of St. Augustine and secondly, the major role which this work played in shaping the thought of the Christian thinkers of the time. For while professedly following Augustine, the author of the DAA was not, however, unaffected by the underlying philosophical tendencies which were beginning to make themselves felt in Christian circles. In the contrary, the modified Augustinianism of the DAA reveals the presence of certain additional elements within the traditional thought of

St. Augustine. These elements are undoubtedly of Aristotelian inspiration. Further, they seem to show certain affinities with the Aristotelian doctrine such as it was interpreted by the Arabian philosopher, Avicenna. Consequently, it is not without reason that we look in that direction for an explanation of the modified character of the Augustinian doctrine which appears in the *ITA*.

Whatever be their source, one thing we may conclude with certainty. There are in the doctrine of the *ITA* certain philosophical undercurrents which are wholly foreign to the original thought of St. Augustine, and which, of their very nature, tend to transform the spirit of his teachings. In the following summary, we shall indicate the main points in which the doctrine of the *ITA* reveals a departure from the historic Augustine. From these, one can see quite readily why we incline towards the suggestion of an Avicennian doctrine as the source of the denatured Augustinianism of the *ITA*.

1) Alchor's study of the human soul is in the nature of a primarily philosophical inquiry which reflects the current interest in psychological problems of twelfth century thinkers. Determined in such a direction, the doctrine of the *ITA* assumes a philosophical character which is lacking to the teachings of St. Augustine. In this direction towards a philosophical conception of the soul, therefore, the intention

of the author is opposed to the religious and moral active which promoted St. Augustine's search.

2) The definition of the soul as given in the *AMA* is turning away from the platonic conception of St. Augustine in the direction of an opposite aristotelian definition wherein the human soul is held to be essentially related to the body.

Between the soul and body in man, the author of the *AMA* places a relation of mutual dependence, such that both, soul and body benefit from their union in man. In this, Alcher was opposing the absolute transcendence which St. Augustine had claimed for the soul. Consequently, in his explanation of sensation, Alcher differs from Augustine; the former allows a certain passivity within the soul whereas Augustine's conception had explicitly defended the completely active role of the soul.

3) Among the powers of the soul, Alcher described a hierarchy wherein the lower powers revealed a limited dependence on the body, through whose instrumentality they functioned; the higher powers, on the otherhand, exercised a properly spiritual and independent activity.

4) The theory of knowledge of the *AMA* is likewise conditioned by the author's psychological principles. Thus, he describes a two-fold knowledge in man, according to the distinction he posits between reason and intelligence as natural faculties of the soul. This two-fold knowledge is differentiated according as the objects known come from beneath the soul itself or from above. In the first case, reason, by means of consideration,

produces a rational cognition of sensible things; this is science. On the other hand, at a higher level, intelligence, informed from above, produces an intellectual knowledge which is wisdom. Here, therefore, Alcher differentiates wisdom and science on the basis of the two-fold faculty of the soul according as it is directed to two different classes of intelligible objects. In this doctrine, consequently, the religious implications of Augustine's distinction between wisdom and science, stemming from his division of reason as superior and inferior, are subdued. This distinction is offered in the 188 rather in the direction of a theory of knowledge where a 'platonic intelligentia' is superimposed on a 'ratio' in which both Augustinian and Aristotelian elements are combined.

5) Again, in the theory of the divine illumination which appears in the doctrine of the 188, a non-Augustinian influence is felt. In the realm of its higher powers, Alcher holds that the human soul is powerless of itself to produce its intellectual knowledge. At this level, the power of the soul is raised above itself by a divine illuminating grace in the light of which alone the soul can contemplate the objects of its knowledge. In this way, he explains that the highest power of the soul, the intelligence, is 'informed from above', but this divine illumination has little in common with that of St. Augustine. For the latter, the theory of divine

illumination bore on the truth of man's judgments, not the content of his concepts. Alcher's illumination, on the other hand, shows a certain affinity to the illumination theory proposed by the arabian interpreter of Aristotle, Avicenna, who held that man's intellectual knowledge was caused as a result of the reception of intelligible forms directly infused into his intellect from above.

Such were the various philosophical tendencies which were just beginning to express themselves in the doctrine of the *IA* and which so effectively transformed the character of its Augustinian teachings. By reason of the new direction thus given to its thought, the *IA* became a powerful influence on the minds of the thirteenth century disciples of St. Augustine as well as a powerful weapon in their hands. In this doctrine of the *IA*, these thinkers found both confirmation and inspiration; confirmation of their traditional Augustinian principles and inspiration in a new direction. Because of the outstanding influence which he saw this work was exerting on the minds of these Christian thinkers, as well as from the denatured character of its Augustinian teaching, St. Thomas launched a particularly fierce attack upon it. By his uncompromising denial of its authenticity, he refused the doctrine of the *IA* the weight of Augustine's authority and thus defeated the historic Augustine from his thirteenth century disciples who sought support for their Augustinian

teachings in the denatured Augustinianism of the doctrine of the SDA.

In this way, from its peculiar location within the philosophical struggle of Christian thinkers of the thirteenth century, the historical importance of the SDA is set in relief. It is this historical importance alone which we have claimed for the doctrine of the treatise attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux.

NOTES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Arch. d'Hist. Eccl. et Lit.	<u>Archives Historiques Ecclésiastiques et Littéraires du Centre de la France.</u>
Beiträge	<u>Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters.</u>
Dict. d'Hist. et Geog. Eccl.	<u>Dictionnaire d'histoire et géographie ecclésiastiques.</u>
Dict. Théol. Eccl.	<u>Dictionnaire de théologie ecclésiastique.</u>
ESA	<u>Liber De Spiritu et Anima</u>
PL	<u>Patrolologia Latina.</u>
Rev. Neo. Phil.	<u>Revue Neoscholastique de Philosophie.</u>
Rev. Sc. Ph. Th.	<u>Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques.</u>

INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER 1

1. For references in the writings of Alexander of Hales, John of Rupella, St. Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas Aquinas, cf. Chapter 1, notes 20-21.

2. Dom A. Wilhert, O.S.B., Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moyen âge latin (Paris, 1932), p. 174, f.3: "Les manuscrits en sont si nombreux que j'ai renoncé à en prendre liste; rien que dans les bibliothèques anglaises, j'en ai compté une soixantaine..."

3. M. DeWulf, History of Mediaeval Philosophy 1, tr. M.C. Messenger (3rd Engl. ed., New York, 1935), p. 67.

4. A. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age (2nd ed., Paris, 1944), pp. 302-3.

5. J.M. Déchanet, O.S.B., Oeuvres choisies de Guillaume de St. Thierry (Paris, 1944), pp. 51-2, gives a list of the principal psychological works of the time. "Les traités du corps et de l'âme, ou simplement de l'âme, sont nombreux au XIIe siècle. Tout auteur spirituel, tout mystique veut avoir le sien. Les raisons en sont multiples et les points de vue différents."

6. Phil. Schedler, 'Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Wissenschaft des christlichen Mittelalters,' Beiträge, XIII, 1 (1916), p. 123.

7. Karl Werner, Der Entwicklungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologie von Alcuin bis Albertus Magnus (Wien, 1876), pp. 44 and 46. Speaking of the difference of interpretation placed on Alcuin's definition of the soul: "anima est spiritus intellectualis, rationalis, semper vivens, semper in motu, bonae malaeque voluntatis capax," which Alexander knows from 199a, Werner states: "Hier nun tritt sofort eine Differenz zwischen Alexander Halensius und Albert hervor, die den schon vom Anfange her bestehenden relativen Gegensatz zwischen den beiden Schulen der Franziscaner und Dominicaner beleuchtet. Alexander hatte...das Verbal 'semper in motu' in platonischen Weise auf die Selbstbewegung der Seele gedeutet. Albert will eine solche Selbstbewegung der Seele nicht zugeben und besteht auf den Satze der aristotelischen Schule..." Cf. also, for the incorporation of Alcuin's psychological work, De Anima rationis ad Lolanium, by Alcher of Clairvaux in the 12th century, H. Meyer, Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie in Grundrissen der Geschichte der Philosophie (Berlin, 1928), p. 161, as well as M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Theologie I (Freiburg, 1909), p. 194 and A. Gilson and F. Böhner, Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie (Maderborn, 1937), p. 246.

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8. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 303.

9. Cf. G. Théry, O.P., 'L'Authenticité du "De Spiritu et Anima" dans St. Thomas et Albert le Grand,' Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques XI (1921), pp. 373-7.

10. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 473: "Grosseteste, s'inspirant ici du De Spiritu et Anima d'Alcher de Clairvaux..." Grosseteste's affiliation with the augustinian doctrine of illumination is described in another work of the same author, namely, 'Pourquoi St. Thomas a critiqué St. Augustin,' Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age I (1926), pp. 91-98.

11. Cf. A. Landgraf, under 'Alcher' in Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche I (Freiburg, 1930), p. 226; cf. infra note 102, where the argument follows F.P. Elienetzrieder, 'Isaak von Stella - Beiträge zur Lebensbeschreibung,' Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Spekulative Theologie XVIII (1904), pp. 30-31.

12. B. Geyer, op. cit., pp. 260-261.

13. Cf. F.P. Elienetzrieder, op. cit.; cf. also Histoire Littéraire de la France XII (Paris, 1869), p. 684.

14. Ibid.

15. M. Lehall, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1922), p. 143.

16. G. Théry, O.P., op. cit., p. 376.

17. E. Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, Engl. tr., I. Irithowan and F.J. Sheed (London, 1935), p. 342.

18. Cf. E. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de St. Augustin (Paris, 1931), pp. 283-284.

19. G. Théry, O.P., 'Thomas Gallus, Aperçu biographique,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A., XII (1935), p. 164.

20. B. Geyer, op. cit., p. 385, where, although direct mention is made only of Isaac of Stella, the statement holds equally true of his disciple, Alcher. "Therefore, the first two Franciscan teachers, Alexander of Hales and John of Rochelle in the field of the theory of knowledge, took a position similar to that of Isaac of Stella in the 13th century, i.e. alongside of the augustinian neo-platonic theory of illumination to which the higher objects of

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

The history of the United States is a story of the growth of a nation from a collection of colonies to a powerful republic. It is a story of the struggles of the people to establish a government that would protect their rights and promote their welfare.

The story begins with the first settlers who came to the New World in search of a better life. They found a land of opportunity, but also a land of hardship. They had to learn to live with the elements and to work the land. They also had to learn to live with each other.

As the colonies grew, they began to assert their independence from England. They demanded the right to self-government and to the right to elect their own representatives. They fought the Revolutionary War to establish their independence.

THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution is the foundation of the United States government. It sets out the principles of the government and the rights of the people. It is the supreme law of the land.

THE PRESIDENT

The President is the head of the executive branch of the government. He is elected by the people and he represents the United States in foreign affairs.

THE CONGRESS

The Congress is the legislative branch of the government. It is made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives. It has the power to make laws.

The Supreme Court is the highest court in the land. It has the power to interpret the Constitution and to decide on the constitutionality of laws.

The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States. It is responsible for the money supply and for the stability of the financial system.

The United States is a country of many different people and many different cultures. It is a country of great diversity and great strength. It is a country that has the power to make a difference in the world.

knowledge are allotted, stands the aristotelian theory of abstraction...to which falls the domain of experience..."

21. Cf. Summa Theologica Inq. IV t. 1, sect. 1, q. 2, ed. Quaracchi II (1938), p. 385, where the definitions in question are numbers 2, 3, 5, 6, 7.

22. Op. cit., Inq. IV, t. 1, sect. 1, q. 1, c. 2, a. 2, ed. cit. II, p. 426.

23. Cf. DSA 13 PL 40, 789.

24. Cf. Summa Theologica Inq. IV, t. 1, sect. II, q. 1, m. 1, ed. cit. II, pp. 430-441; cf. DSA 4, PL 40, 782. It is instructive to note in passing the extent to which Alexander was persuaded of the augustinian character of the DSA. Sharing the current opinion according to which the De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus of Gennadius was attributed to St. Augustine (op. cit., pp. 404-405), when citing this latter work, Alexander appears to have had before him rather the DSA. In his treatment of the efficient cause of the soul, he says: "Et ideo in libro De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus...; while the passage which follows is taken directly from the DSA 48, PL 40, 815, and shows considerable variation from the work of Gennadius as it is given in the original, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus XIV-XV, PL 58, 904.

25. Cf. Summa Theologica, Inq. IV, t. 1, sect. 1, q. 2, m. 2, ed. cit., II, p. 392: "...ergo pari ratione anima, cum non sit ens sine simplici, condita fuit in sua materia illa autem non est nisi spiritualis; ergo in materia spirituali..." It is by this hylomorphic composition of the soul as matter and form that Alexander explains the possibility of a unity of an agent intellect and a possible intellect in man's soul. He attributes the possible intellect to the matter of the soul and the agent intellect to its form, refusing thereby the traditional identity of the soul with its faculties. "Intellectus agens et intellectus possibilis sunt duae differentiae in anima rationali; quarum una, scilicet intellectus agens est ex parte formae ipsius animae, secundum quod, est spiritus; altera vero, scilicet possibilis, est ex parte materiae, quae est potentia eius respectu cognoscibilium quae fiunt in ea..." Summa Theol. II, Inq. IV, t. 1, sect. II, q. 3, a. 3, ed. cit. II, p. 435. On the question of Alexander's place in the discussion of the Agent Intellect, see E. Gilson, 'Pourquoi St. Thomas a critiqué St. Augustin,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. de M.A. 1 (1926) p. 85.

26. E. Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Age, pp. 436-437.

the present situation, the following points are suggested for consideration:

1. The present situation is a result of the failure of the government to take effective measures to deal with the problem of unemployment.

2. The present situation is a result of the failure of the government to take effective measures to deal with the problem of unemployment.

3. The present situation is a result of the failure of the government to take effective measures to deal with the problem of unemployment.

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6. The present situation is a result of the failure of the government to take effective measures to deal with the problem of unemployment.

27. Cf. D.O. Lottin, O.S.B., 'Alexandre de Hales et la Summa de anima de Jean de la Rochelle,' Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale II (1930), pp. 296-309.

28. M. Leault, Histoire de la philosophie médiévale II (6re éd., Paris, Vrin, 1938), p. 111.

29. Cf. D.O. Lottin, O.S.B., 'La Composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles : Les débuts de la controverse,' Revue néoscholastique de philosophie XLIV (1932), p. 33.

30. Cf. D.O. Lottin, O.S.B., Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles I (Louvain, 1942), p. 443.

31. Cf. John of Rupella, Summa de anima. This work has not been published; the pertinent passages can be found in Bibl. de la Ville de Bruges Ms. 515, fols. 4v-5v; or in Brussels, Bibl. Royale Ms. 2793-96, fols. 6r-7v. An analysis of John's treatise, in considerable detail, will be found in the work of H. August, Traité de l'âme de Jean de la Rochelle, ch. 24-26 (Paris, 1875), pp. 30 ff.

32. Lottin's article, cited above (note 29), gives an excellent résumé of the history of the question concerning the hylomorphic composition of separated substances from the beginning of the controversy with Anselm of Laon until the time of St. Albert. Here, he indicates the importance of the doctrine of Philip the Chancellor for his successors, John of Rupella and Albert the Great.

33. G.M. Manser, O.P., 'Johann von Rupella : Ein Beitrag zu seiner Charakteristik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Aristotelische,' Jahrbuch für Phil. und Arch. Theol. XLVI (1912) p. 300; cf. also H. August, op. cit., p. 194.

34. Summa de anima, Bruges Ms. 515, fol. 18v; or Brussels Ms. 2793-96, fol. 26v; cf. August, op. cit., ch. 66, pp. 110-111.

35. Cf. J. Dekker, 'Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de l'âme,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. au M.A. II (1927) pp. 73-77.

36. In librum II sententiarum, II, 10, a. 2, q. 3; Opera Omnia, ed. Quaracchi II (1882), p. 450.

37. II Sent., II, 31, a. 1, q. 1; ed. cit., II, 742.

38. Dea II, PL 40, 786-7; cf. also II, 790; 38, 808-9.

39. Cf. A. Gilson, Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, p. 537.

40. Itinerarium Mentis in Deum c. 1, ed. cit., V, p. 297; cf. also II Sent., D. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, concl., ed. cit., II, p. 564. For likeness to AAA, cf. DNA 10-14, FL 40, 786-790.

41. Cf. A.C. Regis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century (St. Michael's College, Toronto, 1934), p. 52, note B.

42. II Sent., D. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, concl., ed. cit., II, p. 560.

43. Ibid., p. 561.

44. Summa de Creatura II, t. 1, q. 2, q. 1, ordo ordinis ed. Borgnet, XLV (Paris, 1896), p. 10; the same thing appears also in his Summa Theologiae II, t. III, q. 69, a. 1, ed. cit., XXXIII (1895) p. 7.

45. Summa de Creatura II, q. 69, a. 1, obj. 1, ed. cit., XLV, p. 538.

46. The forcefulness of Albert's denial here inclines to the opinion of a second redaction of the Sentences. On this point, cf. G. Théry, O.P., 'L'Authenticité du De Spiritu et Anima dans St. Thomas et Albert le Grand,' Rev. Sc. Phil. et Théol. 41 (1921), p. 375.

47. I Sent., D. 8, a. 20, ed. cit., XLV (1893), p. 257. Leopold Jaul, 'Alberts des Grossen Verhältnis zu Plato,' Beiträge III, 1 (1913), p. 84, suggests that this "william" may possibly be the Cistercian abbot of Alba Ripa (c. 1106), for notice of whom cf. Histoire Littéraire de la France XIV, pp. 200-205.

48. Op. cit., D. 10, a. 2, ed. cit., XLV, p. 312.

49. G. Théry, O.P., op. cit., p. 275, holds that the De Anima of Albert was "finished before the 'De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas' composed in 1256-7 at the advice of Alexander IV..." However, P. de Lou, O.P., 'De Vita et Scriptis S. Alberti Magni,' Analystis Bibliographica XII (Brussels, 1902), p. 369, points out that the De Anima is not a genuine work of St. Albert but was compiled from his various tracts and commentaries.

50. Cf. St. Bonaventure, II Sent., D. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ed. cit., II, p. 560. See above note 42.

The first part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the State to the President, dated January 1, 1892.

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The eleventh part is a letter from the Secretary of the State to the President, dated January 1, 1892.

The twelfth part is a letter from the President to the Secretary of the State, dated January 1, 1892.

31. Isidore in De Anima, V, 2, ed. cit., V (1890) p. 508.
32. St. Thomas, Scriptum super libros sententiarum, IV sent., D. 44, q. 3, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 1, ed. Vivès (Paris, 1874) 21, p. 349.
33. Cf. M.D. Ebner, O.P., 'Authenticité et autorité dans les livres théologiques aux 12^e et 13^e siècles,' Divus Thomas XXVIII (1925), p. 417.
34. De Veritate q. 10, a. 1, ad 1, Questiones disputatae I, ed. Lethellieux (Paris, 1925), p. 417.
35. Op. cit., q. 25, a. 3, ad 2, p. 641.
36. Op. cit., q. 26, a. 5, ad 7, p. 669.
37. De Anima a. 12, ad 1, Questiones disputatae III, ed. cit., p. 135.
38. De Spiritualibus Creaturis a. 11, ad 2, quest. disp. III, ed. cit., p. 89.
39. De Anima a. 19, ad 3, ed. cit., p. 193: "illam austeritatem non oportet nos recipere cum liber iste falsum habet auctorem in titulo; non enim est Augustini sed cujusdam alterius..."
40. G. Théry, O.P., op. cit., p. 375.
41. Quæstiones Theologiae I, q. 77, a. 8 ad 1, ed. Ottawa (1941), p. 471; cf. also q. 79, a. 3, ad 1, p. 489; q. 79, a. 10, ad 1, p. 491; q. 85, a. 5, ad 3, pp. 531-532.
42. Cf. A. Wilmarit, O.S.B., op. cit., p. 175, f. 3: "D'autre part, la tradition manuscrite met en cause saint Augustin lui-même et lui seul, sans doute parce que les extraits de ses œuvres étaient les plus nombreux et les plus évidents..."
43. Cf. Admonitio in librum De Spiritu et Anima, PL 40, 779-780.
44. De Consolatione Philosophiae V, prosa 4 (ed. Guilelmus Weinberger (Leipzig, 1934), GM LXVII, p. 117.
45. Prologion c. 24-25; Opera Omnia, ed. J.L. Schmitt, 1 (Secken, 1928), pp. 117-120.

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
PUBLISHED WEEKLY

CHICAGO, ILL.

Subscription price, Five Dollars Per Annum in Advance. Single Copies, Fifteen Cents. Entered as Second-Class Matter, October 3, 1917. Postpaid. Accepted for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Act of October 3, 1917. Authorized Second-Class Mail Matter.

Published by the American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610. Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Ill. and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes in this journal to JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.

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Printed at the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.

Printed on acid-free paper.

Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Ill.

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66. M. DeWulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages, p. 143: "In the 18th century, a monk by the name of Alcher of Clairvaux had written a small book on psychology, and in order to ensure it a wide circulation, the copyists of the times ascribed it to Augustine..."

67. Hugh died in the year 1141. Cf. E. Gilson, la Philosophie au Moyen Age, p. 303 and A. Wilmart, O.S.B., op. cit., p. 176, l. 1. For the approximate dating of the De Anima of Isaac of Stella about 1161, cf. infra, chapter 1, note 102.

68. Cf. Hist. Litt. de la France XII, p. 684.

69. Ibid.; cf. also R. Werner, op. cit., p. 42 and F.P. Blümmetzrieder, op. cit., p. 30.

70. F.P. Blümmetzrieder, op. cit., p. 31.

71. For internal evidence of the close relations between these two works, see chapter 1, pp. 24-28.

72. Cf. supra, note 66.

73. Cf. E. Gilson, la Philosophie au Moyen Age, p. 303; also M.D. Chenu, O.P., op. cit., p. 271.

74. Cf. Hist. Litt. de la France XII, p. 684.

75. ORA PL 40, 779-832.

76. R. Werner, op. cit., p. 42.

77. F.P. Blümmetzrieder, op. cit., p. 31.

78. B. Geyer, op. cit., p. 161 and 260-261; A. Grabmann, op. cit., p. 194.

79. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 302. Add to this list a number of present day scholars who simply accept the authorship of Alcher without further question, e.g. P. Lattin, O.S.B., Psychologie et Morale aux XIe et XIIe siècles, p. 484; J.H. Dechaet, O.S.B., ORA Cit., p. 61 et al.

80. Hist. Litt. de la France XII, p. 683.

81. Cf. ibid.; cf. also P. Fournier, 'Alcher de Clairvaux,' Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques XI (Paris, 1914), pp. 14-15.

82. F.P. Blümmetzrieder, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

83. Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Venerabilem Familiarem suum de Anima, ff. 194, 1875-80, for the meaning of 'familia-ritas' as signifying members of the same religious community, cf. Lucange, Glossarium scriptorum Medice et Anagninensi-um III, ed. D. Carpentier, p. 410: "familia - conventu-ales monachorum congregationes familiae nomenclantur...quia praefectus monachis eos non aliter quam pater filios trac-tare debet..."; this meaning is also confirmed in J. Baxter and J. Thomson, Medieval Latin Texts (London, 1934), p. 102.

84. Cf. List. Litt. de la France XII, p. 682.

85. Isaac of Stella, Epistola de Anima, ff. 194, 1875: "Vis enim a nobis edoceri de anima...sed de eius essen-tia et viribus, quomodo sit in corpore, vel quomodo exeat vel caetera quae non scimus nec nescire nos sinis..."

86. Cf. ibid: "Cogis me, dilectissime, scire quod nescio et quod nondum didici docere..."

87. Cf. ibid: "Tria itaque sunt corpus, anima et deus, sed horum ne tutius ignorare essentiam, minusque quid corpus quam quid anima, et quid anima quam quid sit deus in-telligere..."

88. Ibid: "...animam nostram cum divina natura plu-rimum gerere similitudinem..." cf. also op. cit., 1880: "Un-de a philosopho definita est (anima) omnium similitudo... Ad totalem enim sapientiae similitudinem facta, anima in se similitudinem gerit..."

89. Op. cit., 1875: "Praedita ergo in medio anima, ali-quam cum utraque habere debet convenientiam et cum summo in suo superiori, et cum imo in suo inferiori, habet namque, ut dictum est, anima secundum proprietates suam, medium, summum quovis secundum essentiam omnia sint unum..."

90. Op. cit., 1881: "Impossibile est etenim, quod corpus est, in spiritum transgredi, vel quod spiritus est in corpus incarnari, cum enim quod natum ex carne, semper per naturam et essentiam caro est; et quod natum est ex spiritu, similiter spiritus est. Sunt tamen utriusque quaedam similia, corporalis videlicet supremum, et spiritus infimum, in quibus sine naturarum confusione, personali tamen unione, facile necesse possunt. Similia enim gaudent similibus et facile an-nexione cohaerent, quae non resiliunt dissimilitudinis. Ita-que quod vere spiritus est, et non corpus, et caro quae vere corpus est, et non spiritus, facile et convenienter uniuntur in suis extremitatibus, id est in phantastico animae, quod fere corpus est, et sensualitate carnis, quod fere spiritus est. Sicut enim supremum animae, id est intelligentia, sive

mens...imaginem et similitudinem sui gerit superioris, id est Dei, unde et ejus susceptiva fore potuit, et ad unionem personalem etiam, quando ipse voluit, donec illa deulatione naturae fuit assumpta; sic et supremum carnis, in hoc convulsionem, personae similitudinem habens, nec ad personalem unionem ejus non suscipiat essentiam."

91. Op. cit., 1880, 1884, 1886, 1888.

92. Cf. Hist. Litt. de la France XII, p. 684; A. Ver-
net, op. cit., p. 43; F. J. Schmetzrieder, op. cit., p. 31;
E. Geyer, op. cit., p. 260, et al.

93. Hist. Litt. de la France XII, p. 682.

94. Cf. DSA 18 PL 40, 791; also 38, 802.

95. Epistola de Anima PL 194, 1882.

96. Op. cit., 1880.

97. Cf. DSA 5 PL 40, 782-3.

98. Cf. DSA 4 PL 40, 782.

99. Epistola de Anima, PL 194, 1880.

100. Disasters, reported to have happened in France in 1161, are recorded in various historical chronicles of the time; these chronicles are published in the collection, Général des Historiques des Evénements et de la France XII (Paris, 1877), pp. 482, 490, 501, 504; XIII (Paris, 1889), pp. 277, 306, 307 et al.

101. Cf. supra, chapter 1, p. 24.

102. Cf. Schmetzrieder, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

103. De Anima a. 12 ad 1, ed. Bethielloux, p. 155:
"nec est multum curandum de his quae in eo dicuntur..."

104. Summa Theologiae I, q. 77, a. 2, ad 1^{am} "quod
ibi scriptum est eadem facilitate continentur quae dicuntur
..." ed. Ottawa, I, p. 471.

105. De Spir. Creat., a. 11, ad 2, ed. cit., p. 89.

106. Cf. E. Geyer, op. cit., pp. 260-261.

107. E. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age, p. 302.

The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a very important document, as it contains the President's message to the Congress at the beginning of his first term. The letter is written in a formal, dignified style, and it is one of the most important documents in American history.

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108. H. Dehault, History of Medieval Philosophy, Engl. tr. P. Colley (New York, 1909), pp. 201-202. More recently, J.M. Dechenet, O.S.B., Guillaume de St. Thierry: l'homme et son oeuvre (Paris, 1942), p. 51: "Aux rêveries antihéistes ou ultra-réalistes d'Adélard de Bath, de Guillaume de Conches, de Bernard et Thierry de Chartres, aux observations d'Adélard et de Jean de Salisbury, s'opposaient contre-poids les idées claires et arrêtées de Guillaume de Champeaux, ... d'Isaac de l'Isle, ... d'Alcher de Clairvaux (le *spiritus* et *anima*, longtemps attribuée à saint Augustin)."

109. "Armenius sagt von dem Buche: 'Opus est hominis variae multaque lectionis, in quo non aliquis artis videas aut ingenii, sed quasi arenam sine calce'..." as quoted by R. Werner, op. cit., p. 42.

110. Cf. ibid.

111. Cf. hist. litt. de la France XII, p. 614.

112. The extent to which borrowings from the various authors have been made will be seen in the succeeding chapter, where Alcher's sources are examined. Cf. also J.S. Thomson, A History of Philosophy I (London, 1922), p. 351: "Both Isaac and Alcher... appear to have felt the influence emanating from St. Victor..."

113. ibid. 43 ff 40, 811: "Plura veteres de natura animae dixisse inveniuntur, sed nihil ita ut non aliquid restare videatur. Ego autem ex eorum dictis, quanto diligentius potui, breve istud et certum colligere, atque in unum studium redigere, quod memorias commendetur. Mebes namque est memoria hominis, et brevitatem gaudet..."

114. Cf. P. Jourdain, "Saint Augustin," Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique I, 2, col. 2307.

CHAPTER 2

1. PL 194, 1875 ff.

2. "Ceux (Cisterciens) qui ont écrit depuis le XII^e siècle jusqu'à notre époque se sont exercés dans les diverses branches du savoir humain... On ne trouve chez eux ni ces hommes extraordinaires, ni cette organisation puissante qui ont valu aux Bénédictins et aux autres ordres religieux une place des plus honorables dans l'histoire littéraire..." J. Leclercq, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique II, 2^e partie, col. 2539.

3. A. Wilmart, C.S.B., op. cit., p. 175, n. 3. Geyer seems to share this opinion because in speaking of William of St. Thierry, in particular, he refers to him as "im all wahren ein Compilatur;" cf. A. Geyer, op. cit., p. 258.

4. Cf. Histoire Littéraire de la France XII, p. 684; also A. Stockl, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters I (Mainz, 1864), p. 389: "Der Brief Isaaks ist, wie erwähnt, an den Cistercienser-Mönch, Alcher, gerichtet, welcher zu Clairvaux unter dem hl. Bernard und dessen Nachfolgern lebte..."

5. A. Stockl, loc. cit.: "Dies setzt voraus, dass auch Alcher mit psychologischen Studien sich beschäftigt habe. Dies um so mehr, als Alcher selbst von Isaak Belehrung über diese Sache sich ertut. In der That haben wir auch von Alcher ein Buch, welches über Psychologie handelt. Es hat die Aufschrift De Spiritu et Anima..." Leclercq also is impressed with the interest in psychology manifested in 12th century writers: "en philosophie, le problème de l'âme, ou de la connaissance de soi, captivait alors les esprits..." J.-L. Leclercq, Guillaume de St. Thierry: l'homme et son Œuvre, pp. 51-52; cf. supra, chapter 1, note 5.

6. Cf. E. Gilson, La Théologie mystique de saint Bernard (Paris, 1934), p. 18.

7. Cf. W. Williams, St. Bernard of Clairvaux (Manchester, 1936), pp. 92-94: "Sixty-eight foundations! It is a great record for thirty-eight years! and when we come to add to it the rest of the houses founded in the line of Clairvaux, it is greater still, for the number amounts to one hundred and fifty-nine... the figures are eloquent of the results achieved by monks professed by St. Bernard and his sons. And when he and his companions entered Cîteaux in 1112 the Cistercian order was sterile!... Thus, we learn to appreciate the nexus between Clairvaux, that is to say,

its spirit as embodied in St. Bernard and transmitted by him to his sons, and the movement of supernaturalism of the ideal of the Civitas Dei, reacting against the materialism alike of a strict monarchy and of constitutional feudalism." Cf. also A.J. Landy, O.Cist., Life and Teaching of St. Bernard (Dublin, 1927), pp. 688 ff, for an account of the immense circulation and influence of St. Bernard's works.

8. William of St. Thierry, Epistola ad fratres de Aonia Dei 1, 1, PL 184, 309-310: "...vitae scilicet solitarie exemplar, et consentanea forma conversationis... Christianae devotionis ac religionis speciosissimum portio, quae coelestis propinquius tangere videbatur, mortuum erat et revixit, perierat de mundo et inventa est... Vos quidem... stulti iacti propter Deum, per stultum Dei, quod sapientius est vanulus hominitus, Christo duce humiliter apprehendite disciplinam ascendendi in coelum... Sed haec novitas non est novella vanitas. Non enim est antiquae religionis, perfecte fundatae in Christo pietatis, antiqua haereditas ecclesiae Dei a tempore prophetarum praemonstrata..." Cf. also A. Wilson, Op. cit., pp. 80-107 especially, where he treats the doctrine of St. Bernard as having been inspired by the example of the Fathers of the Desert and the rule of St. Benedict.

9. L. Bréhier, Histoire de la Philosophie 1 (Paris, 1943), pp. 579-80; cf. also J.M. Léchaneux, O.S.B., Aux sources de la spiritualité de Guillaume de saint-Thierry (Bruges, 1940), pp. 13 ff.

10. Ibid., p. 582: "Il faut pourtant appuyer sur ce fait que, dans ces milieux que nous étudions ici, ce spiritualisme est religieux et sentimental et nullement spéculatif; il est régi de vie par l'âme et non pas, comme chez Plotin, par une conception philosophique de l'univers; c'est la tradition de la méditation intérieure d'Augustin, non celle de la métaphysique néoplatonicienne." Cf. Augustine's preference for the interior life, Wilson writes in La Philosophie au Moyen Âge, p. 131: "On peut remarquer la prédilection d'Augustin pour l'analyse des données de la vie intérieure. C'est un de ses plus grands dons et comme la marque de son génie..." and further: "Ce progrès... semble directement lié aux deux éléments d'Augustin pour l'analyse psychologique..." also in La Théologie mystique de St. Bernard, p. 5: "À la fin du début de son enseignement Bernard s'engage d'abord dans l'étude de l'homme et sa doctrine ne se détourne de la philosophie spéculative que pour s'engager plus profondément dans cette étude de la vie intérieure où l'avait autrefois précédé saint Augustin..."

11. E. Leclercq, History of Medieval Philosophy, 1, p. 286.

12. St. Gilson, La Théologie mystique de St. Bernard, p. 83.

13. St. Bernard, De Diligendo Deo, c. 18, ed. Williams (Cambridge, 1926), p. 83: "quoniam puto de illa dictum 'lex domini immaculata convertens animas' quod sola videlicet sit quae ab amore sui et mundi avertere possit animum et in Deum dirigere. Nec timor quippe nec amor privatus convertunt animas... Lex ergo Dei immaculata caritas est." Cf. also William of St. Thierry, op. cit., I, 1, PL 184, 311: "Altissima enim est professio vestra... Non enim solum variis omnium sanctitatem sua omnia sanctitatis perfectionem... Aliorum est Deum servire, vestrum adhaerere. Aliorum est Deum credere, scire, amare, revereri; vestrum est sapere, intelligere, cognoscere, frui..."

14. Cf. St. Bernard, op. cit., c. 9, pp. 45-47: "Ex occasione quippe frequentium necessitatum, crebris necesse est interpellationibus Deum ab homine frequentari, frequentando gustari, gustando pretari quam suavis est Dominus. Ita fit ut ad diligendum pure Deum plus iam ipsius alliciatur gustata suavis, quam urgent nostra necessitas... amor iste merito gratus, quia gratuitus. Casta est quia non impenditur verbo nec lingua, sed opere et veritate... qui enim sic amat, haud secus profecto quam amatus est amat, quaerens et ipse vicissim non quae sua sunt sed quae Jesu Christi, quomodo illi nostra, vel potius nos, et non sua quaeque... Iste est tertius amoris gradus, quo iam propter se ipsum Deus diligitur..." Cf. also William of St. Thierry, op. cit., II, 3, PL 184, 322-3: "Haec enim unitas nominis cum uno vel similitudo ad Deum, in quantum propinquat Deo, in tantum inferiori suum conformat sibi, infirmum illi: ut spiritus et anima et corpus suo modo ordinata... cogitantur: ut incipiat homo perfecte nosse se ipsum, et per cognitionem sui proficiendo, ascendere ad cognoscendum Deum..." Commenting on a passage very similar to this latter in De Diligendo Deo c. 14, p. 83, Williams explains: "Thus, when the lex caritatis is supreme, we have a graduated dilectio, comprehensive of

- 1) the corpus and its bona propter animum
- 2) the anima propter Deum
- 3) Deus propter seipsum..."

The same doctrine is expressed in different terms in the IIA c. 16, PL 40, 792: "Charitas est via ad homines, et via hominum ad Deum. Per charitatem enim venit Deus ad homines, venit in homines, factus est homo. Per charitatem homines diligunt Deum, eligunt Deum, ad Deum currunt, ad Deum perveniunt... Si ergo charitatem habemus, Deum habemus quia Deus charitas est..." and in c. 38, 809, Alcher defines charity as "concordia mentium"; cf. also c. 36, 807.

15. William of St. Thierry, op. cit. I, 7, PL 184, 320.

16. Op. cit., I, 5, PL 184, 316. Cf. also I, 6, 319. There is even a verbal likeness in ISA 32, PL 40, 801: "sed quia in istis est corporalibus quae cum amore cogitat, et cum quibus amore assuefacta est, non valet sine imaginibus eorum videre semetipsam, vel esse in semetipsa. Nam tanto glutino amoris ei cohaeserunt haec quae foris sunt corporalia, ut etiam cum absint ista, praesto sint imagines eorum cogitant..."

17. Cf. E. Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Age, p. 301; also infra note 29. Ceyer, too, mentions their interest in psychological matters, op. cit., p. 253: "Mit Psychologie, wie Wilhelm von St. Thierry, aber unter Ausschaltung der anatomisch-physiologischen Teile, beschäftigen sich auch die Bistzerienmönche Isaak von Stella und Alcher von Clairvaux."

18. P. Pourrat, Christian spirituality in the Middle Ages (London, 1924), pp. 24-28.

19. Cf. St. Bernard, op. cit., c. 4, pp. 1-14: "Ut-
rumque ergo scias necesse est, et quid sis, et quod a te
non sis ipso, ne aut omnino glorieris, aut inaniter glori-
eris." Cf. also in Cont. Cont. Sermo 23, PL 183, 806. ISA
32, PL 40, 801: "quod autem de se querit, quid antea fuerit,
vel quid futura sit, vel qualis modo sit quaerit, id
est quam simile est vel quam dissimile Deo, quam humilis
et devota, quam pura, quam sancta..."; also c. 62, 826:
"Ecce audietis, anima mea, quid sis et quid possis: modo
audi qualis sis, et qualis esse debeat. Liberata ex peccato,
irretita vitulis, capta illecebris, oscillo captivata,
corpore carcerata..."

20. Cf. E. Gilson, La Théologie mystique de St. Bernard, p. 94: "Remplacer la peur par la charité, grâce à la
pratique de l'humilité, c'est toute l'ascèse de St. Bernard,"
which seems to summarize a passage in St. Bernard: op. cit.,
c. 14, p. 64: "Numquam erit caritas sine timore, sed casto
... implet ergo caritas legem servi, cum infundit devotio-
nem... Corpe timori permista devotio, ipse non aducllet
sed castificat. Poena tantum tollitur sine qua esse non po-
tuit dum fuit servilis et timor tenet in vasculum saeculi
castus et filialis. Sed quod legitur 'perfecta caritas fer-
ras mittit timorem,' poena intelligenda est quae servili
et dissimulata nunquam deest timori, ille scilicet genus locu-
tionis, quo saepe causa ponitur pro effectu." And in ISA
36, PL 40, 807, we read: "Anima namque quam Dei pietas re-
spicit, humilitas subiecit, poenitentia reducit, iustitia
deducit, obediencia conducit, perseverantia perducit, de-
votio introducit, puritas jungit, charitas unit."

21. E. Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Engl. tr. A.H. Downes (London, 1936), pp. 209 ff.

22. St. Bernard, de diligendo deo, c. 8, p. 43. Cf. also in Santi, Santi, Sermo 50, PL 185, 125. DSA c. 10, PL 40, 792: "per amorem dei omnes ei adhaeremus; per amorem proximi omnes ad invicem unum sumus; ut deum commune omnium fiat singulorum, et quod quisque in se habet in altero possideat."

23. Cf. William of St. Thierry, op. cit., I, 14, 21-184, 536: "Amor ergo dei, in homine ex gratia genitus, lac-
tat lectio, meditatio pascit, oratio confortat et illuminat
...homini oranti vel meditati, melius ac talius...preponi-
tur imago dominice humanitatis, divinitatis ejus, passio-
nis et resurrectionis; et infirmus animus, qui non novit
cogitare nisi corpore et corporaliter habet cui se efficiat,
cui juxta modum suum pietatis intuitu insinuetur. Sed quippe
in forma mediatoris in quo, sicut legitur in Job, 'visitans
homo speciem suam, non peccet,' hoc est cum intentione su-
ae intuitus in eum dirigit, humanum in deo speciem cogitan-
do, a vero non usquequoque recedat, et dum per idem ab
homine deum non dividit, deum aliquando in homine apprehen-
dere addiscat... Eodem modo vero fide migrante in affectum,
amplexantes in medio cordis sui dulci amoris amplexu Chris-
tum Jesum, totum hominem propter hominem assumptum, totum
deum propter assumptum deum, incipiunt cum iam non secun-
dum verbum cognoscere, quousque cum necdum secundum deum
plene possint cogitare..." Cf. DSA 17, PL 40, 792: "...
quantum deberem diligere deum meum...dedit mihi vivere, non-
sistere, discernere, perieram, et ad mortales descendit, mor-
talitatem suscepit, passionem sustinuit, mortem vicit; et
sic me restauravit... hominem etiam suo vocavit me, ut memo-
riale suum semper esset apud me. Unxit me oleo laetitiae
que ipse erat unctus, ut ab uncto eodem unctus, et a Chris-
to dicerer christianus..."

24. DSA 47, PL 40, 814; cf. also 34, 804; 57, 822.

25. Cf. op. cit., 44, 812: "Deinde elevat se supra
se, et in eo quod primum et principale speculum est specu-
landi dei, illiusque imagini se similitudini proximam et
cognitam regis factum, invisibilem deum inspicit. Hoc est
ipsa ratio, et mens ratione utens..."; also ch. 54, 819:
"Hunc revertamur ad speculum nostrum, et videamus quomodo
per cognitionem nostri possimus ascendere ad cognitionem
ipsius dei..."

26. DSA 14, PL 40, 791.

27. E. Gilson, de Philosophia ad Xoven, p. 301;
also S. Geyer, op. cit., p. 258. See above note 19.

28. E. Geyer, op. cit., p. 203. In Geyser's earlier edition of this same work, an even greater stress is placed on the interest in psychological studies at this time. Cf. Geyser's Grundriss, (Berlin, 1913), p. 330.

29. Cf. A. Bréhier, op. cit., p. 582. Having spoken of the mysticism developed among the Victorians, he continues: "Même tendance chez Hugues de St.-Victor et ceux qui lui succèdent comme maîtres au cloître Saint-Victor de Paris; ce ne sont plus comme Bernard de grands philosophes, mais des maîtres de théologie qui donnent tous leurs soins à l'instruction des clercs..."

30. P. Pourrat, op. cit., p. 108; cf. also E. Van Steenberghen, Aristote en Occident (Louvain, 1940), pp. 34-37.

31. E. Geyer, op. cit., p. 253.

32. Cf. E. Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Âge, p. 302: "Bien que nous voyions l'étendue de la victoire remportée par la spéculation philosophique que l'intime union et l'accord de la mystique et de la raison tels que nous les trouvons chez les Victorins, il est manifeste à la fin du XII^e siècle que les partisans d'une philosophie mise au service de la foi ont gagné leur cause contre les théologiens de la stricte observance et les tenants de la pure méthode d'autorité, que la connaissance des œuvres scientifiques d'Aristote vienne donner à la pensée médiévale le matériel de principes et de concepts qui lui fait encore défaut, et les grandes synthèses philosophico-théologiques vont immédiatement pouvoir se constituer..."

33. Cf. supra, chapter 1, p. 43.

34. E. Werner, loc. cit., p. 1. For similar estimates of the work as containing a bird's eye view of the traditional psychology, cf. A. Landgraf, Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche I, 226, and M. DeWulf, History of Mediaeval Philosophy I, p. 47, and E. Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Âge, pp. 302-3.

35. The text is too long to be given here in the notes, but the comparison may be made from PSA 64 PL 40, 627-629 and Anselm's Prologium c. 24-25, ed. Summitt, pp. 117-120.

36. PSA 17, PL 40, 792 and Hugh of St. Victor, Soliloquium de Arithmetica, PL 176, 960-62, 963. The editors of the PSA in Higne mistakenly indicate Anselm in Meditation VII as the source for Aicher here. Wilmar shows that this work is spurious; further, he indicates the indebtedness of the author of the PSA rather to Hugh when he

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compares in parallel columns the two works, noted above, and shows that Alcher's is simply an abridgement of Hugh's work, which, in its turn, became the source for the author of the pseudo-Anselmian Meditation VII. The work has been done so thoroughly and is presented so completely by Wilbart that it is unnecessary to duplicate it here; it is sufficient to indicate the locus: A. Wilbart, op. cit., p. 184. For a similar treatment of Dea c. 49-50 and Hugh's De Modo Grandi as the ultimate sources of the same Meditation VII, cf. loc. cit., p. 179.

37. Dea 15 PL 40, 791.

38. Dea 6 PL 40, 783 where a passage from the Trinitate of St. Augustine is inserted between selections from the De Anima of Isaac of Stella.

39. Dea 43 PL 40, 811

40. Dea 6 PL 40, 784.

41. Dea 32 PL 40, 802.

42. Dea 15 PL 40, 791, as compared with Isaac's De Anima, PL 194, 1282; also Dea 62 PL 40, 826 as compared with St. Bernard's In Cant. Cant. Berne 23, PL 123, 1161 and Berne 25, 1193.

43. Thus, Dea 16-17 PL 40, 792 is an excitation to the love of God, proceeding from a consciousness of the benefits conferred on man, inserted somewhat abruptly in the middle of his discussion of the relation of the soul to the body in the human person. Compare again Alcher's insertion of the exemplarist treatment of human nature as such in Dea 6-8 PL 40, 785-6 when dealing with the soul qua soul.

44. In only four cases, throughout the entire work is mention made by name of the persons whose opinions are being quoted, and in all these instances, the passages as they stand are borrowed ones. As a result, no credit is to be given to Alcher as having indicated the source of his thought in these various places:

- 1) Dea 6 PL 40, 783: "...unde et a philosopho definita est (anima) omnium similitudo..." which is taken from Isaac's De Anima PL 194, 1282.
- 2) Dea 37, 808: "Sed tunc dicit intelligentiam solius Dei esse..." taken from Chalcoidius' translation of Timaeus probably; cf. Gundissalinus' De Anima, ed. J. F. Kucklo, C.S.B., Mediaeval Studies II (1940), p. 99.
- 3) Dea 48, 814: "Credimus animas non esse ab initio cum angelis, nec simul creatas, sicut Origines fingit, nec per coitum... sicut Luciferiani et Cyrillus... Neque cum

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corpore moritur ut Aratus asserit; neque postmodum interitura, sicut Zeno dicit...et idea (animalium animae) nec ratione reguntur sicut Plato et Alexander putant..."; the entire passage is drawn from Cennadius, De Moribus Ecclesiasticis XIV, PL 58, 984-6.

- 4) PLA 49, 616: "Non est in hominibus tertius spiritus ut Suidas contendit..." taken from Cennadius, op. cit., XL, PL 58, 985.

45. Cf. PLA 25 PL 40, 798 as compared with Macrobius, Commentaria in Somnium Scipionis, I, 3, ed. Lanus (Leipzig, 1843), pp. 24-28.

46. PLA 43 PL 40, 811, where he refers to the work as a collection of opinions on the subject of the soul. "Sedura veteres de natura animae dixisse inveniuntur, sed nihil ita ut non aliquid restare videretur, ego autem ex eorum dictis, quanto diligentius potui, breves istos et certos colligere, atque in unum studium redigere, quod senioribus commendetur, neque namque est memoria hominis et brevitate gaudet..." What VanSteenberghen says of the work of St. Augustine in relation to an organized christian thought, seems to be proportionately true of Alcher's work also, especially by contrast with the syntheses of the following century: "Oré, dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin, la pensée chrétienne n'a pas encore atteint le stade de l'organisation scientifique; son unité est moins une unité d'ordre que celle d'un savoir non encore différencié..." P. Van Steenberghen, op. cit., p. 30.

47. Of these not customary expressions, the most outstanding instances are:

- a) intellectabilis: Boethius, in Isidorus Hispalensis Commentaria, ed. J. Brandt (Vienna, 1906), PLA XLVIII, pp. 8-9.
- b) phantasticum: Isaac of Stella, De Anima PL 194, 1330, 1381, 1382.
- c) contemplativa ratio: St. Bernard, De Diligenda Leg. c. 10, ed. Williams, p. 48, where the author notes the common use of this phrase among mystical writers.
- d) oculus carnis, oculus rationis, oculus contemplationis, etc. For the language of vision thus used in treating of intellectual knowledge: Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis, I, 10, 2, PL 176, 329, and ultimately St. Augustine, De Quantitate Animae 27, 53, PL 32, 1065.

48. Cf. E. Gilson, La Théologie mystique de St. Bernard, p. 18. Referring to the imposing series of works then produced, he continues: "C'est un des éléments indispensables dans le paysage du XIIe siècle et il se relie à l'ensemble du tableau par des traits dont l'importance ne peut

échapper à personne, aussitôt du moins qu'on les a discernés. Car tous ceux qui le connaissent admettent que le xii^e siècle fut, à sa manière, un âge humaniste. Il le fut assurément beaucoup plus encore qu'on se l' imagine..., c'est un peu partout que l'étude des classiques latins fut alors cultivée..."

40. Cf. Mini. Litt. de la France III, p. 694: "Il (224) est divisé en trente-trois chapitres dans les éditions des œuvres de Hugues de St. Victor, et en quarante quatre dans la Bibliothèque de Cîteaux."

50. Cf. A. Wilmart, C.S.B., op. cit., p. 174, n. 3: "Plusieurs (manuscrits) prennent fin avec le chapitre xxxiii; la majorité ne dépasse pas le chapitre L à tel point que Constant n'a pas connu de témoins directs de la dernière partie... Je croirais que l'ouvrage a été conçu primitivement en trois livres; ceci expliquerait les principales différences des manuscrits."

51. DSA 6 PL 40, 783.

52. DSA 7 PL 40, 784.

53. DSA 12 PL 40, 787.

54. DSA Preface, PL 40, 781.

55. DSA 2 PL 40, 781; cf. also c. 44, 812: "Deinde elevet se supra se, et in eo quod primum et principale speculum est speculandi sui... invisibilem Deum inspiciat, hoc est ipsa ratio et mens ratione utens, quae ad primam similitudinem Dei facta est, ut per se invenire possit eum a quo facta est... De nunquam perfective suum factorem manifestant, quae illius similitudini vicinior appropinquant. Haec autem est rationalis creatura, quae et excellenter et proprie ad illius similitudinem facta est; et tunc citius Creatorem suum, quem non videt, agnoscit et diligit, cum se ad illius imaginem totam intelligit."

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. DSA 31 PL 40, 801.

59. DSA 3 PL 40, 781; cf. also c. 49, 815.

60. Cf. DSA 32 PL 40, 802: "Vivificatione et sensibilisatione descendit anima ad corpus. Praesentia nunquam sua illud vivificat, colligit in unum, siquae in uno tenet; defluere atque contabescere non sinit, congruentiam ejus

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modumque conservat, non tantum in pulchritudine, sed etiam in crescendo atque signendo..."

51. DSA 14 PL 40, 789.

52. Cf. E. Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, pp. 242-51. "For St. Augustine, on the other hand, the essential requirement is to describe the structure of the human soul so that it may be revealed as an image of the Trinity. We believe by faith that God is One in three persons; the human soul must therefore be one and three in its own manner, and the relation of its essence to its faculties must in some way imitate the relation of the divine unity to the Three Persons of the Trinity..." And, of Alcher's position on this question, Gilson says: "On the one side were the theologians and mystics, more Augustinian than Augustine himself, who maintained the unity of the soul's essence to the extent of seeing in its most diverse operations nothing but the various relations of its essence to different objects; Alcher of Clairvaux, for example, interpreting certain Augustinian formulae in their most literal sense, seems to find no other distinction between the soul and its faculties than that which separates a single organ from its various functions."

53. DSA 13 PL 40, 723-729.

54. DSA 61 PL 40, 825.

55. DSA 4 PL 40, 731.

56. DSA 13 PL 40, 789.

57. Cf. ibid., also c. 18, 794.

58. Ibid.

59. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 379-380: "This problem (of deciding the fitting objects of our knowledge)... does not concern our faculty of knowing only, but the whole rational soul with its two faculties of knowing and will. It is the soul that rises upwards or sinks downward, and in rehabilitating or degrading itself, it rehabilitates or degrades its power to love along with its power to know...; it is the distinction between the superior reason and the inferior, that is, within the rational soul considered as looking above or beneath itself for the fitting objects of knowledge and love."

70. DSA 11 PL 40, 787.

71. Cf. ibid. 32 ff. 40, 303: "Habeat ergo ad se mens rationalis et colligat se in se ut sine imaginibus corporeis se ipsam et omnipotentis Dei invisibilem naturam considerare valeat, terrenarum phantasmata imaginum...respuat... Cum enim coeperit mens per puram intelligentiam se et ipsam ascendere, et illam incorporeae lucis claritatem tota intrare, et ex iis quae intrinsecus videt quendam intimae suavitatis saponem trahere, et ex eo intelligentiam suam condire, et in sapientiam vertere..."

72. ibid. 32 ff. 40, 302.

CHAPTER 31. DSA Preface PL 40, 781.

2. Isaac of Stella, Aristotele de Anima PL 194, 1878. It is significant that the passages quoted directly from Isaac's De Anima deal precisely with these topics. Thus, almost perfectly parallel passages are found in:

DSA 4-5 (781-2): Powers, Affections, PL 194, 1877-80
Virtues of soul

DSA 6 (783): Traces of Trinity in PL 194, 1886-88
soul - Exemplarism

DSA 7 (784): Soul's receptivity in PL 194, 1887
knowledge and love

DSA 12 (787-8): Power of sensation - reason PL 194, 1887-88

DSA 14 (789): Mode of union of soul PL 194, 1881-82
and body

DSA 15 (791): Government of body by soul PL 194, 1882

In posing such questions and seeking their solution, Alcher reflects one of the characteristic influences of the times and the milieu in which he was living. Historically, interest in the human soul as such had been greatly stimulated by Abelard and his followers in their discussions on the nature of the Universals and the abstractive power of reason. When, in opposition to this dialectical approach, the mystical current of St. Bernard was introduced, the interest in the soul suffered no diminution, even though the soul was then studied for a very different reason and consequently, from a very different point of view.

3. Cf. E. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age, p. 297: "quant à ses (Bernard) sentiments à l'égard des dialecticiens, ils se révèlent dans la lutte qu'il conduisit contre Abelard et Gilbert de la Porrée, dont les tendances générales et l'indulgence excessive au raisonnement en matière de théologie l'inquiétaient profondément. Saint Bernard n'a certainement rien fait pour amener l'avènement des grandes philosophies scolastiques; il garde une attitude soupçonneuse à l'égard des tentatives contemporaines qui le préparent, mais il élabore profondément sa doctrine de l'amour mystique, et devient par-là même l'initiateur d'un mouvement qui va se développer au cours des siècles suivants." Writing elsewhere of the mystical teachings of the saint, Gilson says: "...mais le XIIIe siècle n'en marque pas moins, sur ce point comme sur tant d'autres (spéculation théologique de l'amour) un nouveau point de départ... Parmi eux (les moines théologiens) réservons une place à certains isolés, comme Abelard, qui peuvent y faire à première vue figure de corps étrangers, mais dont les idées aberrantes ont agi parfois comme un ferment et se sont montrées fécondes par les réactions mêmes qu'elles ont pro-

voqués...." Cf. La Théologie mystique de St. Bernard, pp. 14-15; also B. Geyer, op. cit., p. 258.

4. Cf. J.M. Déchanet, O.S.B., Oeuvres choisies de Guillaume de St.-Thierry (Paris, 1944), pp. 51-52, where the author refers to the numerous works on the subject and lists several of the most important: "Les traités du corps et de l'âme ou simplement de l'âme sont nombreux au XII^e siècle. Tout auteur spirituel, tout mystique veut avoir le sien. Les raisons en sont multiples et les points de vue différents."

- 1) Guillaume de Champeaux, De l'origine de l'âme PL 173, 1040--
- 2) Isaac de l'étoile, De la nature de l'âme PL 194, 1695--
- 3) Hugues de St-Victor, De l'union du corps et de l'esprit PL 177, 255--
- 4) Pseudo-Augustin, De l'âme et de sa nature PL 177, 165--
La cicatrice de l'âme (III) PL 176, 1017--
De la densure inter. PL 184, 507--
- 5) Alfred de Mevaulx, De la nature de l'âme (inédit) Acad. Ms. 50
Br. Mus. Ms. 209
- 6) Arnould de Bonneval, Du paradis de l'âme PL 180, 1515--
- 7) Guillaume de St-Thierry, De la nature du corps et de l'âme PL 180, 695--
- 8) Ste. Hildegarde, Livre des oeuvres de Dieu PL 197, 742--

This does not include others of St. Bernard and Richard of St. Victor which treat less explicitly of the soul.

5. DSA 9 PL 40, 784; cf. also c. 34, 803; c. 49, 815.

6. DSA 31 PL 40, 800-1.

7. DSA 44 PL 40, 812; cf. also c. 34, 804; c. 54, 819.

8. DSA 14 PL 40, 791.

9. DSA 11 PL 40, 786. In defining the ascent of the soul towards God by this "interior" method, Alcher reveals his dependence on that traditional movement which stemmed from St. Augustine. Describing the method as used by the saint, Wilson writes: "Il y a donc dans l'homme quelque chose qui passe l'homme... C'est précisément ce que nous nommons Dieu... de quelques manières qu'on le nomme, on entend toujours désigner cette réalité divine qui est la vie de notre vie, plus intérieure à nous-même que ne l'est notre propre intérieur. C'est pourquoi toutes les voies augustiniennes vers Dieu suivent des itinéraires analogues, de l'extérieur à l'intérieur et de l'intérieur au supérieur" A. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Âge, p. 129

10. Cf. DSA 14 PL 40, 791: "sed quia bona exteriora diu stare non possunt, iussus est homo ab exterioribus ad interiora ascendere. Tantae siquidem dignitatis est humana conditio, ut nullum bonum praeter summum ei sufficere possit... Nihil enim ad beatam vitam praestantius videtur, quam velut clausis carnalibus sensibus extra carnem mundumque affectum quempiam intra semetipsum converti, silentiumque affectum a mortalium cupiditatibus sibi soli et Deo loqui."

11. DSA 45 PL 40, 813; also c. 46, 813.

12. DSA 40 PL 40, 809.

13. DSA 42 PL 40, 811; also c. 14, 790.

14. DSA 48 PL 40, 814-5.

15. Cf. DSA 46, PL 40, 812-3: "Deus omnipotens cujus beatitudo nec augeri potest, quia perfecta est; nec minui, quia aeterna est, sola charitate, nulla sui necessitate rationales spiritus erexit, ut eos suae beatitudinis participes faceret..."

16. DSA 42 PL 40, 811.

17. Cf. DSA 18 PL 40, 793: "Nihil invisibile et incorporeum natura credendum est praeter solum Deum id est Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, qui ex se incorporeus et invisibilis dicitur quia infinitus et incircumscriptus, simplex et sibi omnibus modis sufficiens, se ipsum sustinet et idipsum. Et cum ubique sit in semetipso invisibilis incorporeus esse dignoscitur."

18. Ibid.

19. DSA 39 PL 40, 809.

20. Cf. DSA 48 PL 40, 814: "Postquam vero seductio serpentis per Adam cecidit, naturae bonum perdidit, pariter vigorem arbitrii; non tamen electionem,... Manet itaque...arbitrii libertas id est rationalis voluntas." Given the characterization of the indestructibility of the image as opposed to the mutability of the likeness in man as one of the fundamental notes of St. Bernard's doctrine. "Le point central de la doctrine de saint Bernard, c'est que l'image de Dieu en nous ne peut se perdre; c'est pourquoi l'homme reste l'homme, après comme avant la faute...mais la ressemblance de Dieu en nous peut se perdre; c'est pourquoi, en perdant les vertus dont Dieu l'avait doué pour lier ses déliérations, son choix et ses actions au jugement de sa raison, l'homme a perdu sa ressemblance divine," in Dieu la Théologie de St. Bernard, p. 68. Dechanet, too, finds the same

The first part of the lecture was devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the atom. The speaker emphasized the importance of the wave-mechanical approach, which has led to a more complete understanding of the atomic structure than the classical theory.

The second part of the lecture was devoted to a discussion of the experimental methods used to determine the structure of the atom.

The third part of the lecture was devoted to a discussion of the theoretical methods used to calculate the structure of the atom.

The fourth part of the lecture was devoted to a discussion of the results of the calculations and the comparison of the theoretical results with the experimental results.

The fifth part of the lecture was devoted to a discussion of the applications of the theory of the structure of the atom.

The speaker concluded the lecture by emphasizing the importance of the wave-mechanical approach and the need for further research in this field. He also mentioned some of the problems that are still open in the theory of the structure of the atom.

The lecture was very interesting and informative, and it was a pleasure to attend it.

The speaker's presentation was clear and concise, and he was able to explain the complex concepts of the theory of the structure of the atom in a way that was easy to understand. His use of diagrams and equations helped to illustrate the points he was making, and his discussion of the experimental and theoretical methods used to determine the structure of the atom was very thorough.

The lecture was a very good example of how to present a complex topic in a clear and concise manner.

The speaker's presentation was very well organized, and it was easy to follow the flow of the lecture.

The speaker's presentation was very well organized, and it was easy to follow the flow of the lecture. He began with a brief review of the classical theory of the structure of the atom, and then he introduced the wave-mechanical approach. He then discussed the experimental methods used to determine the structure of the atom, and he compared the theoretical results with the experimental results. Finally, he discussed the applications of the theory of the structure of the atom and the need for further research in this field.

distinction is the difference which William of Saint-Thierry places between the image and the likeness. Describing William's teaching, he claims: "L'image est dans la nature, mais son épanouissement, son actualisation parfaite, dépend de notre libre arbitre. La ressemblance est volontaire... L'image est propre à tout homme, quels que puissent être ses mérites ou démérites, et une similitude-participée, qui n'est la part que des parfaits, ou tout au moins de ceux qui sont sur la voie de la perfection." J.M. Dechanet, *O.S.B. op. cit.*, p. 254. It is not difficult, then, to trace the line of Lecher's doctrine here through the teachings of his monastic predecessors.

21. DSA 48 PL 40, 814.

22. DSA 39 PL 40, 809.

23. Ibid.

24. DSA 35 PL 40, 806.

25. DSA 48 PL 40, 814.

26. DSA 1 PL 40, 781; also c. 9, 783.

27. DSA 40 PL 40, 809.

28. Cf. DSA 54 PL 40, 820: "...propter nimiam charitatem suam quam nos dilexit (Iesus) misit filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati ut nos salvaret; misit etiam spiritum sanctum quo nos adeptaret in filios..."

29. DSA 16 PL 40, 792.

30. DSA 39 PL 40, 809; also c. 17, 792: "Perieram, et ad mortalem descendit, mortalitatem suscepit, passionem sustinuit, mortem vicit; et sic me restauravit. Perieram et abieram; quoniam in peccatis meis eram venundatus; venit ille post me ut redimeret me... Nomine etiam suo vocavit me, ut memoriale suum semper esset apud me."

31. DSA 35 PL 40, 806.

32. DSA 54 PL 40, 819.

33. Cf. DSA 48 PL 40, 815: "Anima a Creatore principium habens, ex quo est, perfecta est in genere suo; unde ex quo est, scilicet omnia quae ab homine spiri possunt, nisi gravitas carnis esset. Quod per primum hominem, qui ante corruptionem humanitatis, ex quo fuit, perfecte habuit scientiam humanam, probari potest. Sed modo corrupta humanitate, ex quo conjungitur corruptioni, corrumpitur."

34. DSA 51 PL 40, 817.
35. Cf. DSA 50 PL 40, 816: "Sed multo meliores sunt, qui huius scientiae (naturalis) proponunt noscere semetipsos ... Praeposuit enim scientiam scientiae, id est scire se ipsum..."
36. DSA 44 PL 40, 812.
37. DSA 34 PL 40, 819.
38. DSA 2 PL 40, 781.
39. DSA 3 PL 40, 781; also c. 49, 815 et al.
40. Cf. DSA 49 PL 40, 815: "Non est tertius in hominis substantia spiritus...sed spiritus ipsa est anima quae vel pro spirituali, vel pro eo quod spirat in corpore spiritus appellatur... Tertium vero, qui ab Apostolo cum anima et corpore inducitur spiritum gratiam sancti spiritus intelligamus..."
41. Cf. DSA 9 PL 40, 784; c. 42, 811, c. 48, 814-5.
42. DSA 1 PL 40, 781.
43. DSA 2 PL 40, 781.
44. DSA 9 PL 40, 785.
45. DSA 34 PL 40, 803.
46. DSA 32 PL 40, 802; also c. 61, 825.
47. DSA 34, PL 40, 803.
48. Cf. DSA 3 PL 40, 781: "...anima vero rationale suum tenet sine carne;" also c. 34, 803: "Cum autem anima in se agit se, ex se et per se, sola mens alio vellet..."
49. DSA 48 PL 40, 815.
50. Cf. supra, note 19.
51. DSA 34 PL 40, 803.
52. Cf. DSA 41 PL 40, 810; also c. 14, 789-90.
53. DSA 14 PL 40, 789-90.
54. Cf. supra, note 40.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace for the year 1880.

- John A. Smith
- John B. Jones
- John C. Brown

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace for the year 1880.

- John D. White
- John E. Black
- John F. Green
- John G. Hall
- John H. King

- John I. Lee
- John J. Scott

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace for the year 1880.

- John K. Adams
- John L. Baker
- John M. Carter

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace for the year 1880.

35. DSA 9 PL 40, 784; also c. 43, 814.

36. DSA 41 PL 40, 810.

37. DSA 14 PL 40, 789.

38. DSA 41 PL 40, 810.

39. DSA 40 PL 40, 809.

40. DSA 43 PL 40, 811-812.

41. DSA 31 PL 40, 800.

42. DSA 14 PL 40, 791; also c. 31, 800.

43. DSA 54 PL 40, 819.

44. DSA 12 PL 40, 788.

45. DSA 32 PL 40, 802.

46. The many points of resemblance between Aicher's description of the composition of the human body and that of William of St. Thierry as found in the De Natura Corporis 91-101AR (PL 180, 695-708) might at first suggest a direct dependence. According to Dechaenot, however, these various ideas were common property during the Middle Ages; so that Aicher may be merely noting the then current notions of the physicians. Referring to William's sources, he writes: "Les théories d'Empédocle sur les 'Éléments,' d'Hippocrate sur les 'Humeurs'... sont des lieux communs de la médecine et de la physiologie antiques. Pareillement, l'attribution aux 'organes fondamentaux' - le cerveau, le cœur, le foie - des trois vertus ou esprits qui président à la vie du corps; la localisation dans telle partie de la boîte crânienne, de la génération, de la mémoire ou des énergies motrices; le rôle étrange attribué à la respiration d'être un simple tempérant du foyer cardiaque, etc., etc. Ces données biologiques des premiers penseurs de la Grèce - philosophes, médecins, poètes, hommes d'État tout à la fois - ont connu dans l'Antiquité, le Moyen Âge et bien au-delà, un succès qui nous étonne. On les rencontre un peu partout, dans les traités de physique tant religieux que profanes..." Cf. J.-M. Dechaenot, O.S.B., op. cit., p. 60.

47. Cf. supra, chapter 1, p. 25.

48. DSA 33 PL 40, 802; also c. 44, 812.

49. DSA 15 PL 40, 791.

70. DSA 34 PL 40, 803.

71. DSA 61 PL 40, 823.

72. DSA 15 PL 40, 791.

73. DSA 25 PL 40, 798.

74. In spite of the fact that this seems to be the logical place to treat of the vital forces by which the body is maintained in a state of harmony as to its activity, we have preferred to discuss these powers in detail elsewhere in our analysis. They are primarily powers of the soul, belonging to the body only as an instrument of the soul. Therefore, they will be treated where we think the author intended to locate them, namely under the heading of the activities of the soul, its powers and faculties. see infra, chapter 3, section III, C, b, pp. 43-46.

75. Cf. DSA 20-22 PL 40, 794-5, where a detailed description of each of the three powers will be found.

76. DSA 22 PL 40, 795.

77. DSA 4 PL 40, 782; also c. 34, 803.

78. DSA 36 PL 40, 807.

79. DSA 34 PL 40, 803.

80. DSA 52 PL 40, 802: "Intendit se etiam anima in tactum, et eo calida et frigida, aspera et lenia, dura et mollis, gravis et levis sentire atque discernit, levis innumerabiles differentias asperarum, coarum, sonorum atque ferarum, gustando, olfaciendo, audiendo, videndoque dijudicat."

81. DSA 22 PL 40, 795.

82. Ibid.

83. Cf. supra note 75.

84. DSA 32 PL 40, 802.

85. DSA 36 PL 40, 806-7; also c. 18, 793.

86. DSA 1 PL 40, 781.

87. Cf. DSA 45 PL 40, 813; also s. 40, 813: "...Cumque tamen rationalis creaturae licet similis videatur origo, facta est diversa conditio, pars etiam tertiae terrenae unita corporibus locum nullum sortita cognoscitur."

88. Cf. DSA 2 PL 40, 781.

89. DSA 35 PL 40, 805.

90. DSA 20 PL 40, 794.

91. DSA 35 PL 40, 805.

92. DSA 15 PL 40, 791; also c. 30, 800.

93. DSA 14 PL 40, 790.

94. DSA 17 PL 40, 792.

95. DSA 38 PL 40, 808.

96. DSA 2 PL 40, 781.

97. Ibid.

98. It is well to note here again the traditional Augustinian method which Alesher consistently pursues in his search for the nature of the soul: a passing, by means of the interior progression, from the exterior to the interior, from the visible to the invisible.

99. DSA 24 PL 40, 796.

100. DSA 40 PL 40, 809; also c. 24, 796; c. 2, 781.

101. DSA 18 PL 40, 793.

102. Cf. DSA 40 PL 40, 809.

103. DSA 24 PL 40, 796; also c. 8, 784.

104. DSA 48 PL 40, 814.

105. DSA 41 PL 40, 810.

106. Cf. DSA 1 PL 40, 781; c. 2, 781; c. 8, 784; c. 12, 783; c. 56, 821; et passim.

107. Cf. DSA 24 PL 40, 796: "Anima est substantia spiritalis... impassibilis et indivisibilis, sine pondere, figura et colore..."

108. DSA 24 PL 40, 796.

109. DSA 15 PL 40, 791-2.

110. DSA 16 PL 40, 792.

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111. Cf. DSA 13 PL 40, 793: "ratione insignita est anima, qua artibus docetur oratione et disciplina instruitur eximie, et divina sapiat, et humana tractet, atque sic cetera animalia decenter excellat, utpote substantia rationalis. Nec est enim proprie anima, substantia scilicet rationalis, id est, spiritus rationalis."

112. DSA 9 PL 40, 785.

113. Cf. DSA 43 PL 40, 811: "Lex corpore et anima consistit homo; et quicquid oculis corporeis videtur, propter corpus factum est, corpus propter animam; anima autem propter Deum. Vita corporis anima est, vita animas Deus est."

114. DSA 15 PL 40, 792.

115. Cf. DSA 43 PL 40, 811: "Et ideo in morte vita nostra non perit, sed corpus destituit, dum discedens anima vim suam non perdit..."

116. Cf. DSA 8 PL 40, 784: "...aliquatenus immortalis, quoniam sensus, quo et post hanc vitam vel bene vel male vit,mittere non potest; non quod pre actis ante carnem gentis moraretur ut in carne includeretur, ut quidam velarent..." The author is seen here to reject the doctrine of pre-existence as advocated by Plato, certain of the Platonists and Origen, as an explanation of the soul's immortality.

117. DSA 13 PL 40, 782.

118. DSA 8 PL 40, 784.

118a. Cf. DSA 18 PL 40, 793: "Anima tamen nihil de morte habere potest nisi per vitia ei propinatum fuerit..."

119. Ibid.; also c. 8, 784.

120. DSA 43 PL 40, 812.

121. DSA 43 PL 40, 821.

122. DSA 18 PL 40, 793.

123. DSA 35 PL 40, 805.

124. DSA 18 PL 40, 793.

125. Cf. DSA 35 PL 40, 805: "Sic anima in suo corpore ubique tota viget, vivificans, movens et gubernans. Nec enim in majoribus corporis sui partibus major est, et in minoribus minor; sed in minimis tota est, et in maximis tota."

The following information was obtained from the records of the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, on the
subject of the land owned by the United States in the
State of California, and the same is hereby published for the
information of the public.

1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890

The following information was obtained from the records of the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, on the
subject of the land owned by the United States in the
State of California, and the same is hereby published for the
information of the public.

1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901

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1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912

1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923

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1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934

1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956

1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

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State of California, and the same is hereby published for the
information of the public.

126. DSA 19 PL 40, 794.
127. Cf. DSA 13 PL 40, 789: "...nec per partes dividitur, cum simplex sit et individua."
128. Cf. ibid: "Deus est omnia sua et anima quaedam sua... Habet accidentalia et ipsa non est..."
129. DSA 46 PL 40, 813-4; cf. also c. 4, 782, c. 48, 814.
130. DSA 19 PL 40, 794.
131. DSA 61 PL 40, 825; cf. also c. 34, 803.
132. Cf. supra chapter 1, p. 6.
133. See supra note 131.
134. DSA 13 PL 40, 789.
135. Ibid.
136. DSA 13 PL 40, 788.
137. DSA 4 PL 40, 782.
138. DSA 13 PL 40, 789.
139. DSA 4 PL 40, 782.
140. DSA 13 PL 40, 789.
141. DSA 6 PL 40, 783; also c. 7, 784.
142. Cf. ibid: "Anima ad similitudinem totius sapientiae facta, omnium in se gerit similitudinem; unde a philosopho definita est omnium similitudo..." The reference is, of course, to Aristotle's De Anima III, 8 (431b).
143. DSA 19 PL 40, 794: "Potest namque ex parte cogitare et ex parte diligere," among the several other places where Aicher signalizes these two as the proper activities of the soul.
144. DSA 7 PL 40, 784.
145. Cf. DSA 4 PL 40, 782: "quinque enim progressibus rationalitas exercetur ad sapientiam, et quatuor affectibus ad charitatem..."
146. DSA 13 PL 40, 789.

147. Ibid.

148. Cf. supra chapter 3, pp. 114-115 where the vital intension as the manner in which the soul is present in the members of the body is described.

149. DSA 20 PL 40, 794; cf. also c. 21-23, 795 for a detailed account of the purpose and functioning of each of these three powers.

150. Cf. ibid. "Istae vires habent omnia animalia; et ideo corporis esse videntur, non animae."

151. DSA 10 PL 40, 785; also c. 21, 794; c. 33, 802.

152. DSA 22 PL 40, 794.

153. DSA 33 PL 40, 802.

154. Cf. DSA 22 PL 40, 795: "Istae vires (sensus et motus) tam animae quam corporis dici possunt; quia ab anima in corpore fiunt, nec sine utroque fieri possunt."

155. Ibid.

156. Cf. DSA 18 PL 40, 793: "Hoc enim proprie est animae, substantia scilicet rationalis, id est spiritus rationalis."

157. DSA 19 PL 40, 794.

158. DSA 7 PL 40, 784.

159. DSA 13 PL 40, 789.

160. Cf. DSA 48 PL 40, 815: "Unde Virgilius: 'quantum non nexia corpora tardant' Et licet aliae sint actiones corporis, et aliae animae; tamen corporis vitia vel virtutes possunt esse animae."

161. Cf. DSA 4 PL 40, 781: "Cognoscit siquidem Deum supra se, et in se, et angelum juxta se et quiddam coeli ambitu continetur infra se."

162. DSA 2 PL 40, 781.

163. Cf. DSA 24 PL 40, 797.

164. Cf. ibid.

165. Ibid.

166. DSA 4 PL 40, 782. The reading obediendum in the work of Aicher is obviously a mis-reading of odendum in Isaac's Epistola de anima PL 194, 1078, which we have substituted here.

167. Ibid.

168. Ibid.

169. DSA 34 PL 40, 803.

170. Ibid.

171. Cf. DSA 11 PL 40, 786: "Mens enim ex eo dicta est quod eminent in anima; praestantior aliquidem vis animae est, a qua procedit intelligentia."

172. DSA 12 PL 40, 788.

173. Cf. DSA 32 PL 40, 801: "Mens ergo cui nihil se ipsa praesentius est, quidem interiori, non simulata, sed vera praesentis, videt se in se... non cognoscit se vivere, se meminisse, se intelligere, se velle, cogitare, scire, judicare..."

174. Cf. DSA 34 PL 40, 804.

175. Cf. DSA 11 PL 40, 786.

176. DSA 4 PL 40, 782.

177. DSA 11 PL 40, 787.

178. Cf. DSA 12 PL 40, 788: "...quoniam justum fuit ut brutis animalibus, quibus nil dandum erat in intellectu, aliquid amplius daretur in sensu. Et e contrario tanto major necessitas indicitur homini exercendae rationis, quanto majorem defectum patitur sensualitas."

179. DSA 33 PL 40, 802.

180. DSA 11 PL 40, 787.

181. Cf. DSA 12 PL 40, 788.

182. Cf. DSA 11 PL 40, 786: "Per intelligentiam utique ipsam veritatem intelligit, per sapientiam diligit. Sapientia namque est amor boni sive sapor boni, a sapore aliquidem dicitur. Mentis visio est intelligentia; gustus, sapientia est. illa contemplatur, ista delectatur."

183. DSA 7 PL 40, 784.

THE FIRST OF THE YEAR WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL ONE. THE REVENUE WAS \$100,000.00. THE EXPENSES WERE \$80,000.00. THE PROFIT WAS \$20,000.00.

1900

1900

1900

1900

THE SECOND OF THE YEAR WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL ONE. THE REVENUE WAS \$120,000.00. THE EXPENSES WERE \$90,000.00. THE PROFIT WAS \$30,000.00.

1900

THE THIRD OF THE YEAR WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL ONE. THE REVENUE WAS \$140,000.00. THE EXPENSES WERE \$100,000.00. THE PROFIT WAS \$40,000.00.

1900

1900

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THE FOURTH OF THE YEAR WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL ONE. THE REVENUE WAS \$160,000.00. THE EXPENSES WERE \$110,000.00. THE PROFIT WAS \$50,000.00.

1900

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THE FIFTH OF THE YEAR WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL ONE. THE REVENUE WAS \$180,000.00. THE EXPENSES WERE \$120,000.00. THE PROFIT WAS \$60,000.00.

1900

184. DSA 11 PL 40, 786; also c. 10, 786.
185. DSA 35 PL 40, 805.
186. DSA 14 PL 40, 790; also c. 45, 813.
187. Ibid.
188. Cf. DSA 35 PL 40, 805.
189. Cf. Ibid.
190. DSA 40 PL 40, 809.
191. DSA 10 PL 40, 786.
192. DSA 9 PL 40, 785.
193. Cf. DSA 48 PL 40, 814: "Anima a Creatore principium habens, ex quo est, perfecta est in genere suo; unde ex quo est, sciret omnia quae ab homine scire possunt, nisi gravitas carnis esset. quod per primum hominem, qui ante corruptionem humanitatis, ex quo fuit, perfecta habuit scientiam humanam, probari potest."
194. DSA 48 PL 40, 814.
195. DSA 40 PL 40, 809.
196. Cf. DSA 9 PL 40, 785.
197. DSA 40 PL 40, 809.
198. DSA 48 PL 40, 814.
199. Cf. DSA 16 PL 40, 792: "Per charitatem enim venit Deus ad hominem, venit in homines, factus est homo,..." also c. 17, 792: "Perieram, et ad mortalem descendit, mortalitatem suscepit, passionem sustinuit, mortem vicit; et sic me restauravit; perieram et abieram; quoniam in peccatis meis eram venundatus, venit ille post me et redimeret me."
200. Cf. DSA 54 PL 40, 820: "Hanc charitatem et hanc trinitatem Deus Pater nobis manifestavit, cum propter nimiam charitatem suam qua nos dilexit, misit Filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati ut nos salvaret; misit etiam Spiritum Sanctum qui nos adoptaret in filios;" cf. also c. 6, 783-4.
201. DSA 35 PL 40, 806.
202. DSA 41 PL 40, 810.

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203. DSA 42 PL 40, 811.

204. DSA 32 PL 40, 802.

205. DSA 37 PL 40, 807-8.

206. Cf. DSA 52 PL 40, 817: "...ut possimus ascendere ad nos. Tres siquidem ascensus sunt. In primo ascendimus ab istis exterioribus et inferioribus ad nos... In secundo ascendimus ad cor altum; quanto namque amplius proficimus, tanto amplius ascendimus... In tertio ascensu ascendimus ad Deum."

207. Cf. DSA 53 PL 40, 818.

208. DSA 52 PL 40, 817-18.

209. Cf. DSA 54 PL 40, 819.

210. DSA 57 PL 40, 822; also c. 14, 791.

211. DSA 61 PL 40, 825.

212. Cf. ibid.

213. DSA 65 PL 40, 829-830.

214. ibid.

215. ibid.

216. DSA 56 PL 40, 821-2.

217. DSA 61 PL 40, 826.

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CHAPTER 4

1. Cf. Dea Tractatio, PL 40, 781: "...idcirco reddam me tibi, ino Deo meo, cui maxime me debeo, et videbo quid sit animus, et quae patria ejus." What Gilson says of St. Augustine's use of the term 'animus' is true of Aicher also; "...animus n'a pas d'autre sens que anima," cf. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin, p. 33, n. 1.

2. Cf. Dea 32 PL 40, 790; c. 43, 811: "...ex corpore et anima constat homo; et quidquid oculis corporeis videtur, propter corpus factum est; corpus propter animam; anima autem propter Deum. Vita corporis anima est, vita animae Deus est."

3. Cf. Soliloquia I, 2, 7, PL 32, 872: "Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino," and with the same directness, loc. cit., I, 13, 27 (833): "Anima te certe discis et Deum velle cognoscere? Hoc est latum negotium meum. Nihilne amplius? Nihil prorsus."

4. Solil. II, 1, 1, PL 32, 885: "Deus semper idem, noverim me, noverim te. Cratum est."

5. A.C. Pegis, 'In Defense of St. Augustine,' Essays in Modern Scholasticism (Westminster, Maryland, 1941), p.106.

6. Cf. E. Ferras, La psychologie de saint Augustin (Paris, 1907), p. 41: "Augustin n'a composé un traité spécial de psychologie...mais il a répandu dans tous ses ouvrages une foule de vues fines et élevées sur la nature humaine toutes les fois qu'il a senti le besoin d'y chercher la raison dernière de quelques grande vérité morale ou religieuses. C'est, en effet, un des caractères de la psychologie de ce père d'être souvent mêlée à sa théologie et à sa morale, et d'y être profondément engagée..." Such the same idea is later expressed by A.D. O'Connor, The Concept of the Human Soul according to St. Augustine (Washington, Cath. Univ. Press, 1921), p. 25.

7. Cf. supra, chapter 1, p. 24.

8. Cf. Isaac of Stella, Anistola de anima, PL 194, 1975: "Vis anima a nobis edoceri de anima sed magis id quod in divinis litteris didicimus...sed de ejus essentia et viribus, quomodo sit in corpore, vel quomodo exeat vel cacteris quae non scimus..."

9. Cf. Dea 34 PL 40, 803, where Aicher explains that the several names by which the soul can be signified is a result of the multiplicity of its moral powers and

their functions: "pro efficientia tamem causarum, diversa nomina anima sortita est." Cf. chapter 3, p. 142.

10. De Genesi ad litteram VII, 21, 40; PL 34, 386. A useful note on the Augustinian terminology has been given by E. Gilson, op. cit. p. 63, n. 1. Less studied accounts appear also in S.V. D'Avoy, S.J., 'The Philosophy of St. Augustine,' A Monument to St. Augustine (London, 1930), p. 171 and S.V. O'Connor, op. cit. pp. 30-39.

11. DSA 9 PL 40, 784; also c. 34, 804.

12. DSA 12 PL 40, 788.

13. Cf. De Trinitate XII, 9, 13; PL 42, 1005, which is the direct source of Alcher's citation, as may be seen from comparing the texts: "unde incipit aliquid occurrere, quod non sit nobis commune cum hostis, inde incipit ratio."

14. DSA 1 PL 40, 781.

15. De Anima II, 1 (412a). For information respecting the differences in the Aristotelian and Platonic definitions of the human soul on a background here, see E. Gilson, 'Une raisonnée chez Albert le Grand,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A. XIV (1943-45), pp. 5-72.

16. DSA 9 PL 40, 764.

17. DSA 32 PL 40, 801.

18. DSA 24 PL 40, 796.

19. Cf. DSA 36 PL 40, 806-7.

20. Cf. chapter 4, pp. 199-203.

21. DSA 12 PL 40, 788.

22. Cf. DSA 38 PL 40, 809.

23. Cf. DSA 45 PL 40, 813; also c. 46, 815.

24. DSA 15 PL 40, 792.

25. Cf. DSA 47 PL 40, 814: "Humanus animus quasi in medio collectus quodam conditionis esse excellentia, et huius instabilitati quae deorsum est supereminet, et ad illam quae est apud deum, veram instabilitatem necesse pertingit." The nature of the relations he further specifies in c. 51, col. 401: "ut secundum naturam suam (anima) vivat et ordinari appetat sub illo a quo regi debet, et supra ea regere debet."

26. Cf. De quantitate animae 10, 22; PL 32, 1048: "Nam videtur nihil animae est substantia quaedam rationalis particeps, regendo corporis secundum se," which is the exact formula of Alcher's definition, cf. supra, note 14. An analysis of this definition of Augustine's has been made by M. Ferraz, op. cit., pp. 71-74 and again by S.J. O'Connor, op. cit., pp. 40-43.

27. Cf. Anarratio in Isaias CXLV PL 37, 1386: "Natura animae praestantior est quam natura corporis, excellit multum, res spiritualis est, res incorporea est, vicina est substantiae Dei. Invisibile quidam est, regit corpus, movet membra, dirigit sensus, praeparat cogitationes, exercit actiones, capit rerum infinitarum imagines." Cf. also Epistola CXXXVII, 3, 11, PL 33, 517: "Nam si anima in sua natura non fallatur, incorpoream esse comprehendit;" Anima et eius Origenes IV, 17, PL 44, 539: "procul dubio tamen spiritualis est, non corporalis." The position of those who hold the human soul to be a body is examined by St. Augustine in De Trinitate I, 10, 16, PL 42, 961-2; also in De Civitate Dei VIII, 5, PL 41, 230; et al.

28. Cf. E. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin, pp. 55-56.

29. Cf. Quarr. in Psalm. CXLV, PL 37, 1387: "(Anima) natura supra se Conditorum, infra se quod sub illa conditum est; in medio quodam loco rationalis anima constituta...habere superioris, regere inferiorum, nisi regetur a meliore."

30. Cf. M. Ferraz, op. cit., pp. 72-73: Referring to the Augustinian definition wherein the soul is called reasonable and at the same time capable of ruling the body, he writes: "Cette définition a, selon nous, une autre portée; c'est de contenir en germe la psychologie de saint Augustin tout entière; car toutes les grandes fonctions de l'âme se ramènent, d'après lui, à la connaissance et à l'amour, et il n'y a que deux espèces d'amour et de connaissance: l'amour et la connaissance du corporel... (et) du divin. Cette définition, déjà remarquable à tant d'autres titres, l'est encore en ceci, qu'elle est la psychologie de saint Augustin en abrégé, comme sa psychologie est cette même définition développée."

31. Cf. supra note 25 which may be compared here with its source in St. Augustine, De Trin., I, 5, 7, PL 42, 977: "Credo ut se ipsam cogitet, et secundum naturam suam vivat, id est, ut secundum naturam suam ordinari appetat sub eo scilicet cui subienda est, supra ea quibus praepo- nenda est; sub illo a quo regi debet; supra ea quae regere debet."

32. DSA 3 PL 40, 781; also c. 49, 815.
33. Cf. DSA 15 PL 40, 791, also c. 42, 811.
34. DSA 41 PL 40, 810.
35. DSA 32 PL 40, 802.
36. DSA 14 PL 40, 790.
37. DSA 31 PL 40, 800.
38. DSA 48 PL 40, 814; also c. 9, 784.
39. DSA 14 PL 40, 789-90.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. De Civ. Dei XXI, 10, PL 41, 725.
43. Cf. Confessiones 1, 7, 9, PL 32, 783: "Ecce corpus et anima in me mihi praesente sunt; unum exterius, et alterum interius... Homo interior novit haec per exterioris ministerium; ego interior cognovi haec, ego animus per consensus corporis mei." Compare with this Alcher's notion, ibid. 54 PL 40, 819: "Duplex est natura hominis. una interior, quae est ipse homo, quoniam mens unius cujusque est ipse; altera exterior, id est, corpus."
44. De Trin. XV, 7, 11, PL 42, 1065.
45. De Trin. III, 2, 8, PL 42, 871.
46. Cf. De Civ. Dei 1, 13, PL 41, 27: "Haec (corpora) enim non ad ornamentum vel adiutorium, quod adhibetur extrinsecus, sed ad ipsum naturam hominis pertinent."
47. Epist. CXXVII, 3, 11, PL 33, 520.
48. De Anima et ejus Origine IV, 2, 3, PL 44, 525; also De Civ. Dei I, 13, 14, PL 41, 208: "Corpus vero animae cohaerere, ut homo totus et plenus sit, natura nostra ipse teste cognoscimus."
49. De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae 1, 27, 32, PL 32, 1532.
50. Cf. E. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age, p. 128: "Lorsqu'il parle simplement en chrétien, Augustin prend soin de rappeler que l'homme est l'unité de l'âme et du corps;

dès qu'il philosophe, il retombe dans la définition de Platon. Bien plus, il retient cette définition avec les conséquences logiques qu'elle comporte, dont la principale est la transcendence hiérarchique de l'âme sur le corps." There is a certain contrast here in the reasons which are offered for Augustine's use of this definition. V.F. O'Connor sees in this "decidedly Platonic notion of man" only the influence of the Saint's new contacts with the philosophic works of the neo-Platonists; he holds further that the formula was discarded subsequently in favour of the more Christian definition found in the De Trinitate; cf. op. cit., p. 44. Régis, on the contrary, points out that in his later definition, Augustine "is not saying anything which he had earlier denied, nor have his interests changed. Without denying that man is the composite of soul and body, he is, as ever, seeking what is best in man, - and this at the very moment when he cites these rather neutral philosophical definitions of man." In the light of a distinction which Régis makes and which seems to be of fundamental importance for the understanding of Augustine, "the Augustinian definition of man undertakes to answer the question not what is man, but how in man ordered and governed." Cf. A.C. Régis, 'The Mind of St. Augustine,' Mediaeval Studies VI (1944), p. 40. Therefore, it was not necessary, as O'Connor suggested, that "the early formula be cast aside in later years," because even when Augustine became a Christian, he did not cease to be thereby a Platonist. The two definitions in question reveal Augustine speaking first, as a philosopher, and then, as a Christian, as Gilson has indicated in the passage quoted.

31. Cf. De Moribus Eccl. Cath., I, 27, 52; PL 32, 1332: "Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est mortali atque terreno utens corpore;" De Trin. IV, 7, 11, PL 42, 1065: "Homo est enim, sicut veteres definierunt, animal rationale, mortale;" In Joannis Evangelium, XII, 6, 15, PL 35, 1553: "Quid est homo? Anima rationalis habens corpus" where the unity of man is being stressed for the Saint continues: "Anima habens corpus non facit duas personas sed unum nomen." Cf. A.C. Régis, art. cit., pp. 39-41 where the question is treated thoroughly.

32. Ibid.; cf. also E. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude du saint Augustin, p. 55, n. 3 where the author indicates that the definition in question was proposed by St. Augustine in answer to a wholly different question, namely, one's duties to one's neighbour's temporal welfare. The writer says: "Cette définition de l'homme (anima rationalis est mortali atque terreno utens corpore), où l'accent est mis avec tant d'insistance sur la transcendence hiérarchique de l'âme à l'égard du corps, s'explique par les tendances profondes de l'augustinisme... Ce qui l'intéresse, c'est le problème moral du souverain bien... c'est pour cela que dans la

définition de l'homme la supériorité de l'âme sur le corps doit être mise en relief."

53. Cf. A. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60: "Comment d'ailleurs une substance intelligible peut être unie à un corps matériel pour l'animer, c'est aux yeux d'Augustin un profond mystère... on chercherait donc vainement dans les traités augustiniens qui se rapportent à l'âme la solution de cette énigme."

54. DSA 2 PL 40, 781.

55. DSA 18 PL 40, 793; also c. 36, 806-7.

56. DSA 24 PL 40, 796.

57. Cf. DSA 18 PL 40, 793.

58. Ibid., 794.

59. DSA 20 PL 40, 794.

60. DSA 19 PL 40, 794.

61. DSA 35 PL 40, 805.

62. DSA 15 PL 40, 791.

63. Cf. DSA 22 PL 40, 795: "Tres naves sunt ventriculi cerebri, unus anterior, a quo omnis sensus; alter posterior, a quo omnis motus; tertius inter utrumque medius, id est, rationalis."

64. Cf. Ibid.: "In prima parte cerebri vis animalis vocatur phantastica, id est imaginaria; quia in ea corporaliū rerum similitudines et imagines continentur, unde et phantasticum dicitur. In media parte cerebri vocatur rationalis; quia ibi examinat et iudicat ea quae per imaginationem representantur. In ultima parte vocatur memorialis; quia ibi commendat memoriae quae a ratione sunt iudicata."

65. Cf. DSA 33 PL 40, 802; cf. also chapter 3, p. 129.

66. Cf. DSA 4 PL 40, 782: "Sensus vero unus est in anima, et quod ipsum, et sum corpus non sit, corporeus dicitur, quia...corporeis constituitur instrumentis; unde et ob instrumentorum quinquem partitus dicitur..." also c. 34, 802: "Habet etiam corpus quinque sensus, qui ex se dicti sunt quia per eos anima totum corpus subtilissimum agili vigore sentiendi;" also c. 33, 802.

67. DSA 38 PL 40, 808.

68. Cf. De Gen. ad Litt. VII, 18, PL 34, 364: "Ideo tres tanquam ventriculi cerebri demonstrantur; unus, anterior ad faciem, a quo sensus omnis; alter, posterior, ad cervicem, a quo motus omnis; tertius, inter utrumque, in quo memoriam vigere demonstrant."

69. Cf. ibid.: "Sed anima in istis tanquam in organis agit, nihil horum est ipsa; sed vivificat et regit omnia et per haec corpori consulit et huic vitam in quo factus est homo in animum vivam."

70. Epist. CLVI, 11, 4, PL 33, 722; also De Sant. An. 32, 69, PL 32, 1073: "non spatio loci ac temporis vi ac potentia;" De Immortalitate Animae 16, 25, PL 32, 1034.

71. Cf. De Gen. ad Litt. VII, 18, 21, PL 34, 364 where the saint treats the question of the action of the soul in and on the body through the medium of fire and air, the two elements which are most like to the nature of the soul itself and which, therefore, become remote instruments of the soul's activity in the body. This has, consequently, a direct bearing on the question of sensation. Cf. A. Ferraz, op. cit., pp. 117-124 where the author describes exactly the manner of Augustine's sensation and the principles which he invokes to maintain the supremacy of the soul; A.O. Regis, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

72. DSA 32 PL 40, 802; also c. 14, 791.

73. DSA 38 PL 40, 808.

74. Cf. DSA 13 PL 40, 789: "Potentiae namque ejus et vires idem sunt quod ipsa;" also c. 34, 803: "In essentia namque est simplex, in officiis multiplex;" c. 4, 782: "et haec omnia in anima nihil aliud sunt, quam ipsa, aliae et aliae inter se proprietates propter varia exercitia, sed una essentia rationis, et una anima."

75. DSA 32 PL 40, 802.

76. De Musica VI, 5, 9 PL 32, 1168.

77. Op. cit. VI, 5, 10 PL 32, 1169.

78. Ibid.

79. Op. cit. VI, 5, 12 PL 32, 1170.

80. Cf. A.O. Regis, "The Mind of St. Augustine," Medieval Studies VI (1944), pp. 42-43.

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81. Cf. A.C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century, pp. 147-169.

82. DSA 11 PL 40, 787.

83. DSA 32 PL 40, 802.

84. DSA 33 PL 40, 803.

85. DSA 11 PL 49, 787.

86. Ibid.

87. Cf. E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennien,' Arch. d'Hist. Sect. et Litt. du S.A., IV (1929), p. 63, where the author describes a universal hierarchy of forms ranging from the highest intelligence down through the lowest of the elements as characteristic of the avicennian cosmos.

88. Cf. F. Vansteenberghe, Aristote en Occident, pp. 16-17; also E. Gilson, art. cit., pp. 64-72.

89. DSA 11 PL 40, 787. The text as given in Migne appears to be faulty here; the reading recipiens is less intelligible than respiciens which is to be found in Hugh of St. Victor, apparently Acher's source for the passage; cf. PL 177, 556.

90. Avicenna, Liber VI Naturalium I, 3 (ed. Venice, 1808), fol. 5v: "Anima humana est una substantia habens compositionem ad duo; quorum unum est supra eam et alterum infra eam, sed secundum unumquodque istorum habet vim per quam ordinatur habitus qui est inter ipsam et illud; haec autem virtus activa est illa virtus qua habet anima propter debitum quod debet ei quod infra est eam, scilicet corpus ad regendum aliquid. Sed virtus contemplativa est illa virtus qua habet anima propter debitum quod debet ei quod est supra ipsam ut patiatur ab eo et perficiat per illud et recipiat ex illo tanquam anima nostra habet duas facies, faciem scilicet deorsum ad corpus quem oportet nullatenus recipere aliquam affectionem generis debili naturae corporis. Et aliam faciem sursum versus principia altissima quam oportet semper recipere aliquid ab eo; quod est illis et affici ab illo; ex eo autem quod est infra eam generantur mores; sed ex eo quod est supra eam generantur sapientiam; et haec est virtus activa, sed virtus contemplativa est virtus quae solet inferri a forma universali nuda a materia."

91. De Trinitate XII, 3, 3 PL 42, 999.

92. Op. cit., XII, 4, 4 PL 42, 1000

93. Op. cit., XII, 12, 19 PL 42, 1003.

94. Op. cit., XII, 3, 3 PL 42, 1000.

95. Op. cit., XII, 2, 2 PL 42, 999

96. Op. cit., XII, 13, 21 PL 42, 1009.

97. Op. cit., XII, 7, 10-12 PL 42, 1004-5.

98. Op. cit., XII, 13, 21 PL 42, 1009: "sed ut quid-
quid in usu temporalium rationabiliter facimus, aeternorum
adipiscendorum contemplatione faciamus, per ista transeun-
tes, illis inherentes;" cf. also 15, 25 (1012) and 14, 22
(1009); Contra Faustum Manichaeum XII, 52-53 PL 42, 432-3
where the contemplative and active lives are figured in the
persons of the biblical Rachel and Lia, signifying the roles
of wisdom and science respectively.

99. Op. cit., XII, 15, 25 PL 42, 1012.

100. Op. cit., XII, 14, 22 PL 42, 1010.

101. Op. cit.; also XIV, 1, 3 (1037).

102. Cf. A.C. Regis, 'The Mind of St. Augustine,'
Medieval Studies VI (1944), p. 47: "The study of man in St.
Augustine thus turns out to be a study in the ordering of
the active and contemplative life... In this sense the dis-
tinction between wisdom and science is not to be taken as
distinction between two bodies of abstract truths. On the
contrary, far from being a distinction between Plato and
Aristotle, it is really a distinction between Mary and Mar-
tha."

103. Cf. supra chapter 4, pp. 221-222.

104. It must be remembered that the notion of the
human body for Aleher presupposes always the presence of an
animating principle, the soul, because it is only by means
of the latter that the body is quickened so as to become a
living body of a man; cf. DSA 36 PL 40, 807; c. 41, 810 etc.

105. DSA 34 PL 40, 803.

106. DSA 35 PL 40, 805.

107. DSA 36 PL 40, 807; also c. 49, 815.

108. DSA 65 PL 40, 830.

109. Cf. supra chapter 4, note 43.
110. De Trinitate XII, 1, 1 PL 42, 997; 1, 3, 999.
111. DSA 6 PL 40, 783: "Anima ad similitudinem totius sapientiae facta, omnium in se gerit similitudinem; unde et a philosopho definita est omnium similitudo;" cf. Aristotle, De Anima III, 8 (431b).
112. DSA 4 PL 40, 782; also c. 13, 789.
113. DSA 11 PL 40, 787.
114. Cf. DSA 12 PL 40, 787: "Intellectus et intelligentia iuvantur superius."
115. DSA 37 PL 40, 808.
116. Cf. DSA 43 PL 40, 815.
117. Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalion II, 17, ed. O.A. Luttmer (Washington, 1939), p. 38: "Logica consideratio est in rebus, attendens intellectus rerum, sive per intelligentiam, ut neque sint haec neque horum similitudines, sive per rationem, ut non sint haec sed horum tamen similitudines." A similar distinction appears in Gundissalinus, De Anima c. 10, ed. J.T. Muckle, C.S.B., Mediaeval Studies II (1940), pp. 98-99.
118. Cf. B. Geyer, op. cit., p. 137.
119. Commentarii in Aristotelis de Interpretatione (seconda editio), II, 3, PL 64, 433.
120. Cf. M.D. Chenu, O.P., 'Notes de lexicographie philosophique: "Disciplina",' Rev. de Th. et Ph., XXV (1936), pp. 691-92.
121. De Consecratione Philosophiae V, pr. 4, ed. Guil. Weinberger (Leipzig, 1931), ibid. 47, p. 117.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Op. cit., V, pr. 5, ed. cit., p. 120.
125. DSA 59 PL 40, 824; cf. also c. 47, 814.
126. DSA 14 PL 40, 791.
127. Ibid.

128. ISA 11 PL 40, 766.
129. Cf. ISA 9 PL 40, 763-764.
130. ISA 14 PL 40, 789.
131. Cf. ISA 12 PL 40, 788: "Et sicut solem non videt oculus nisi lumine solis; sic verum ac divinum lumen non poterit intelligentia videre nisi in ipsius lumine. Domine, inquit propheta, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen."
132. ISA 35 PL 40, 804; also c. 14, 791; 54, 819.
133. ISA 7 PL 40, 784.
134. De Trinitate XII, 2, 2 PL 42, 999
135. E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A. IV (1929), p. 107.
136. Cf. R. DeVaux, Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin aux confins des XII et XIII siècles (Bibliothèque Thomiste, Paris, 1934), p. 141: "...le De Anima où un exposé authentique de la psychologie avicennienne se couronne d'une théorie mystique de la connaissance, inspirée de source chrétienne."
137. Cf. E. Gilson, art. cit., p. 79: "C'est précisément ce que semble avoir voulu faire Dominicus Gundissalinus, dans la médiocre compilation qu'il nous a laissée sur la nature de l'âme et qui, malgré son indéniable pauvreté, n'en a pas moins exercé une influence certaine sur la suite de la philosophie médiévale." For further reference, see loc. cit., pp. 91-92 and G. Théry, O.P., Toledo, Grande ville de la Renaissance médiévale (Paris, 1944), p. 83.
138. Cf. E. Gilson, 'Pourquoi St. Thomas a critiqué St. Augustin,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A., I (1936), pp. 90 and 103. DeVaux, however, indicates his preference for the term "l'avicennisme latin;" cf. op. cit., pp. 9-13 against which Gilson directs further remarks in his introduction to Father Muckle's edition of the De Anima of Gundissalinus; cf. Mediaeval Studies 11 (1940), pp. 23-24.
139. Cf. G. Théry, O.P., op. cit., pp. 8-13; also A.G. Palencia, El Arzobispo Don Raimundo de Toledo (Barcelona, 1942), p. 142; G. Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science II (Baltimore, 1931), p. 174.

140. Cf. M. Bedoret, S.J., 'Les premières versions latines de philosophie: œuvres d'origine,' Rev. néoschol. de phil. VII (1933), p. 375; also G. Théry, O.P., op. cit., pp. 85-86.

141. Cf. A. Gilson in his introductory notice to 'The Treatise De Anima of Dominicus Gundissalinus,' ed. J.T. Noonan, O.S.A., Medieval Studies, II (1940), p. 25; also another work of the same author, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennais,' Arch. d'hist. phil. et litt. du M.A. IV (1939), p. 80: "Au vrai, c'est une œuvre de compilation avec prépondérance marquée des matériaux d'origine avicennienne;" and C. Baumbach, 'Dominicus Gundissalinus als philosophischer Schriftsteller,' Beiträge... XV, 1-2 (1927), pp. 267-268.

142. A. DeVaux, op. cit., p. 144

143. op. cit., pp. 143-144. Previous mention of St. Albert's reference to the same John is to be found in the article of Baumbach, already cited, p. 268, where the author is careful to indicate the incomplete manner in which St. Albert makes his citations.

144. Ibid.

145. G. Théry, O.P., op. cit., p. 87.

146. DeVaux's work was published in 1934; after a lapse of at least ten years, that of Father Théry appeared, bearing, as date of publication, 1944.

147. Cf. P.B. Gams, Series Episcoporum Ecclesiae Catholicae (Leipzig, 1931), p. 81; also V. de la Puente, Biblioteca Histórica de España III-IV (Madrid, 1873), p. 486. The only reference beyond these two simple statements of the historical fact that John was bishop and occupied the episcopal see at Toledo is found in a quotation of Father Bedoret S.J., op. cit., p. 395: "C'était (Jean), affirme Gams, un homme de grand esprit, doué de toutes les qualités d'un parfait supérieur." For this reference, the source indicated in Gams is Die Birkengeschichte von Spanien III, p. 37; this work was not readily available, but it does not appear to be essential to any of the arguments, in any case.

148. G. Théry, O.P., op. cit., p. 147.

149. Ibid. also p. 149.

150. G. Théry, op. cit., p. 91.

151. Cf. loc. cit., p. 147.

The first of these is the fact that the
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THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF EXPANSION

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 has been based on the principle of
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152. It is interesting to note what looks like a rather curious triangular development respecting the influences at work on the author of the De Anima. DeVaux sees in Gundissalinus not a case of 'augustinisme avicennisant,' but rather a case of 'avicennisme latin' simply (op. cit., p. 146). Gilson, on the other hand, conceived it as a grafting of arabian philosophy onto a tradition which had stemmed from St. Augustine and was, in a very definite sense, augustinian; thus, his 'augustinisme avicennisant' (Archives..., IV, p. 85). In supporting his thesis, he indicates that there are numerous formulae copied from various Christian authors, who are all in the line of the augustinian tradition; the doctrine can hardly be qualified as 'avicennisme' purely, he concludes. And indicating several significant insertions, drawn from St. Augustine, Gilson says: "Is it too much to suppose that the one who cites these latter words in that precise place, remembers that in the text which he cites it is God who illumines? Is it, in truth, to attribute to him some intention which he never had, to suppose that Saint Augustine is here inserted, not without reason, into Avicenna? At this very point are we not, on the contrary, witnessing the grafting of Augustinianism on the trunk of Avicenna?" (Introduction to De Anima, ed. J.T. Buckle, Med. Studies II, 1940, p. 26). Whereupon, Father Thery, whose work shows a rather close adherence to DeVaux's opinions on several issues, introduces John, bishop of Toledo at whose hands the author claims the doctrine of Avicenna underwent its christianizing without his fully intending it (op. cit., p. 91), in which there seems to be some suggestion of an echo, however slight, of Gilson's remarks immediately preceding this. Be that as it may. We do think, for all that, that Gilson's comments on the insertion of the several glosses to the text of Avicenna are significant, not only for the point he is there making, but also for our present purpose, utatis mutandis, of course. Cf. L. Gilson, Introduction to 'The Treatise De Anima of Dominicus Gundissalinus,' Medieval Studies II (1940), pp. 25-27.

153. L. Gilson, 'Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A. I (1926), p. 46.

154. C. Basunker, op. cit., p. 268, has drawn up a list of some eighteen parallel passages between the Long Vitae and the De Anima.

155. Cf. Avicenna, Liber VI Naturalium, ed. Venice, 1508, fols. 36v-37r; fol. 33r-v.

156. De Anima c. 10, ed. cit., p. 94, ll. 25-26: "Nastat ergo...ut discere non sit nisi perquirere perfectam aptitudinem coniungendi se intelligentiae agentis..."

157. S. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennaisant,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A. IV (1929), p. 85.

158. Cf. S. Gilson, 'Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A., I, (1926), pp. 47-48.

159. Cf. op. cit., pp. 110-127.

160. Gilson has placed the literary activity of Gundissalinus as being probably during the episcopate of Raymond (about 1126 and 1150; cf. Archives... IV, p. 86, n. 1). Father Thérý, more recently, from certain documented evidence that Gundissalinus was still alive in 1181, believes that the period of the Gundissalinian works can be considerably extended: "Entre 1150 et 1181, il y a 31 ans, pendant lesquels Gundissalvi aura certainement continué ses travaux." (Cf. Tolède..., p. 131). He places the composition of the De Anima by John between 1151 and 1166: "L'un de Tractatus de anima composé entre 1151 et 1166..." (loc. cit., p. 147). This dating coincides with the composition of the De Anima which we have given above (cf. chapter I, p. 28).

161. Cf. DSA c. 11 PL 40, 787 and Isaac of Stella, Epistola de Anima, PL 194, 1184.

162. Cf. DSA c. 11-12 PL 40, 787-788 and Isaac's Epistola de Anima, PL 194, 1183-4.

163. Cf. DSA c. 14 PL 40, 769-90 and Isaac's Epistola de Anima, PL 194, 1181-2. Here we must make an observation on the different interpretations of the authors in respect of the nature of the intermediary placed between the intelligible and the sensible in the De Anima. Describing the functioning of the rational soul in the act of knowing a sensible object, Gilson writes that, according to the De Anima, the soul can only apprehend the sensible through the intermediary of a middle term which is equally distant from the soul, on the one hand, and from the object, on the other. This middle term is precisely the spiritus in which the two extremes of the spirituality of the soul and corporality of the sensible object are joined (cf. Archives... IV, p. 87). Father Thérý, on the contrary, adopting DeVaux's reading of the manuscript as sensus - which is, on DeVaux's admission, a personal conjecture (DeVaux, op. cit., p. 108 where he gives the actual reading as spiritus) - sees in Gilson's description what he calls a "grave erreur d'interprétation (qui) vient de ce que dans les manuscrits nous lisons véritablement spiritus, alors qu'il faut lire comme l'a fait l'éditeur (DeVaux) sensus" (Tolède... p. 82). According to Fr. Luckle, there is no given variant in the manu-

scripts; rather pointedly, he notes: "all mas. spiritu" (ed. cit., p. 97, note 1). Isaac's De Anima and, therefore, Aboher's DJA too, seem to be not out of keeping with the first interpretation, since the emphasis is in the direction of elevating the sensible to a higher level of the spiritual (cf. DJA c. 14 PL 40, 789-90).

164. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 86, n. 1; also G. Théry, op. cit., p. 147, who, however, attributes the work to John, as we have seen.

165. Cf. the article of J. Rohmer, 'Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de l'âme,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A. II (1927), pp. 73-77, which has been cited above.

166. De Anima c. 10; ed. cit., p. 86.

167. Cf. Liber VI Naturalium I, 5; ed. Venice, 1508, fol. 5v.

168. DJA 11 PL 40, 787.

169. On this question of the insertion of scientiae into the text of Avicenna as an indication of a certain leaning towards an Augustinian tradition, cf. J. Rohmer, art. cit., p. 77: "En attribuant à l'intellect pratique les sciences, c'est-à-dire la connaissance du sensible, il interprète la distinction d'Avicenne en vertu d'une doctrine qui veut... que l'âme tout entière, avec ses deux facultés de connaître et de vouloir, se tourne tantôt vers le haut, tantôt vers le bas. Mais quel que soit finalement le départ exact des sources arabes dans les traités de Gundissalinus, on ne peut qu'être étonné de l'étrange parenté de ces doctrines avec la distinction augustinienne." And is not the step from more to prudential and easy one for Aboher?

170. DJA 11 PL 40, 786.

171. Cf. Cassiodorus, De Anima I, 7; PL 70, 1282.

172. Cf. De Anima, c. 10; ed. cit., p. 102.

173. DJA 12 PL 40, 788.

174. Cf. Isaac of Stella, Anistola de Anima, PL 194, 1888.

175. Cf. De Anima c. 10; ed. cit., p. 99.

176. Ibid., n. 199; cf. also R. Devaux, op. cit., p. 172, n. 1.

177. R. DeVaux, op. cit., p. 172, n. 3.

178. Cf. De Anima c. 10; ed. cit., p. 100, ll. 8-20.

179. DSA 11 PL 40, 786. For the relation between the ideas expressed both here and, especially, in the work of Gundissalinus, see immediately above, with the doctrine of St. Bernard, some of whose characteristic expressions are even repeated in the De Anima, cf. DeVaux, op. cit., p. 172, n. 4, as well as E. Gilson, Archives, IV, pp. 90-92: "Nous n'osons affirmer que saint Bernard soit ici la source de Gundissalinus, bien que les dates autorisent l'hypothèse; une source commune pourrait expliquer aussi bien cette coïncidence; si elle existe, elle nous est inconnue. Tout le passage s'accorderait bien avec la mystique de saint Bernard." Here the intelligentia marks the transition between the avicennian intellect and the beatific vision (cf. ibid., p. 91).

180. De Anima c. 10, ed. cit., p. 99, ll. 1-3.

181. DSA 37 PL 40, 808.

182. Cf. J.F. Muckle, C.S.B., op. cit., p. 99, n. 4.

183. Ibid., p. 101, ll. 14-23. The conjectured reading of mundique affectus which DeVaux offers (op. cit., p. 172, l. 27) is less good and has no manuscriptural authorization; rather Muckle's reading mundumque electum is also that of the Latin translation of Rufinus (CSEL, XXXVI, I, p. 11).

184. DSA 14 PL 40, 791.

185. Cf. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio, II, 7 PG 35, 413, for the original source of the passage. The Latin translation offered in Migne, however, differs from that of Rufinus, which seems to be much closer to our texts. See Apologeticus I (CSEL, XXXVI, I, p. 11).

186. G. Théry, O.P., op. cit., p. 147: "Jean, archevêque de Tolède...fait preuve de connaissances toutes nouvelles; il utilise certaines sources connues déjà du cistercien Isaac de Stella...et d'un autre cistercien, Alcher de Clairvaux... A maintes reprises, il utilise S. Bernard... Ces sources directement cisterciennes ou communes aux cisterciens du XIIe siècle, nous font penser à propos du Tractatus de Anima, à un autre cistercien, connaissant la littérature de son ordre et ayant les mêmes tendances augustinienne que ses confrères."

187. Ibid., p. 29: "Mais ces sources, pourquoi ne seraient-elles point connues à Tolède? ...les écrivains de

Toledo are not point confined in the knowledge of the philosophical works of Aristotle and of his commentators. Quel qu'il soit, l'auteur de De Anima...utilise saint Augustin... on y connaît aussi saint Bernard. Que Scot Erigène ait été connu à Tolède...cela est digne de remarque, mais ne constitue nullement un empêchement prohibant pour l'origine tolédane d'un écrit." And later on, Father Théry suggests that the citations from Erigena in the twelfth century, at Toledo, point in the direction of a cistercian influence, inasmuch as the cistercians used frequent citations from Erigena, but anonymously; they were then instrumental in effecting the influence of Erigena in that period. Cf. Ibid., p. 149; also P. Jaquin, 'L'influence doctrinale de S. Scot au début du XIII^e siècle,' Rev. des Sc. Ph. et Th. IV (1910), pp. 104-106.

188. Cf. E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'Augustinisme avicennisant,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A. IV (1929), pp. 90-92, n. 2; also DeVaux, op. cit., p. 172, n. 2 and n. 1.

189. In his article describing Toledo as a centre of intellectual activity in the twelfth century, already alluded to several times, Father Théry seems to favour the possibility of a two-way, reversible influence among the cistercians of France and those of Spain in this period.

190. We use the term in the characteristic mediaeval meaning as given by Father Chenu; see his 'Authenticité et spiritualité - Deux lieux théologiques aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles,' Divus Thomas XXVIII (1935), p. 271: "L'opinion de l'auteur est authentique, on pourrait dire, et on disait dans le haut moyen-âge 'canonique.' quelques textes de St. Thomas...confirment ce sens du mot, exprimant la valeur, la qualité, le crédit et non pas, comme dans la langue moderne, l'origine gémme, d'un ouvrage..."

191. Cf. G. Théry, S.P., 'L'authenticité du De Spiritu et Anima dans S. Thomas et Albert le Grand,' Rev. des Sc. Ph. et Th. X (1921), pp. 373-377; Cf. also St. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles I, p. 483.

192. We have already indicated the frequent invocation of the PSA as a genuine work of Saint Augustine by the theologians of the thirteenth century; cf. PSA, chapter 1, pp. 7-14.

193. De spiritualibus creaturis, c. 11, ad St. Augustinum disputans III, ed. Leithellieux, p. 80.

194. Cf. II Sententiarum, D. 24, 1, 3, 1 concl., ed. Quarachi, II, p. 500: "Et si tu dicas quod ille liber non

est Augustini, per hoc non evaditor, quia hoc ipsum in libro de Trinitate dicit (Augustinus)..."

195. On condition of accepting the relationship we have suggested between the DA and the de Anima of Gundissalinus, Gilson's observations become proportionately applicable here: "...la critique de l'augustinisme médiéval par saint Thomas supposait l'existence d'une école dont la doctrine combinait, selon des doses variables, l'influence dominante de saint Augustin au néoplatonisme d'Avicenne; la situation de fait devant laquelle saint Thomas s'est trouvé a donc en partie son origine dans la modeste compilation de Gundissalinus. Si l'on accorde l'existence d'une série de théologiens qui, plus ou moins profondément, se sont prêtés à l'influence philosophique d'Avicenne..." Cf. E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennien,' Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt. du M.A., IV (1939) p. 103.

196. Summa Theologiae I, q. 77, a. 8, ad 1; ed. Ottawa, I, p. 471.

197. For the list of those thirteenth century theologians whose doctrines have shown developments of the original Augustinian themes in various directions, cf. E. Gilson, 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,' Archivum... (I, pp. 49-110). It will be noticed, in addition, that some of their Augustinianism is derived from the DA which they quote ad libitum. Moreover, by way of confirming the position of the DA as marking a transition between Arabian and Christian thought, we call attention to what we think is a significant passage in Kohmer's article; cf. J. Kohmer, op. cit., Archivum... II, pp. 73-77. Having remarked on the distinction of superior and inferior reason of which St. Bonaventure makes use, the author continues: "Il n'est peut-être pas sans intérêt de relever les antécédents de cette doctrine. La distinction augustinienne de la raison supérieure et de la raison inférieure semble avoir joué dans l'enseignement franciscain d'un prestige général, accrû du fait qu'elle s'accordait à merveille avec les doctrines similaires de l'aristotélisme arabe. Nous en trouvons des traces dans la Summa de Anima de Jean de la Rochelle, qui donne la distinction de la raison supérieure et de la raison inférieure attribuée à saint Augustin, à côté d'une autre qu'il appelle la distinction de 'la double face de l'âme,' mais dont il n'indique pas la provenance. Voici nos textes..." Now, the first of the two texts which the author goes on to cite is taken directly from the DA (c. 11 PL 40, 707), while the second, which strongly resembles the doctrine developed by Gundissalinus in his de immortalitate animae, has, in the opinion of the author, been very probably derived from the liber VI naturalium of

Avicenna. Here, then, in the work of a thirteenth century theologian, the PLA can take its place side by side with good arabian doctrine! And the author's final conclusion is à propos: "Mais quel que soit finalement le départ exact des sources arabes dans les traités de Gundissalinus, on ne peut qu'être étonné de l'étrange parenté de ces doctrines avec la distinction augustinienne..." The wide use of the PLA at the hands of the same John of Acchella has been mentioned above: supra, chapter 1, pp. 10-11.

198. E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A., IV (1929), p. 107.

199. Cf. G. Théry, O.P., 'L'augustinisme médiéval et l'unité de la forme substantielle,' Acta hebdomadae augustiniano-Thomisticae (Rome, 1931), p. 157, indicates that the PLA was one of the main channels through which the theologians acquired their augustinian doctrine. On the question of the unity of the substantial form, Alexander of Hales had made an important contribution by introducing a text which was then attributed to St. Augustine. Referring to the text in question, the author states - and it is this statement which of relevance for our purpose - "Ce texte que Pierre Lombard n'avait pas inséré dans ses sentences pouvait arriver à un théologien du XIIIe siècle par deux voies différentes: ... et par le liber de spiritu et anima ..." The text is found in this latter in c. 48 PL 40, 814.

200. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 107 where the writer underlines the basic distinction in the illumination of St. Augustine and that of Avicenna, the neglect of which led to the confusion which St. Thomas was to re-order: "Ces saint Augustin, la doctrine de l'illumination porte sur la vérité des jugements et non sur le contenu des concepts. Avicenne, au contraire, apportait aux hommes du moyen-âge une doctrine de l'illumination où ce sont les formes intelligibles, donc les concepts, qui sont conférés du dehors à l'intellect humain..." and the confusion of the two grew more founded until, "jusqu'à ce que l'analyse thomiste, dissociant de nouveau ces deux problèmes, vienne restituer à la Vérité divine sa fonction illuminatrice et réserver à l'intellect humain la fonction d'abstraction." Cf. also E. Gilson, 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,' Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A., I (1936), pp. 110-111.

201. The following section, which summarizes the criticism that St. Thomas offered against the avicennized augustinism of the early thirteenth century, is largely dependent on the authority of Professor Gilson whose reputation as a scholar of mediaeval thought is so solidly established. The ideas he expresses in his article, 'Pourquoi

saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin, *Archives...* I, pp. 8-127, have been the source of much of the argument here. Our task has been the additional task of indicating the place of the DSA within this avicennian-augustinian movement.

202. Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 110: "rien n'est dès lors mieux défini que la doctrine des maîtres (qui fait de Dieu notre intellect agent) auxquels s'opposera saint Thomas...; ce sont des théologiens, qui, sous l'influence d'Avicenne, empruntent la terminologie d'Aristote pour formuler la théorie augustinienne de l'illumination. Cette coïncidence entre l'enseignement de la philosophie pure et celui du plus savant des pères de l'Eglise confèrerait à leur doctrine l'évidence absolue que ces docteurs lui reconnaissent, mais elle liait le sort de l'illumination augustinienne à celui de la philosophie d'Avicenne et d'Alfarabi. Dans la mesure exact où Guillaume d'Auvergne et ses partisans réussissaient à démontrer que notre âme n'a qu'un intellect possible et que l'intellect agent séparé d'Avicenne et d'Aristote ne peut être que le Dieu de saint Augustin, ils établissaient du même coup que l'illumination augustinienne impliquait Dieu dans les opérations de notre âme. Fait d'une importance capitale pour l'histoire des idées au XIII^e siècle si, comme tout porte à le croire, la préoccupation de lutter contre l'influence des doctrines arabes fut une des causes déterminantes de la réforme thomiste." Cf. also *supra*, note 200.

203. Cf. DSA II PL 40, 787: "Ratio est ea vis animae, quae rerum corporearum naturas, formas, differentias, propria et accidentia percipit, omnia incorporea, sed non extra corpora, nisi rationes subsistentia. abstracta a corporibus, quae fundantur in corporibus, non actione, sed consideratione..."

204. Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45, where the weakness of Avicenna's position on the question of abstraction is a consideration is described according to the mind of St. Thomas: "La doctrine d'Avicenne n'est autre chose qu'un platonisme, mais un platonisme inconséquent... parce que les substances séparées, étant essentiellement immuables, doivent continuellement illuminer nos âmes et faire resplendir sur elles de la manière même, la science des choses... Platon n'a pas commis l'erreur d'admettre que le rôle du sensible consiste à disposer l'âme en vue de recevoir l'intelligible, car, en droit, l'âme recevrait perpétuellement. Il a donc supposé que les idées avaient primitivement causé dans notre âme la science de tous les connaissables, et que le sensible excitait simplement l'intellect à considérer des connaissances qu'il possédait déjà... Tout, dans le platonisme, vient à l'âme du

denore, mais tout lui a été donné en une fois; l'hypothèse invraisemblable d'une âme qui se tournerait vers les choses sensibles pour mieux se prêter à l'action des substances intelligibles est donc une erreur qu'Avicenne ajoute à celle de Platon, mais dans laquelle Platon lui-même n'est pas tombé."

205. DSA 7 PL 40, 784.

206. Cf. Quatre contre Gentilon II, 12, 2 (ed. Leonina Manualis, Rome, 1934), p. 100.

207. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 111. He describes the directions in which these theologians tended: "Pour la première école, Dieu ne peut être dit notre intellect agent qu'au sens improprie; pour la seconde, Dieu seul peut être au sens propre notre intellect agent. Pour St. Thomas, les deux écoles se valent et leurs solutions du problème de la connaissance reviennent finalement au même, parce qu'il est contradictoire d'attribuer à l'homme l'intellect agent que lui reconnaît Aristote, si l'on veut lui conserver en même temps l'illumination divine que nous accorde saint Augustin." Elsewhere, the same author suggests the apparent continuity in this augustinian tradition in such wise that Roger Bacon finally draws the conclusion which is already implicit in the earlier doctrine of William of Auvergne; cf. 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennien,' Arch. d'Hist. doct. et litt. du M.A. IV (1929), p. 105.

208. Cf. op. cit., p. 120; see supra, note 207.

209. Cf. op. cit., p. 126; also E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes...', loc. cit.

210. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 100: "La possibilité de cette synthèse repose sur le néoplatonisme dont les deux traditions s'inspirent en commun. Chez Avicenne comme chez saint Augustin, toute connaissance de l'intellect suppose une action de la lumière divine; bien que cette action ne s'exerce pas de la même manière selon les deux philosophes, ils s'accordent à considérer l'intelligible humain comme reçu d'en haut."

211. For interpreting the relations between St. Thomas and St. Augustine here, the essential text, according to Professor Gilson, is that to be found in the De spiritualibus creaturis, c. 10, ed 2, where the celebrated statement of the origin of Augustine's philosophy is found: "Augustinus autem Platonem secutus quantum fides catholica patiebatur," in contradistinction to his own (Thomas') Aristotelian tendencies. Cf. Gilson, 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,' Archives (1930), p. 119, n. 1; p. 125, n. 4.

212. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 120-121: "...qui a effectué...le passage de l'augustinisme avicennien à la nouvelle conception de l'homme? ... C'est saint Thomas, et lui seul; nous n'avons en effet pas rencontré d'autre philosophe, avant lui, pour enseigner que l'intellect agent créé soit la raison suffisante de la connaissance humaine, toute spéciale illumination divine étant écartée ..." Cf. supra, note 202.

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